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Abstract
Analysts predict billions of everyday objects will soon become “smart” after design-
ers add wireless communication capabilities. Collectively known as the Internet
of Things (IoT), these newly communication-enabled devices are envisioned to
collect and share data among themselves, with new devices entering and exiting
a particular environment frequently. People and the devices they wear or carry
may soon encounter dozens, possibly hundreds, of devices each day. Many of these
devices will be encountered for the first time. Additionally, some of the information
the devices share may have privacy or security implications. Furthermore, many
of these devices will have limited or non-existent user interfaces, making manual
configuration cumbersome. This situation suggests that devices that have never
met, nor shared a secret, but that are in the same physical area, must have a way to
securely communicate that requires minimal manual intervention. In this disserta-
tion we present novel approaches to solve these short-range communication issues.
Our techniques are simple to use, secure, and consistent with user intent.
We first present a technique called Wanda that uses radio strength as a commu-
nication channel to securely impart information onto nearby devices. We focus on
using Wanda to introduce new devices into an environment, but Wanda could be
used to impart any type of information onto wireless devices, regardless of device
i
type or manufacturer.
Next we describe SNAP, a method for a single-antenna wireless device to
determine when it is in close physical proximity to another wireless device. Because
radio waves are invisible, a user may believe transmissions are coming from a
nearby device when in fact the transmissions are coming from a distant adversary
attempting to trick the user into accepting a malicious payload. Our approach
significantly raises the bar for an adversary attempting such a trick.
Finally, we present a solution called JamFi that exploits MIMO antennas and
the Inverse-Square Law to securely transfer data between nearby devices while
denying more distant adversaries the ability to recover the data. We find JamFi is
able to facilitate reliable and secure communication between two devices in close
physical proximity, even though they have never met nor shared a key.
ii
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1
Introduction
The concept of the Internet of Things (IoT) has garnered a great deal of press
lately, with suggestions that billions of everyday objects will soon become “smart”
after product designers add wireless communication capabilities to items that
were previously not networked [94]. The dream is that networks of these newly
connection-enabled devices will give us greater insight into the behavior of complex
systems than previously possible. The reality, however, is that the arrival of billions
of devices could quickly turn the IoT dream into a nightmare if these new devices
are deployed with insecure configurations or are operated without secure com-
munication between devices. In this dissertation we present novel approaches to
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short-range communications that are simple to use, secure, and consistent with user
intent. Our techniques can be used to impart information such as configuration pa-
rameters onto nearby devices and can also be used to ensure secure communications
between physically proximate devices.
Before detailing our contributions, we make the following observations about
the impending arrival of billions of IoT devices:
• many devices already have IoT connectivity (and billions more are expected);
• devices may handle sensitive information;
• securing sensitive information will be difficult;
• insecure IoT devices are dangerous; and
• existing security methods are inadequate.
1.1 Many devices already have IoT connectivity
As they are typically envisioned, IoT devices are low-powered devices that have
one or more sensors or actuators, have limited computational capabilities and user
interfaces (UI’s), and have short-range radios such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, or Zigbee.
A simple use case is that these IoT devices will be physically placed in areas of
interest, will monitor aspects of the environment using their sensors, then will use
their radio to communicate measurements to one or more distant data repositories
for aggregation and analysis. In more complex scenarios, multiple devices may
work together to influence an outcome. For example, a blood-glucose monitor may
work with an insulin pump to maintain a diabetic patient’s sugar levels in a desired
range [101].
Devices are already shipping with IoT-type connectivity. The market research
firm Berg Insight estimates that 5.9 billion products were sold worldwide in 2014
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that contained embedded microprocessors and 4.8 billion of those devices had some
form of embedded connectivity [12]. Gartner, another market research firm, builds
on this growing connectivity theme and projects the IoT market will grow to 26
billion devices in the next few years [78]. Others have projected as many as 100
billion IoT devices will be in service by 2025 [102]. While these estimates vary
widely, they point to same conclusion – there will be a lot more connected devices
in the near future than there are today. If these forecasts are even close to accurate,
then there will soon be more than four connected devices for every person on Earth.
Berg Insight goes on to predict that devices that already have some compu-
tational capabilities but currently lack communications gear will be the first to be
augmented with short-range Wi-Fi, Bluetooth or Zibgee radios, but by 2020 the
majority of new IoT devices will be devices that have historically had no computa-
tional capabilities whatsoever. For example, several commercial companies and re-
searchers are adding computing and connectivity to previously non-computational
items such as shirts [54], shoes [25], and jewelry [53]. Connecting these previously
non-computational devices to the Internet raises security and privacy concerns if
the devices, the networks they connect to, or the data repositories where they store
data are misconfigured or contain vulnerabilities.
1.2 Devices may handle sensitive information
As IoT devices become ubiquitous, they will likely collect and share sensitive
information that may impact a user’s security or privacy.
1.2.1 Security
Sometimes IoT devices are envisioned to work together to not only monitor a situa-
tion, but also to influence an outcome. For example, as noted above, a blood-glucose
3
monitor may work with an insulin pump to maintain a diabetic patient’s blood-
sugar level in a desired range [101]. In this case the blood-glucose monitor would
analyze the patient’s glucose levels and instruct the insulin pump to discharge a
bolus of insulin when necessary. The data exchanged between devices must be
secure for patient safety. An adversary that breaks the communication security
between the two devices may be able to command a release of dangerous levels of
insulin, possibly harming or killing the patient [32].
1.2.2 Privacy
In addition to causing physical harm, IoT networks present numerous privacy
risks [98]. For example, as Rose et al. note, if a user’s refrigerator reports the foods
eaten and a fitness tracker reports activity data, the combination of these data
streams paint a much more detailed and private description of the person’s overall
health [102]. This data aggregation effect can be particularly powerful with respect
to IoT devices because many devices produce additional metadata like time stamps
and geolocation information. This metadata adds even more specificity about the
user and the user may not want that information revealed. In some cases the user
may not even be aware the food eaten and activity level data were aggregated and
shared.
Sayles et al. highlight another privacy risk with potentially profound conse-
quences. They found HIV-positive patients fear of stigma after disclosure of their
condition often led patients to avoid medical services and medications [105]. In this
case, if a medical device were to leak private information about an HIV patient’s
condition, the patient may avoid needed therapy.
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1.3 Securing sensitive information will be difficult
Researchers and the popular press have already pointed out that securing billions
of devices of devices will be difficult by calling attention to the coming “Inter-
net of Risky Things" [66, 80, 107, 116]. These authors point out instances where,
even with today’s relatively limited numbers of IoT devices, items ranging from
automobiles [48] to baby monitors [42] have been compromised by adversaries
exploiting incorrect configurations, insecure communications between devices, or
other security vulnerabilities. To avoid these compromises devices must be properly
initially configured, must be managed so that they stay secure, and must securely
communicate with unfamiliar devices.
1.3.1 Initially configuring devices
In many cases IoT devices will not know ahead of time where they will be placed
nor the devices with which they will need to communicate. This suggests the
devices will need to be individually configured for their local environment at or
near deployment time. For example, if a new device must connect with a local
Wi-Fi access point (AP), the device must be configured with the particular AP’s
network name (e.g., SSID) and password. Configuring devices to make these
connections has historically been difficult, especially for users who are not tech-
savvy [16, 29, 49, 50, 75, 128]. We provide techniques to impart information such as
the access point’s SSID and password onto new devices. Our methods are fast, easy,
secure, and consistent with user intent.
1.3.2 Managing devices
After devices are configured they must be actively managed to remain operational
in changing environments. For example, sometimes network access credentials
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change, such as when a Wi-Fi AP’s password is changed. In that case, all the devices
using that password for connectivity must be updated to the current password or
the devices will go offline.
While there are other steps required to keep devices operational, such as
applying security patches and software updates, in this thesis we are primarily
concerned with keeping devices current with the proper configuration information.
Like with initial configuration, a solution that would allow users to quickly and
consistently manage device configuration would be useful. Our techniques provide
a consistent way to impart updated information onto wireless devices, regardless
of device type or manufacturer.
1.3.3 Communicating with unfamiliar devices
If billions of wireless devices are deployed, people and the devices they wear
or carry may encounter dozens, possibly hundreds, of other devices each day.
Sometimes these devices will need to securely communicate. In this thesis we
adopt the approach advocated by Balfanz et al. where we consider demonstrative
identification and location-limited channels [10]. Unlike many existing approaches, we
do not require pre-authentication between devices.
Demonstrative identification
Demonstrative identification means that a user takes action to identify the specific
device with which they intend to interact. The idea is that user does more than
simply select a device from a list of (possibly spoofed) devices displayed on a screen.
Instead they take action to positively identify a specific device. For example, Balfanz
suggested touching a device to positively identify a particular device from many
others in the local environment. In this way the user demonstrates identification of
the desired device.
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We adopt a similar approach. In our work a user moves devices into close
physical proximity as a method of demonstrative identification. We assume the
user can reliably identify devices they wish to use. Whether the devices have been
compromised in some fashion, however, is out of scope for this work.
Location-limited channels
Location-limited channels refers to channels which only operate over a short dis-
tance. These location-limited channels are used to exchange secrets between devices
in physical proximity. We concur and use aspects of radio wave propagation to
ensure secure short-range communications between devices.
Pre-authentication
Pre-authentication is a concept often suggested for device communication [119]. In
this case, it is assumed that devices have already been introduced and that they have
a means for secure communications going forward. We do not assume devices have
already been introduced nor even that they mutually trust a common third party
such as a certificate authority. Our techniques can be used to impart information
such as a cryptographic key onto a device, can be used to ensure the key came
from a nearby device (not a distant imposter), and can facilitate secure short-range
communications with nearby devices.
1.4 Insecure IoT devices are dangerous
IoT devices are normally thought of as having little computational power and are
sometimes dismissed as not particularly dangerous to a large network. This think-
ing is misguided when billions of “small” devices are aggregated into large botnets.
Like the infamous torture, “death by a thousand cuts”, billions of computationally
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small IoT devices working together, each making a tiny cut, comprise a formidable
threat to the entire Internet.
One recent example of a horde of low-powered devices working together to
achieve an outsized result is the Mirai botnet that first surfaced in 2016 [121]. Mirai
scans the Internet for devices using common default user names and passwords.
If it encounters a device using one of more than 60 common credentials, Mirai
logs in and installs malware on the device. Once a device is compromised by
malware, it connects to a Command and Control server for further instructions
such as participating in Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks as part of a
larger botnet [123].
Mirai made headlines on September 20, 2016 when it attacked the website of
security researcher Brian Krebs with the largest DDoS attack that had ever been
seen, with some reports suggesting the site was offline for more than 24 hours
(although Krebs’ report claims the attack was not successful) [69]. The Mirai botnet
subsequently attacked French web hosing and cloud service provider OVH with
an even larger attack, generating more than 1 terabyte of traffic per second, largely
generated by web cameras with little computation power [43]. Next, Mirai attacked
Domain Name Service provider Dyn (now part of Oracle) [27], making several
high-profile websites such as Twitter, Netflix and Github unavailable for several
hours [55]. These attacks originated from small IoT-type devices such as web
cameras, but in aggregate they had an enormous impact by taking down some of
the Internet’s best known and most used sites.
We now know that Mirai was originally written to give a group of college
students an advantage in the online game Minecraft, but its method of exploiting
misconfigured devices has had a far larger impact [46]. Mirai is still active today and
there are now many variants. Mirai and its brethren succeed primarily by checking
for misconfigured devices with default user name and passwords [68]. The most
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# User name Password
1 root admin
2 admin root
3 DUP root 123456
4 ubnt 12345
5 access ubnt
6 DUP admin password
7 test 1234
8 oracle test
9 postgres qwerty
10 pi raspberry
Table 1.1: Ten most commonly exploited IoT device default passwords [120].
commonly exploited default passwords reported by security firm Symantec are
shown in Table 1.1 [120]. In that table we see that hackers are aware that every
Raspberry Pi computer [97] is initially configured with the user name “pi” and
password “raspberry” and they write malware that attempts to compromise these
devices by guessing those default credentials. If these credentials are not changed
before a device is exposed to the Internet, it will be compromised in a short period
of time. One study by Nazario found that devices exposed to the Internet were
probed for vulnerabilities 800 times per hour and it took on average six minutes for
a device with default credentials to be compromised [82].
In addition to various botnets active on the Internet, a search engine for
misconfigured Internet-connected devices called Shodan [114] can automatically
search for and identify vulnerable devices. This tool can give attackers a ready list
of devices to exploit. If a ready-made list of vulnerable devices is not easy enough,
Tech Republic reports that networks of compromised devices can be rented to
“systematically attack and attempt to take down a company for less than $100” [99].
Clearly these problems, where misconfigured online devices are compromised
and used for nefarious purposes, will get worse if the number of Internet-connected
devices grows into multiple billions of devices.
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1.5 Existing security methods are inadequate
Many IoT-type devices have limited user interfaces and may not have any form of
display or keyboard. To overcome this interface limitation, device manufacturers
often rely on smartphone or PC-based setup applications for initial configuration
and management [34]. Users must find and download the correct setup application
for their particular device and if they do not run the setup application, devices
frequently use well-known default credentials such as those shown in Table 1.1.
This setup application requirement may be manageable when the number of
devices is relatively small (although even that assumption is questionable given the
success of Mirai and its siblings), but will quickly break down as the number of
devices to be managed grows. If a person needs to find and download a different
setup application for each device they manage (e.g., an application for their smart
lights, a different application for their smart shirts, another application for their
smart shoes, and so on), then when IoT-type devices are common place, users will
be overrun with setup applications!
1.6 Our techniques point to a solution
In this thesis we present three approaches that can help with IoT security and
privacy: (1) a technique called Wanda that can securely impart information such a
configuration details onto a nearby target device, (2) a method called SNAP where a
single-antenna device can determine when it is in close proximity with a transmitter
so the single-antenna device can reject spoofed information sent by an adversary
located more than about 9 cm away, and (3) a solution called JamFi that builds on
Wanda, delivering data faster and without the need for the target device to run
additional software.
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1.6.1 Wanda
Wanda uses radio strength as a communication channel to securely impart informa-
tion onto nearby devices, even though the nearby devices have never been seen
before, nor have any secrets been pre-shared. We focus on using Wanda to introduce
new devices into an environment, but Wanda could be used to impart any type of
information onto nearby devices, regardless of device type or manufacturer. Unlike
many other approaches, Wanda does not require any specialized hardware (or any
hardware changes) in the new devices, does not require any pre-shared secrets,
does not require a trusted third party, does not require Internet access, and does not
require complex algorithms or complicated cryptography libraries. Furthermore,
Wanda does not require the devices to be adjacent, or even movable – making it
useful for large appliances as well as small mobile devices.
Contributions
We discuss Wanda in Chapter 2 and make the following five contributions:
1. a consistent, fast, easy, and secure method to impart any kind of information
onto commodity wireless devices, regardless of device type or manufacturer,
without hardware modifications to the device;
2. protocols for imparting information onto new devices (such as a Wi-Fi SSID
and password), introducing two devices so they can establish a secure and
user-intended connection, and imparting cloud identity and credentials into a
new device;
3. a prototype implementation and experimental evaluation;
4. a security analysis of the system; and
5. the results of a 36-person user study.
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1.6.2 SNAP: SiNgle Antenna Proximity
Because radio waves are invisible, a user may believe transmissions are coming
from a nearby device when in fact the transmissions are coming from a distant
adversary attempting to trick the user into accepting the adversary’s malicious
payload. SNAP is a method for a single-antenna wireless device to determine
when it is in close physical proximity to another wireless device. Our approach
significantly raises the bar for an adversary attempting such a trick.
Contributions
We discuss SNAP in Chapter 4 and make the following contributions:
1. a novel method for a single-antenna device to quickly determine when it is in
close proximity with a transmitting device;
2. a reference Wi-Fi implementation that performs the same frame decoding
steps any Wi-Fi device must perform; and
3. an experimental evaluation of the technique using several popular types of
antennas.
1.6.3 JamFi
Finally, we present a method called JamFi that exploits MIMO antennas and the
Inverse-Square Law to securely transfer data between nearby devices while denying
more distant adversaries the ability to recover the data. We find JamFi is able to
facilitate reliable and secure communication between two devices in close physical
proximity, even though they have never met nor shared a key. JamFi is faster than
Wanda and does not require the target device to run additional software.
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Contributions
We discuss JamFi in Chapter 5 and make the following contributions:
1. a consistent, fast, easy, and secure method to transfer any kind of information
between commodity wireless devices, regardless of device type or manufac-
turer, without hardware modifications to the devices;
2. a theoretical analysis of jamming at close range to facilitate data transfer; and
3. an experimental evaluation using several different commercial off-the-shelf
Wi-Fi receivers.
1.6.4 Published work
Chapter 2 is a revised and extended version of our INFOCOM paper [88] and tech-
nical report [89]. That chapter is also the basis of our MobiSys demonstration [87].
Chapter 4 is currently in preparation for conference submission. We presented
an early version of Chapter 5 at the MobiCom S3 workshop [90]. A version of
Chapter 5 is currently in preparation for conference submission. Additionally we
have applied for patents based on Chapters 2, 4, and 5.
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2
Wanda: securely introducing wireless
devices
2.1 Introduction
We note in Chapter 1 that configuring and managing billions of devices will be
extremely difficult. As an illustration in the healthcare domain, imagine that a
general-practice physician tells a patient that he’d like the patient to take home
a wireless blood-pressure monitor and use it every day so that the physician can
remotely monitor the patient’s health. The intention is that the blood-pressure
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measurements taken by the patient will end up stored in the patient’s Electronic
Health Record (EHR) at the physician’s clinic. The clinical team can then see the
patient’s blood pressure on a daily basis and get automated alarms if any abnormal
readings are recorded.
At least three problems arise in making scenarios such as at-home blood-
pressure monitoring a reality. The first problem is that blood-pressure monitors,
like many IoT sensors, do not normally come with long-range communication
connections; they have short-range radios such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, or Zigbee.
The blood-pressure monitor must somehow get connected with other devices
in the home such as a Wi-Fi access point (AP) in order to transmit its medical
data to the physician’s EHR system. Making those connections is difficult for
many people, especially considering that different types of devices from different
manufacturers often have different methods of making a connection and that the
devices themselves often have very limited user interfaces.
A second problem with this blood-pressure scenario is that once a connection
is made between the blood-pressure monitor and a device capable of transmitting
data long distances, the blood-pressure readings must get to the right patient record
in the right physician’s EHR system. This implies that the blood-pressure readings
must be augmented with additional EHR credentials (e.g., patient ID, password)
and destination information (e.g., a Restful API URL).
A third problem arises when devices partner with other nearby devices so
they can work together in a peer-to-peer fashion, such as a blood-glucose monitor
working with an insulin pump. In these peer-to-peer cases the devices may main-
tain a connection with a long-range communication device, but may also need a
connection with neighboring devices using encryption based on a unique key for a
specific pair of devices, rather than a common key shared by all devices. Establish-
ing the encryption can be difficult if the devices have never met before and have
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Figure 2.1: Wand with two antennas, A1 and A2, separated by 7 cm in our prototype. The
distance between antenna A1 and the target device is d1. The distance between antenna A2
and the target device is d2. The Wand is intended to be pointed directly at the target device,
so that d2 = d1 + 7 cm.
never shared a secret key.
To overcome these three and other difficulties inherent in configuring wireless
devices, we present a technique called Wanda. Wanda introduces a small hardware
device called the “Wand” that has two antennas separated by one-half wavelength
as shown in Figure 2.1 and uses radio strength as a communication channel to
simply, securely, and consistent with user intent, impart information onto devices.
In this chapter we focus on introducing devices to an environment, but the Wand
could be used to impart any type of information onto a nearby device. Wanda is
more than just a solution for pairing devices or connecting to access points.
Wanda builds on pioneering work done by Cai et al. in Good Neighbor [18]
in that the Wand determines when it is in close proximity to another transmitting
device by measuring the difference in received signal strength on the Wand’s two
antennas. Wanda then expands upon Good Neighbor by exploiting wireless signal
reciprocity to securely impart information in-band from the Wand onto the nearby
target device.
Unlike many other approaches, Wanda does not require any specialized hard-
ware (or any hardware changes) in the new devices, does not require any pre-shared
secrets, and does not require complex algorithms or complicated cryptography li-
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braries. Furthermore, Wanda does not require the devices to be adjacent, or even
movable – useful for large appliances as well as small mobile devices.
Using Wanda could hardly be easier: a person simply points the Wand at
a nearby device that requires connectivity and the Wand almost magically im-
parts connectivity parameters onto the target device. This happens one time and
afterward the Wand is not involved in future communications – the Wand itself
disappears from the picture.
2.1.1 Assumptions
Throughout this chapter we make the following assumptions about the “target
device,” which is the device receiving information from the Wand: (1) it has at least
one radio antenna that it can use to transmit and receive wireless data, (2) it can
measure the signal strength of wireless communication frames, (3) it may be limited
computationally, but can run a small piece of software that implements the Wanda
protocol, (4) it cannot be relied upon to have additional sensors such as cameras,
microphones or accelerometers, and (5) it cannot be altered to add new hardware.
We make the following assumptions about the Wand: (1) it can be trusted to
generate a secret key, (2) it has a radio compatible with that of the target devices,
and two antennas located approximately one-half wavelength apart, (3) it is easily
portable and can be brought next to and pointed at the target device, and (4) it can
run the Wanda protocol.
2.1.2 Contributions
Wanda is a novel approach for imparting information onto a target device, even
though the target device has never been seen before, nor have any secrets been
pre-shared. We make the following five contributions:
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1. a consistent, fast, easy, and secure method to impart any kind of information
onto commodity wireless devices, regardless of device type or manufacturer,
without hardware modifications to the device;
2. protocols for imparting information onto new devices (such as a Wi-Fi SSID
and password), introducing two devices so they can establish a secure and
user-intended connection, and imparting cloud identity and credentials into a
new device;
3. a prototype implementation and experimental evaluation;
4. a security analysis of the system; and
5. the results of a 36-person user study.
2.2 Background
Wanda uses radio signal strength to impart information onto devices; in this section
we briefly review some basic concepts that are key to Wanda’s operation. We start
by reviewing the theory behind how a radio signal travels through free space,
then examine how obstacles can affect the received signal strength, and finally
investigate variation in real-world signal strength by capturing Wi-Fi frames in
three different environments. Wanda leverages signal-propagation characteristics
described in this section to impart information on target devices and exploits real-
world environmental factors to make it virtually impossible for adversaries to
eavesdrop on Wanda communications. The material in this section provides the
theoretical foundations for why Wanda should work, while Section 2.6 shows that
Wanda does work.
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2.2.1 Radio propagation in free space
A radio signal transmitted by an antenna attenuates, or fades, as it travels through
the air according to the well known free-space propagation model (sometimes called
the Friis transmission equation) [96] given in Equation (2.1):
Pr = PtGtGr
(
λ
4pid
)2
(2.1)
where Pr is the power received in watts, Pt is the power at the surface of the
transmitting antenna in watts, Gt and Gr are the gains of the transmitting and
receiving antennas, λ is the frequency of the signal, and d is the distance between
the transmitting and receiving antennas.
This model assumes the radio waves travel through free space without bounc-
ing off or passing through any obstacles before arriving at a receiving antenna.
Although reflections and multipath signals, where the waves bounce off objects, can
affect the signal strength measured at a receiver (discussed in more detail below),
in general the distance factor d in the denominator of Equation (2.1) tells us that as
the distance between the transmitter and receiver increases, the signal strength at
the receiver decreases quadratically.
It is sometimes useful to consider signal strength in relation to a known
amount of power. In that case, dBm, which expresses power in decibels compared
to one milliwatt (mW), is often used. The conversion is given by Equation (2.2)
as [96]:
dBm = 10 log10
(
Pr
1 mW
)
. (2.2)
Using Equation (2.2) we can rewrite Equation (2.1) in dBm for free space
as [96]:
Pr = P0 − 10α log10
(
d
d0
)
(2.3)
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where Pr is now the received power in dBm, P0 is the power in dBm received at
a distance of d0 from the transmitter, d is the distance between the sending and
receiving antennas, and α, called the path-loss exponent, represents the reduction
in power as the signal travels. In free space α is 2.
In the remainder of this chapter we use Px to indicate power in dBm predicted
by radio signal propagation models, and we use Received Signal Strength Indicator
(RSSI) to indicate power measured in dBm by actual hardware.
2.2.2 Obstacles
Equation (2.3) gives a good approximation of signal attenuation in free space,
but in the real world obstacles, moving and fixed, can attenuate a signal or cause
reflections that create multiple paths between a transmitter and a receiver. The result
is that multiple copies of the transmitted signal, each with a different attenuation,
delay, and phase shift, arrive at the receiver superimposed upon each other. This
superposition can result in either constructive interference where multiple copies of
the signal add to each other, or destructive interference where multiple copies of
the signal cancel each other. The changes in signal strength caused by obstacles is
called fading.
There are two types of fading: slow and fast. Slow fading occurs when changes
to the signal strength happen slowly over time. Shadowing, where an stationary
obstacle such as a building lies between the transmitter and receiver, is an example
of slow fading. In this case the alteration to the signal strength is normally constant
unless the transmitter or receiver move. Fast fading occurs when changes to the
signal strength happen quickly such as when a moving obstacle comes near a
transmitter and receiver.
We can account for fading by altering Equation (2.3) to add a fading compo-
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nent, which gives us the log-normal shadow model [96]:
Pr = P0 − 10α log
(
d
d0
)
+ χσ (2.4)
where χσ is a Gaussian random variable representing fading. In slow fading
environments, χσ has zero mean and σ standard deviation. In fast-fading line-of-
sight environments χσ follows a Rician distribution. In fast-fading, non-line-of-sight
environments, it follows a Rayleigh distribution. As noted above, in free space α is
2, but it in real-world dynamic environments α often ranges from 1.2 to about 8 [84].
In a dynamic environment where there are moving objects, the χσ in Equa-
tion (2.4) can change rapidly, making actual measurements of RSSI highly variable.
In a dynamic environment the moving objects are changing their position relative to
the transmitter and receiver – which slightly changes the length of the path taken by
the portion of the signal reflecting off from those obstacles. The difference in path
length, in turn, slightly alters the phase of the received signal. This change in phase
can change how the multiple copies of the signal add up to create constructive or
destructive interference. Finally, a Doppler shift caused by the moving obstacle
slightly changes the frequency of the received signal, and interference has been
shown to vary depending on the frequency of the signal [51]. We examine these
issues in detail in Chapter 4.
In addition to the environmental variables, the signal strength captured by real
hardware is also subject to manufacturing variability as well as thermal noise in the
antenna [59]. Wanda exploits the variability from manufacturing and thermal noise,
together with variability from obstacles in the environment, to make it difficult
for an adversary to eavesdrop on communications between Wanda devices (see
Section 2.7 for details).
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2.2.3 Real-world observations
To understand the role environment plays in signal propagation, we captured the
signal strength of Wi-Fi frames exchanged between a computer and a Wi-Fi AP in
three very different (but realistic) locations where Wanda might be used. The first
was a quiet home environment where no one was moving, the second was a local
coffee shop where a small number of customers were milling about, and the third
was a busy computer science lab bustling with student activity. We used an Alfa
Networks AWUS036H external Wi-Fi antenna [4] and captured the RSSI returned
by the Alfa card in the form of RadioTap [136] headers. These RSSI values were
captured using a Python program written with Scapy [13]. In all cases the receiving
antenna was stationary while frames were exchanged with the AP.
Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of RSSI measurements returned by capturing
12,000 Wi-Fi frames sent between a Wi-Fi AP and the receiving antenna at each
location. Frames were sent every 100 ms (we note that this is 25,000 times longer
than the timeframes discussed in Chapter 4). In the home and computer science
lab, the distance between the access point and the receiver was approximately 4
meters. In the coffee shop the distance was approximately 8 meters. The differences
in distance led to differences in RSSI, and as expected the presence (or absence)
of moving obstacles lead to a varying degrees of variability of the RSSI. When
frames were captured in the quiet home environment the RSSI readings were tightly
grouped and had little variation; we saw increased variability in the coffee shop,
and a great deal of variability in the busy lab. Table 2.1 provides details on the
mean, standard deviation, and range (number of distinct RSSI values) of the frame
RSSIs captured.
Although the variability in RSSI is lower in environments where there is little
activity, it is important to note that there is still variability – it is not the case that
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Figure 2.2: Real world RSSI observations. Distribution of 12,000 RSSI readings captured in
three different environments. The figures show a histogram of RSSI values measured, and a
best-fit Gaussian distribution for the RSSI values. Environments with more moving obstacles
had higher variability in RSSI values.
RSSI readings were the same for all frames. We see in the quiet home environment
that there were still eight different RSSI values observed. Other researchers have
found that even in an underground concrete tunnel where outside signals and the
effects of moving obstacles were not present, there was still a variation of at least 2
dBm away from the mean [59].
The equations in this section provide the theoretical basis for Wanda’s opera-
Location Mean Std Dev Range
Home -60 0.69 8
Coffee shop -84 1.50 10
CS lab -61 3.48 19
Table 2.1: RSSI mean, standard deviation, and range (number of distinct values) of 12,000
Wi-Fi frames captured at three different locations. The standard deviation and range of
RSSI measurements increased as the number of moving obstacles increased, but even the
static home environment still exhibited eight different RSSI readings.
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tion. We see below that Wanda is able to overcome the unpredictable environmental
noise and impart secret information onto a nearby device while making eavesdrop-
ping extremely difficult from more than a few centimeters away.
2.3 Approach
Wanda builds on two insights that can be gleaned from the concepts highlighted in
Section 2.2. The first insight is that if a device has two antennas, it can determine
when it is in close proximity to another device that is transmitting radio signals.
The second insight, Wanda’s major technical contribution, is that when a device
with two antennas determines it is in close proximity to another device, it can use
its two antennas to securely impart information onto the other device.
In Wanda, the Wand is a device with two antennas (see Figure 2.1) and it uses
those antennas to implement two primitive operations: detect and impart. This
section explains these primitives in detail.
2.3.1 Detect primitive
Wanda uses a two-antenna Wand to determine if it is in close proximity to another
device that is transmitting a radio signal. Each antenna in the Wand is capable of
independently measuring the power received and providing its own RSSI measure-
ment. Building on Equation (2.4), the power received on each of the two antennas
of the Wand will be:
P1 = P0 − 10α log10(
d1
d0
) + χσ
P2 = P0 − 10α log10(
d2
d0
) + χσ
(2.5)
where P0 is the power in dBm measured at a distance of d0 from the transmitter,
Pi is the power in dBm measured at receiving antenna Ai, and di is the distance
between the transmitter and receiving antenna i.
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Armed with the equations in (2.5), we can calculate the difference in signal
strength between the two antennas A1 and A2 as follows:
P1 − P2 = P0 − 10α log10(
d1
d0
) + χσ
− (P0 − 10α log10(
d2
d0
) + χσ)
= −10α( log10(
d1
d0
)− log10(
d2
d0
))
= −10α log10(
d1
d2
).
(2.6)
The antennas on the Wand are physically close together; in our prototype they
are 7 cm apart (roughly 1/2 wavelength). Because they are close together and the
signal is measured on each antenna at almost exactly the same instant (except for
signal travel time to cross the gap between antennas), the environmental factors
represented by χσ in Equation (2.6) are likely to be similar on each antenna. By
taking the difference in signal strength observed on two antennas, sometimes called
the RSSI Ratio [20], the environmental factors tend to cancel out. This suggests that
some of the randomness of the environment we saw in our real-world observations
in Section 2.2 will be minimized in the RSSI Ratio on the Wand.
We note that Equations (2.3) though (2.6) are meant to estimate power in the
transmitter’s far field, but when the transmitter and receiver are close together,
near-field effects can cause changes to the signal. We estimate near-field effects
with greater precision in Chapters 4 and 5, but with Wanda we are interested in the
difference in signal strength between the Wand’s two antennas. While estimates of
the power received by antennas in the near field diverge from estimates of antennas
in the far field, the difference in signal strength as represented by the RSSI Ratio
is the same in both fields (see a derivation in Appendix A.1). Additionally we see
in Section 2.6 that our experimental results conform well to the equations in this
chapter, even when antennas are in the near field.
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Next we see that the RSSI Ratio in Equation (2.6) provides an indication of the
proximity between the Wand and the target device. When the Wand and the target
device are far apart, the distance between antennas A1 and A2 is small relative to
the distance to the transmitter. In that case the RSSI will be approximately, although
not precisely, equal on each receiving antenna. For example, suppose antennas A1
and A2 on the Wand are 7 cm apart and are aligned with the transmitting antenna so
that A2 is 7 cm farther away from the transmitting antenna than A1 (see Figure 2.1).
In this case d2 = d1 + 7 cm. Further suppose the distance between A1 and the
transmitting antenna, d1 is 30 cm (i.e., more than 4 times the distance between the
two antennas). In that case, using Equation (2.6) and assuming α = 2 yields a
difference, ∆, of:
d1 = 30 cm
d2 = 30 cm+ 7 cm = 37 cm
∆ = −10α log10(30/37) ≈ 1.8 dBm.
(2.7)
When the Wand is close to the target device, the distance between antennas A1
and A2 is large relative to the distance to the transmitter. In that case the difference
between received power on the two antennas on the Wand will be large. For
example, assume the transmitter in Figure 2.1 is located 1 cm from A1. In that case
the expected RSSI difference is:
d1 = 1 cm
d2 = 1 cm+ 7 cm = 8 cm
∆ = −10α log(1/8) ≈ 18.1 dBm.
(2.8)
This demonstrates that when the Wand is in close proximity to a transmitting
device, the difference in power readings between the Wand’s two antennas will be
significantly larger than the difference in power readings when the device is far
away. In this example there is an expected 10-fold increase in the RSSI Ratio when
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Figure 2.3: Expected difference in RSSI using Equation (2.6) with d1 ranging from 1 to 50 cm.
The difference in RSSI readings increases rapidly as distance decreases.
the Wand moves from 30 cm to 1 cm between the transmitter and A1. Figure 2.3
shows how the expected power changes as the distance between the device and
transmitter changes.
Wanda determines whether the Wand and device are in close proximity by
examining the average RSSI Ratio according to the following procedure:
δ¯ =
1
ω
ω
∑
i=1
r1(i)− r2(i) (2.9)
where i is the ith frame received and r1(i) is the RSSI for frame i measured on
antenna A1, r2(i) is the RSSI for the same frame measured on antenna A2, and ω is
a window containing the RSSI of the most recent frames received.
If the average difference δ¯ rises above a predetermined threshold τ, then the
Wand declares it is in close proximity to the transmitting device. The Wand waits
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to check for proximity until it has received at least ω frames, and re-checks for
proximity every ω/2 frames afterward using the last ω RSSI values until it detects
it is close to the transmitter or times out.
In this way, the Wand can determine when it is in close proximity to a transmit-
ting device even if that device has only a single antenna. If the device has multiple
antennas, Wanda assumes it will transmit frames using only one of its antennas
and will not change transmitting antennas while executing the detect primitive.
In keeping with declarative identification discussed above, to execute detect, a
user expresses the intent to start the process by taking an action such as pressing a
button on the target device. The target device then begins broadcasting an AssocReq
frame every 50 ms indicating that it is looking to connect with another device. The
Wand uses those broadcast frames to determine whether it is in close proximity to
the device using Equation (2.9).
The Wand can provide its user visual or audio feedback to encourage the user
to move the Wand closer if needed. The Wand can change a row of LED lights
or increase (decrease) the frequency of an audio tone if the spread between RSSI
readings on the two antennas is becoming larger (smaller) to indicate if the Wand is
getting closer to (farther from) the target device. Additionally, a visual indicator
such as a sticker bearing a Wanda logo could be affixed on top of the antenna
location on the target device to make detect easier. The user would then simply
move the Wand close to the sticker and initiate the detect process. See Figure 2.4 for
an example of how a logo could be affixed to a blood-pressure monitor.
Once the Wand determines that it is in close proximity to the device, it sends
an AssocAck frame to the target device. The target device receives the AssocAck,
stops transmitting frames, and begins listening for Message frames from the Wand.
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Figure 2.4: Blood-pressure monitor with Wanda logo indicating where to place the Wand.
Photo by Eli Burakian.
2.3.2 Impart primitive
After devices are in close proximity, the Wand can exploit a property of radio
wave propagation called reciprocity to impart information onto the nearby target
device. Reciprocity says that a signal will experience the same multipath properties
(e.g., attenuation, phase shifts, and delays) in both directions of the link [96]. This
means that transmitting from the target device to the Wand has the same fading
characteristics as transmitting from the Wand to the target device. As we saw above,
the Wand should see a large RSSI Ratio when a transmitting device is close to the
Wand. Similarly, due to reciprocity, the device should see a large difference in RSSI
when the Wand transmits from antenna A1 versus when it transmits from antenna
A2.
Wanda exploits the expected difference in RSSI on the target device to impart
information. The Wand first converts the data to impart onto the device into a
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binary string m and then sends m one bit at a time. To send a 1, the Wand sends a
Message frame using the closest antenna, A1. To send a 0, it sends a Message frame
using the farthest antenna, A2. If the Wand and device are physically close together,
the device will see a large difference in RSSI depending on which antenna the Wand
used. For example, if we assume as above that the Wand is pointing directly at the
device and the distance d1 between A1 and the device is 3 cm, then with α = 2,
the difference in signal strength received on the device between a frame sent by
antenna A1 versus A2 would be about 10.5 dBm by Equation (2.6).
To test the expected signal strength difference, we measured the RSSI of 1,000
Wi-Fi frames sent with antenna A1 located 3 cm from the receiver, intermixed with
1,000 frames sent with antenna A2 located 10 cm from the receiver. Figure 2.5
shows the result. It is clear that there was a large difference in RSSI depending
on which antenna sent the frame. In this case, the RSSI values are consistent with
Equation (2.6) with the path loss exponent α ≈ 1.6.
To decode the message m sent by the Wand, the target device simply calculates
the average RSSI over all frames received and then compares the RSSI value for each
frame with the average RSSI over all received frames. If the RSSI for an individual
frame is above the average, the target device declares the frame to be a 1. If the RSSI
is below the average, the target device declares the frame to be a 0. More formally:
r¯ =
1
n
n
∑
i=0
r(i) (2.10)
mˆ(i) =
 1 if r(i) ≥ r¯0 if r(i) < r¯
where r(i) is the RSSI measured on the single antenna of the target device for frame
i and mˆ(i) is the ith bit in the message received. Once complete, the device will have
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Figure 2.5: Large RSSI difference experimentally observed at close range. There is a large
difference in RSSI received from 1,000 Wi-Fi frames sent by antenna A1 located 3 cm from
the receiving antenna, compared with 1,000 Wi-Fi frames sent by antenna A2 located 10 cm
from the receiving antenna.
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string mˆ representing the string m sent by the Wand.
To ensure the target device is not missing any bits in message m due to dropped
frames, each Message frame sent by the Wand carries an increasing sequence number
in the payload. The target device uses the sequence number of each frame to
determine whether it missed any frames. If any frames are missing, the target
device requests a resend of only those missing frames; otherwise it sends an empty
list to the Wand.
To be clear, the information is transferred using the RSSI alone – the frames
themselves sent do not contain portions of the message m. The payload only
contains a sequence number so the target device can identify any missing bits.
The Wand sends the entire message without waiting for acknowledgement
from the target device. When all message bits have been transmitted, the Wand
sends a Done frame. The Done frame is similar to a Message frame, but it also includes
a hash of m in the payload. Once the target device receives the Done message, it
computes the value for each bit using Equation (2.10), creating message mˆ on the
target.
Finally, the target device hashes mˆ and compares it with the hash of m included
in the Done frame. If the hashes match, the target received all of the frames correctly.
If the hashes do not match, the target device tries flipping each bit in mˆ, one at a
time, re-hashes, and compares with the hash sent by the Wand. If a match is still
not found, the target device follows a similar pattern but tries flipping two bits. If a
match is still not found, the target device signals the Wand to restart by sending a
Restart frame. If a match is found, the target device transmits a Success frame to the
Wand.
If the message to be imparted is long, it could be sent in chunks to enable the
target device to efficiently flip bits. On the other hand, if messages are short they
may be susceptible to an adversary discovering the message by brute-force flipping
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bits and hashing. To protect against these potential exploits Wanda can chunk long
messages and pad short messages into 128-bit messages.
To demonstrate the impart primitive, we converted the message “hello” into
binary and sent it to a target device using the impart primitive. Figure 2.6 shows
the results. The horizontal axis shows the correct bit value for each frame and the
vertical axis shows the RSSI measured for each frame. Frames representing bit
values of 1 should be received on the target device with an RSSI above the average
and frames representing bit values of 0 should be received below the average.
Circles indicate frames where the bit value was correctly resolved by the receiver
using Equation (2.10) and X’s indicate frames where the bit value was incorrectly
resolved. We see the message was easily decoded at a distance d1 = 3 cm and had
many errors with d1 = 30 cm.
2.4 Protocols
Wanda uses the primitive operations detect and impart described above to build
protocols for configuring new devices. In this section we define three higher-
level protocol operations: (1) Common Key, where a target device is imparted with
parameters that are common to all devices in a local-area network, (2) Unique Key,
where two devices connect with a key unique to that pair of devices, and (3) Copy
and Paste where the Wand copies data from one device and pastes it onto another
without creating a lasting bond between devices.
2.4.1 Common Key protocol
The Common Key protocol is used when a new device must be configured with
information common to all devices in a local-area network such as the blood-
pressure monitor described above. The blood-pressure monitor must learn the SSID
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and password of a Wi-Fi AP. In this case we expect the Wand has earlier learned
the SSID and password from the Wi-Fi AP over a wired USB connection. One can
imagine the Wand being a 7 cm stick that lives in the USB port of the AP, keeping its
batteries charged so it is ready when needed, and using the USB to securely obtain
the connectivity parameters from the AP.
The Wand and target device then implement the Common Key protocol as
follows: the Wand and target device run the detect primitive to determine whether
they are close together. Once the Wand determines it is in close proximity to the
target device, it runs the impart primitive to send the SSID and password to the
target device. After the target device has confirmed it has properly received the
message, flipping bits if necessary as described in the impart primitive, the target
device connects to the Wi-Fi AP using the SSID and password it received, and the
Wand is then not required for future communications.
2.4.2 Unique Key protocol
A slightly more complicated scenario arises when a user wants two devices to
establish a connection using a key that is unique to those two devices. In this case
the Wand can facilitate the introduction of the devices. The Unique Key protocol
starts with the Wand generating a random key R. The Wand and Device 1 run detect
and impart to send R to Device 1. The Device 1 includes its IP address (if it has one)
in the payload of the Success message at the end of impart and the Wand notes the
IP address as well as the MAC address of the target device from the frame headers.
The user then carries the Wand close to Device 2 and the Wand then imparts R plus
the MAC and IP address of Device 1 to Device 2 using detect and impart. Device 2
can now open direct communications with Device 1 by sending a hash of R to
Device 1 at the MAC or IP address obtained from the Wand. Device 1 receives the
hash from Device 2 and hashes its own copy of R. If the hashes match, then Device 1
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bootstraps a MAC- or IP-layer connection with Device 2 using R as an initial key. If
the hashes do not match, Device 1 does not attempt the connection.
2.4.3 Copy and Paste protocol
A third Wanda protocol is Copy and Paste. In Copy and Paste one device has informa-
tion that the user would like imparted onto another device, although there may be
no need for the devices to form a lasting pair as in the Common Key or Unique Key
protocols. An example of where Copy and Paste could be useful is the blood-pressure
monitor scenario described above. As shown above, the patient can use the Common
Key protocol to link the blood-pressure monitor to a Wi-Fi AP, and while that solves
the problem of getting a long-range communication connection for the short-range
blood-pressure monitor, it does not solve the problem of getting the data stored
in the patient’s Electronic Health Record. For data storage to happen the blood-
pressure monitor must know where and how to send the data. The blood-pressure
monitor must know things such as a Restful API URL to send the medical readings,
as well as the patient’s credentials such as ID and password so the data can be
stored in the correct patient record in the EHR.
Copy and Paste is designed to solve this problem. Continuing with the medical
example, the patient brings the Wand to the doctor’s office and performs the Copy
phase by using detect and impart to send a random key R onto a device in the
doctor’s office. The doctor’s office device encrypts the patient’s credentials using
R as a key and sends the resulting cypher text c to the Wand. The Wand stores the
cypher text until the patient returns home. The patient then performs the Paste
phase by using detect and impart to send random key R and cypher text c to the
blood-pressure monitor. The blood-pressure monitor then decrypts the data and
begins sending data to the doctor while the Wand deletes the cypher text. In this
way, the Copy and Paste protocol copies the data from one device and pastes it onto
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Figure 2.7: Prototype Wand and A&D Medical blood-pressure monitor as target device (some
cables removed for clarity). Photo by David Kotz.
another device, even though the devices may be physically far apart.
2.5 Implementation
We implemented a Wand prototype using a Raspberry Pi 2 Model B computer [97]
connected to two external Panda Ultra Wireless N USB Wi-Fi adapters [86]. Fig-
ure 2.7 shows a photo of the prototype Wand and medical device. A production
version would benefit by using one Wi-Fi card that has multiple antennas (com-
monly found on 802.11n or 802.11ac Wi-Fi devices). This single-radio, dual-antenna
approach would ensure consistent energy is transmitted by the two antennas and
could help reduce the potential for fingerprinting attacks [24, 61] by generating the
radio frequency energy from the same source.
We used an FDA-approved A&D Medical UA-767PC blood-pressure mon-
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itor [1] as the target device. Because we were unable to modify the software on
FDA approved medical devices, we added an external Raspberry Pi with a single
Alfa Networks AWUS036H Wi-Fi antenna [4] and connected to the blood-pressure
monitor using a RS-232 over USB connection. This gave us the ability to extract
the blood-pressure readings from the blood-pressure monitor using the RS-232
connection and the ability to communicate with the Wand over the single Wi-Fi
antenna. Of course the manufacturer of the medical device would be able to alter
their software to include the Wanda protocols (Wanda does not require hardware
modification as long as the device has Wi-Fi connectivity), but our prototype demon-
strates that even an existing device without a radio can be easily retrofitted to the
conform to Wanda’s protocols. We imagine the retrofit device to be a small dongle
instead of our prototype Raspberry Pi-based system.
We then used the prototype Wand to impart two types of information onto the
retrofitted blood-pressure monitor located in a busy computer science lab. First we
imparted the SSID and password of a local Wi-Fi AP so the device could establish a
connection and get to the Internet. Second, we imparted the URL and a username
and password for a Restful API representing a web service end point into a medical
Electronic Health Record (EHR) in the cloud. The result is that now when someone
measures their systolic pressure, diastolic pressure, and pulse, the Raspberry Pi
reads those measurements and securely passes them to the simulated EHR.
We used Python and Scapy to create Layer 2 Wi-Fi frames in our prototype.
While our prototype used Wi-Fi, the technique could also be adapted for other
protocols such as Bluetooth or Zigbee.
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Distance Detected close
< 5 cm 100%
5 cm 87%
6 cm 38%
> 6 cm 0%
Table 2.2: Percentage of time when the detect primitive declared proximity. The Wand
implemented detect and successfully discerned proximity with high accuracy at close
range while correctly determining it was not in proximity at longer ranges.
2.6 Results
We evaluated both the detect and impart phases of Wanda. For the evaluation we
used the same software as our prototype, but for easier control and monitoring of
our experiments we used a MacBook Pro instead of a Raspberry Pi. All experiments
were conducted in a busy computer science lab.
2.6.1 Detect tests
We conducted 1,000 trials of the detect primitive where the distance d1 between the
Wand’s A1 antenna and the device’s antenna ranged between 1 and 50 cm. Trials
were conducted at 1 cm intervals from 1 to 10 cm, then at 10 cm intervals from 10 to
50 cm for a total of 14 distances with 1,000 trials each. The percentage of trials where
the Wand detected proximity is shown in Table 2.2 using a window size ω = 20
and a threshold value τ = 6.2. We chose this value for τ because the equations in
Section 2.3 estimate that detect will declare the devices in close proximity when d1 is
less than 6 cm. We found that at distances less than 5 cm, proximity was detected
100% of the time. At 5 cm proximity was detected 87% of the time, and at 6 cm
proximity was detected 38% of the time. At distances longer than 6 cm proximity
was not detected. These results suggest that detect was able to correctly determine
when it is in close proximity to the device with high probability.
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2.6.2 Impart tests
We tested Wanda’s ability to correctly impart data by first confirming the RSSI
differences behaved as expected, then sent 1,000 messages from the Wand to the
target device at various distances and counted bit errors to determine the Wand’s
effective range. Finally we measured how fast the Wand could impart information
on target devices.
RSSI differences
To confirm that a single-antenna device is able to correctly receive a message when
using the impart primitive, we tested whether it would consistently measure a
significant difference in RSSI based on the Wand’s transmitting antenna (A1 or A2)
as predicted by the equations in Section 2.3. In these tests the Wand sent 1,000 Wi-Fi
data frames from each of its two antennas, alternating between antenna A1 and
A2, where the distance d1 between antenna A1 and the target device ranged from 1
to 50 cm and the distance d2 was 7 cm larger than d1. For these experiments, each
Message frame contained a sequence number as specified in the impart primitive,
as well as an indication of which antenna sent the frame to avoid confusion over
which antenna actually sent the frame.
The target device recorded the RSSI of each frame and calculated an RSSI
difference for each of the 1,000 pairs of frames it received. The results are shown
in Figure 2.8 along with the RSSI difference predicted by Equation (2.6). The plot
shows that the values observed mirror the predicted values when α = 1.6.
Bit errors
Next we measured how well the Wand was able to impart information on another
device. We ran 1,000 trials where the Wand sent a 128-bit random message to a
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Figure 2.8: Observed RSSI differences on a single-antenna device from 1,000 pairs of frames
sent by the Wand alternating between antennas. The box represents the 75th and 25th per-
centiles of the observed RSSI differences, the red line is the median, and the whiskers rep-
resent the range of differences. The predicted RSSI difference according to Equation (2.6) is
shown with α = 1.6.
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Figure 2.9: Bit errors decoding a 128-bit message. The box represents the 75th and 25th
percentile, the red line is the median, and the whiskers represent the range of bit errors.
single-antenna target device, and then counted the number of mismatched bits.
Figure 2.9 shows that very few bit errors occurred at close range, but the number
of errors increased significantly as distance between the Wand and the receiver, d1,
increased. Because each message contained 128 bits, random guessing should yield
64 correct bits. In our experiments this began to happen at a distance of about 30 cm.
Some of these errors can be corrected with the bit-flip technique described
above where the target device flips bits in its derived message mˆ and re-hashes.
Figure 2.10 shows the percentage of successful message transfers at distance from
1 to 50 cm, correcting bits when needed, by flipping zero to three bits. From this
graph we see that messages were transferred with a high probability of success
when the Wand was less than 6 cm from the device. Due to the variability in RSSI
42
Distance between TX and RX (cm)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 20 30 40 50
Lik
eli
ho
od
 o
f s
uc
ce
ss
fu
l m
es
sa
ge
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Likelihood of successful message by flipping bits
0 flipped
1 flipped
2 flipped
3 flipped
Figure 2.10: Likelihood of successful message by flipping up to three bits. At distances less
than 6 cm messages were received with high probability.
Ratio, however, the bit-flipping technique is not effective at long range. This suits
a legitimate user well because the devices are close together, but makes a distant
attacker’s task difficult.
Timing
We also measured the speed at which the Wand was able to impart a message.
The average time to send 128 bits was 0.454 seconds, which translates to just over
280 bits per second. We note that our implementation was written in Python.
An implementation in C might have seen even faster throughput, although for
many applications transferring a message in under half a second is acceptable.
Additionally, long messages can be sent by first imparting a key and then using
that key to encrypt normal frames carrying data in their payload.
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2.7 Security
In prior sections we show that Wanda works well; in this section we evaluate its
security against passive adversaries attempting to eavesdrop on communications
between the Wand and the target device, and active adversaries attempting to inject
malicious information onto the target device or Wand. We assume an adversary
has complete knowledge of the Wanda protocol and can use that knowledge to try
to exploit the system.
We assume the adversary:
• is able to receive, tamper with, or inject frames into the communications
between the Wand and target device;
• is able to modulate its transmit power;
• may have multiple antennas and be positioned at multiple locations;
• does not try to jam the communications channel, creating a denial of service;
• does not have physical access to tamper with the Wand or target device; and
• is located more than 30 cm away from the target device and Wand while they
are communicating.
2.7.1 Eavesdropping
Because the bits in the message m sent by the Wand are encoded only in the Wand’s
choice of transmitting antenna, an adversary must determine which antenna sent a
frame in order to decode the information transferred. There are four main ways this
could be done by an adversary: (1) receive frames from only one Wand antenna,
(2) use the environment to differentiate between antennas, and (3) analyze the
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RSSI to differentiate between antennas and (4) use signal processing and MIMO
antennas.
Receive frames from only one Wand antenna
If it were possible for an adversary to receive frames sent by only one of the Wand’s
antennas – not both – the adversary would be able to determine which antenna sent
all of the bits in a message. The adversary would simply list the frame sequence
numbers it receives and infer those frames represent a bit with a value of 1. For the
sequence numbers the adversary does not receive, it can assume those frames came
from the other antenna on the Wand and infer those represent a bit value of 0. After
all the frames are sent, if the adversary does not drop any frames, the adversary
will either be correct on all bits (the monitored antenna was actually sending 1s), or
wrong on all bits (the monitored antenna was actually sending 0s) in which case the
adversary simply flips all bits. The hashed message contained in the Done frame
would let the adversary determine which value is correct.
The adversary’s dilemma is that both antennas on the Wand are close together
and radiate energy that travels outward in a spherical shape. This makes receiving
signals from only one antenna very difficult. An adversary could try to use a highly
directional antenna and attempt to create a narrow main lobe pointed precisely at
one of the antennas on the Wand. Given that the antennas on the Wand are only 7
cm apart, this approach is unlikely to work if the adversary is located a reasonable
distance away because the main lobe expands with distance and should encompass
both of the Wand’s antennas. For example, as shown in Figure 2.11, an adversary
located 1 m away and bore-sighted on one of the Wand’s antennas would need to
have a one-half beam width of α =tan−1(7/100) ≈ 4 degrees to avoid receiving a
signal from the Wand’s second antenna.
An adversary might use an antenna array in an attempt to create a narrow
45
A1#A2#
7"cm"
1"m"
Adversary"
α"
Figure 2.11: Adversary beam width. Given the antennas on the Wand are separated by 7 cm,
an adversary located 1 m away and bore-sighted on one of the Wand’s antennas, would need
a one-half beam width of α =tan−1(7/100) ≈ 4 degrees to avoid receiving a signal from the
Wand’s second antenna.
beam and only receive the signal from one of the Wand’s two antennas. Using
software provided by Balanis [9] and assuming the antennas are spaced 0.25λ
apart, Figure 2.12 shows the resulting normalized radiation pattern for a 10-antenna
array. This radiation pattern is the same for both transmitting and receiving, and
demonstrates that the array can create a narrow beam focused along the z-axis. In
this case, even with a large number of antennas sharpening the beam, the Half-
Power Beam Width (e.g., the width were the receive power is one-half that of the
maximum and commonly considered to be the resolution at which an antenna array
can separate two sources [9]) can be shown to be 38.64 degrees – far wider than
beam width required for an adversary to receive from a single Wand antenna if the
adversary is located 1 m away. If the adversary is located more than 1 m, it would
need an even smaller beam width than 4 degrees.
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Figure 2.12: Antenna array radiation pattern. A 10-antenna array with antenna spaced at
0.25λ creates a focused beam. This array can be shown to have a Half-Power Beam Width of
38.64 degrees [9].
Use the environment to differentiate between antennas
An adversary might also attempt to determine which antenna sent a frame by
detecting differences in the signal due to environmental effects. Because the char-
acteristics of the received signal depend on the specific paths taken as the signal
travels from the transmitter to the receiver, and signals from different transmit
antennas might take different paths to an adversary, the adversary might be able to
determine which antenna sent each frame. The chances of this attack succeeding,
however, are vanishingly small. Cai et al. calculated the odds of an adversary
succeeding with this type of attack from a random location to be 10−15 [18]. They
go on to suggest that, in theory, an adversary might choose an ideal location by
carefully measuring locations, geometries, and surface properties of all objects in
the environment. While this precise measurement is practically impossible, never-
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theless even that attack could be mitigated by incorporating a frequency-hopping
scheme where each frame is sent on a different Wi-Fi frequency.
Analyze the RSSI to differentiate between antennas
Wanda uses a simple algorithm on the target device to determine which antenna sent
a frame based on the RSSI, but we assume an adversary can use more sophisticated
techniques. While we cannot anticipate every possible technique, we expect from
Equation (2.6) that the difference in RSSI when the Wand uses antenna A1 vs. when
it uses antenna A2 will be small when the Wand is not close to the adversary.
Additionally, the environmental noise described in Section 2.2 increases as distance
increases. Figure 2.13 illustrates these differences for 1,000 frames sent by antenna
A1 and 1,000 frames sent by antenna A2 at d1 = 3 cm and d1 = 50 cm. As expected,
the RSSIs of frames from the same transmit antenna form a Gaussian with a distinct
mean (due to distance) and standard deviation (due to noise).
If an adversary were somehow armed with perfect knowledge of the Gaussians
of each antenna on the Wand, they might be able to determine which antenna sent a
frame. When a frame arrives, the adversary could measure the RSSI and determine
from which distribution that sample is drawn, that is, which antenna is most likely
responsible for sending the frame. The distributions are constantly changing due
to changing environmental factors, however, making this assumption of a priori
knowledge of the Gaussians unrealistic.
Even if an adversary somehow did have perfect knowledge of the Gaussian
distributions that characterize frames sent by each antenna on the Wand, the ad-
versary will still suffer from a large number of errors when observing from long
distances. Figure 2.14 shows that, even if armed with perfect knowledge of the
frame distributions, an adversary only a short distance away would still make
nearly 50% bit errors predicting which antenna sent a frame using the Gaussian
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Figure 2.13: RSSI distribution of 1,000 frames sent where d1 = 3 cm and 50 cm. At close
range there was a distinct difference between antennas whereas at longer distances the
gaussian distributions of frame RSSIs heavily overlapped.
distributions. We conducted those experiments with a prototype built with two ra-
dios (rather than one radio), cheap antennas (not specifically selected for a spherical
radio dispersion pattern), and without precise antenna alignment (see Figure 2.7);
a commercial Wand (with a single radio and two antennas selected and aligned
carefully) would be even harder to attack in this manner.
Analyze the signal phase to differentiate between antennas
The phase of a received signal is dependent on the distance between the transmitter
and receiver. A sophisticated adversary may try to use Channel State Information
(discussed in Chapter 3) to measure the difference in signal phase to determine
which of the Wand’s antennas sent a frame. The antennas on the Wand are located
close together, suggesting the difference in distance between an adversary and each
of the Wand’s antennas will be small and phase of the received signal will likely be
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Figure 2.14: Percentage of bit errors if adversary had perfect knowledge of RSSI distributions
by antenna. Even with the unrealistic assumption of perfect knowledge, an adversary would
still make numerous errors.
similar for both antennas.
It may be the case, however, that an adversary in a particular location is able to
reliably discern a difference in phase from signals sent by each the Wand’s antennas.
A simple countermeasure would be add a different random phase offset in the
range [0, 2pi) radians to each frame the Wand transmits. The target device uses
the signal strength of each frame to determine which antenna sent the frame, and
does not consider the phase of the signal to reconstruct the Wand’s message. The
added phase would confound a phase-observing adversary while not affecting a
signal-strength-observing target device.
2.7.2 Frame injection
An active adversary may attempt to inject information onto the target device by
tricking the target device into believing it is communicating with the Wand while
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the Wand is not actually present. Wanda defends against the attack by asking the
user to declare intent to start the protocol on the target device by taking an action
such as pushing a button on the target device. This ensures that when the Wand is
not present, the target device will not begin running the Wanda protocols. In that
case, if an adversary were to try to communicate with the target device, the target
device would not respond.
Alternatively, an adversary could try to override the information sent by the
Wand while the Wand is communicating with the target device. To override the
Wand, an adversary might modulate its transmission power; increasing power to
send a 1 and decreasing power to send a 0. The target device, which may have only
a single antenna, has no way of knowing if these modulated signals are coming
from a nearby Wand or from a distant adversary because the RSSI of the frames
would appear to the target device in the same way frames appear from the Wand.
To prevent this attack, the Wand can monitor for rogue Message frames that it
did not send. If it detects rogue frames, the Wand can send a Stop frame to the
target device to halt the process. In Chapter 4 we discuss a method where the
single-antenna target device can determine proximity with a transmitter without
the Wand’s assistance.
The Wand can protect itself from storing malicious data (as in the Copy and
Paste protocol), by ensuring any received frames have a large RSSI ratio. This test
would ensure the data came from a nearby target device, and not a distant adversary
attempting to exploit the Wand.
2.8 Related Work
There has been a great deal of research on how people actually configure and
manage computing devices. Our interest is focused on how people will introduce
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and manage wireless devices such as the blood-pressure monitor described above
with limited UI’s (e.g., devices with a small number of buttons, not keyboards,
and with limited or non-existent displays) into existing networks. This leads to
two primary questions studied in the research literature: (1) who configures and
manages devices, and (2) how are new devices actually configured to work with
other existing devices.
2.8.1 Who configures and manages devices
There are three main approaches identified in the literature that can be used to
configure and manage a new device such as a blood-pressure monitor: (1) use a
professional technician, (2) find a local expert, or (3) do it yourself. We briefly
discuss the pros and cons of each of these three approaches.
Use a professional technician
One approach to adding a new device such as a Wi-Fi-enabled blood-pressure
monitor into a person’s home would be for the device manufacturer, or another
service entity, to dispatch a professional technician to physically visit the home
to install and configure the new device. This approach makes sense for some
applications, such as a heart monitor to track a patient that has just undergone
cardiac surgery [67]. In this case, the relative rarity of cardiac surgery combined with
the dire consequences that could arise from missing the onset of a life-threatening
condition make installation by a trained professional desirable.
As the number and variety of deployed IoT devices grows, however, this
approach will be economically unattractive. If the predictions of the growth rate of
IoT devices are correct (or even partially correct) and billions of connected devices
are coming, then relying on professional technicians to configure new devices
will be like calling a professional to change a light bulb – impractical. Poole et al.
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noted that as residential computing infrastructures have become more complex,
even before the wide-spread roll out of IoT devices, professional technical support
services have not sufficiently matured alongside the technologies [93].
Recognizing the highly variable equipment and dispersed geographical nature
that exists in real-world deployments, researchers have proposed standardized
environments such as HomeLab [17] to help deal with the complexity. These
proposals, however, are typically aimed at the research community rather than the
population at large.
While useful in some instances, practical issues make relying on a professional
technician undesirable for configuring and managing many devices.
Find a local expert
Another approach to configuring a new device is to assume the presence of a local
tech-savvy expert (sometimes a grandchild) who can configure a new device for
the less savvy user. Other researchers have found that there is often a person who
is a “technology driver” [65, 77, 91] and takes responsibility for configuring devices
on family or friend’s networks.
The local expert, however, may not be willing or available to help configure a
new device at any given time. One group of researchers developed an algorithm
to predict if the local expert is inclined to provide help, citing factors such as the
amount of the expert’s available free time, and how important the person needing
help is to the expert [92]. Often the answer is no, the expert will not help. This causes
an issue, of course, if the device user must rely on the local expert to configure a
new device. Additionally, the local tech expert may not have experience with a
particular type of device that a user would like configured or the user may hesitate
to bother the expert yet again to configure the latest device.
Privacy is another factor that further compounds reliance on a local expert.
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If someone other than the device user configures a new device, say a tech-savvy
neighbor, it is possible the device’s data may be visible to the person performing
the configuration. This may not be critical in some environments, but in others,
such as where a device could reveal a medical condition that carries a social stigma,
maintaining privacy could be extremely important to the user. As noted previously,
for example, Sayles et al. found HIV-positive patients fear of stigma after disclosure
of their condition often led patients to avoid medical services and medications [105].
Even in the less extreme blood-pressure monitor example, where a person’s blood
pressure may not be as sensitive an issue as HIV, the tech-savvy neighbor may
learn the SSID and password of the Wi-Fi AP while configuring the blood-pressure
monitor and may then be able to sniff any traffic on the network, including banking,
email, or other sensitive matters (although they may need to force devices to re-join
the network to observe all four EAPOL handshake packets) [132].
Do it yourself
Finally, a user may elect to configure a new device themselves. As noted above,
configuring new devices has historically been difficult and prone to error. Making
secure connections between IoT devices such as a Wi-Fi-enabled blood-pressure
monitor is difficult for a number of reasons:
Limited UIs
IoT devices tend to have limited user interfaces – they may not have any form
of display or keyboard. This makes it impossible to use traditional approaches to
pairing devices such as Bluetooth’s Simple Secure Pairing [15] where one device
displays a numeric code that is entered into a second device. In fact, IoT devices
cannot be counted on to have any particular form of inputs such as cameras or
accelerometers or even USB ports.
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Confusing setup applications
To skirt UI limitations, many IoT devices use a setup application running on a
smartphone or laptop to configure the device and establish connectivity. This need
for a setup application creates its own set of issues. Users must find the correct
setup application for their particular phone or operating system, and find the right
app for the specific model of device to be configured, must download it, then must
figure out how to connect the setup application with the the new device.
As an example, Table 2.3 shows the setup steps required to configure the
popular Fitbit Aria smart weight scale [33]. The Aria has been praised for its easy
setup process, but in step 8 the user is required to select their Wi-Fi network from
a list of nearby networks, and then must enter the network’s password. Selecting
the proper network SSID from all nearby networks is trivial if the setup is being
done in a remote farmhouse where there are no other networks nearby, but would
be significantly more challenging in a crowded city apartment building where most
apartments have a Wi-Fi network (which of the 12 “linksys” networks I can see
is mine?). Our experiments in the User Study section suggest many users do not
know their SSID or password, causing even the Aria’s relatively straightforward
setup process to fail.
Inconsistent methods
Even if a user does master a setup application from one vendor, it does not
mean that they have mastered the setup for all IoT devices. For example, GoPro
cameras [45] take a similar approach to the Aria weight scale in that both the camera
and the scale create their own Wi-Fi network, but the two devices differ significantly
in setup application UI and steps required. The skills learned setting up the scale
do not necessarily transfer to setting up the camera.
Finally, if the projected proliferation of IoT devices happens, each of us may
interact with dozens of IoT devices on a daily basis. Without a consistent means
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of configuring devices, we may have to deal with dozens of setup applications (an
app for the washing machine, a different app for the refrigerator, a different app for
the lighting system, and so forth). Each of these setup applications will likely have
differing UI’s and steps users must take. This situation will likely be bewildering
and unmanageable for many users. Also, each application widens the potential
attack surface that malicious actors may be able to exploit!
2.8.2 How are new devices actually configured
Researchers have proposed many technical solutions to the problem of how to
securely configure new devices. While the proposed approaches vary widely,
they can be categorized into two main groups: out-of-band (OOB) and in-band
communications. In OOB solutions a secret key is exchanged between devices
over a secondary communications channel that is impervious to observation and
interference by an adversary; the devices then bootstrap a secure connection over
the primary channel using the information exchanged over the secondary channel.
In-band approaches differ in that they only use the primary communication channel
to establish a secure connection. In this section we examine some of the proposed
solutions and highlight some of their differences with Wanda.
Out-Of-Band
Systems employing an OOB approach use a secondary channel to exchange secret
information (e.g., a cryptographic key) that is used to secure the primary channel’s
communication. While many methods have been proposed, they all convey secret
information over secondary channels such as: wired, visual, audio, gesture, or
out-of-band radios such as RFID or NFC. These approaches, however, assume the
presence of hardware that may not be present on some devices and may also require
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Step Description
1. Go to http://www.fitbit.com/setup.
2. Click the Get Started button below Aria.
3. Double-click the .dmg file in your Downloads folder.
NOTE: If the file does not appear on your desktop, search for
“Fitbit Wi-Fi Scale Setup” using the Spotlight search feature.
4. Click Get Started.
5. a. If you don’t already have a Fitbit.com account, enter your email
address and a password and click Sign up.
b. If you have a Fitbit.com account, select Log in to your account and
enter your Fitbit.com credentials, then click Log in.
6. Enter or confirm your personal information and click Next. This
information personalizes your Fitbit experience. By default this
personal information is only visible to your friends, but you can adjust
your privacy settings from your Fitbit.com account to control what
information is shared with others.
7. Name your scale and input your initials, then click Next.
8. The setup software will attempt to detect your Wi-Fi network.
If the software does not detect your Wi-Fi network, it will show all
visible networks in range. Select your network from the list.
If your network is password-protected, enter your password in the
box to the right and click Connect.
NOTE: If your network is hidden or does not appear in this list, select
Add Network. Enter your network’s name and password and click
Connect to continue.
9. If you have not already put your scale into Setup Mode, the onscreen
instructions will direct you to do so by removing a battery for 10
seconds and then reinserting it.
10. Click Connect to start searching for your scale. When your computer
finds the scale, the setup software will show a success screen. The
software will automatically transfer the wireless network credentials to
the scale, and your scale’s display will show a checkmark.
11. Click Done, place the scale on a hard surface, and weigh yourself to
start tracking your weight.
12. Following a weight measurement, a checkmark on the scale’s display
will indicate a successful sync with your Fitbit.com Dashboard.
NOTE: If you have trouble setting up your Aria using the Fitbit
Wi-Fi Scale Setup software, please try the web-based setup
method at http://fitbit.com/scale/setup/start.
Table 2.3: Steps to configure a Fitbit Aria scale using Mac OS X. Users must go through
several steps and must know their Wi-Fi SSID and password to complete the configuration
(from www.fitbit.com/setup/aria; emphasis on step 8 is ours).
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complex processing that exceeds the capabilities of embedded devices.
The wired approaches assume the presence of a cable that is able to connect
devices [62, 119]. Many devices today, however, do not have a compatible wired
interface or are mobile, making a cable run impractical.
The visual channel assumes the presence of cameras to capture an image
such as QR codes [16], 2D bar codes [76], or blinking LEDs [104, 103], and may
also require displays on some of the devices to show changing codes [108]. The
visual channel also normally requires a great deal of computational capability on
the devices to analyze the images captured.
The audio channel requires microphones to listen to environmental noises
or human voices [41]. Additionally, the audio channel may require speakers to
purposely generate tones [118].
Some gesture approaches require coordinated button presses [117] while
others require accelerometers [74]. Aside from the fact that many devices do
not have accelerometers or the computational horsepower to run the required
algorithms, some sensitive devices may not tolerate being jostled, and some are
simply too big to shake.
Approaches requiring secondary radios such as RFID or NFC have also been
proposed. These radios, however, have not yet been widely deployed on actual
devices. Medical devices in particular tend not to have RFID or NFC capabilities.
Unlike smart phones, medical devices tend to have only one radio.
Wanda differs significantly from these all of these approaches in that it does
not assume the presence of specialized hardware other than the existing wireless
radio, nor does it require advanced processing power. Furthermore, Wanda requires
little human effort and the Wand’s mobility allows it to be used when devices that
are not physically adjacent or would be inconvenient to move (such as a treadmill
and a Wi-Fi AP).
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In-Band
Researchers have also suggested techniques that do not require a OOB channel,
but instead exploit characteristics of the in-band radio channel. These techniques
are typically more closely aligned with Wanda than OOB techniques. Although
Gollakota et al. developed an in-band method to defend against Man-In-The-Middle
attacks [39], their approach relies on changes to the Wi-Fi specification.
Most in-band approaches, however, use characteristics of the radio channel
to develop a secret key independently on two devices. To develop the secret key,
each device typically goes through several phases. The first phase is bit extraction,
where each device monitors a common radio channel simultaneously and extracts
bits from extreme signal fluctuations to form a string of bits. Next, reconciliation
attempts to ensure both devices have extracted the same bit string. This normally
involves several rounds exchanging information about portions of the bit string,
such as checksums, in the clear. Finally, a privacy amplification phase reduces the
size of the bit string to form a secret key that is known to the participating devices
and unknown (with high probability) to an adversary [11]. Several works use a
variant of this extraction-reconciliation-amplification approach. ProxiMate [73],
for example, uses FM radio or TV signals to generate its bit string, but requires
additional radios to tune those signals. BANA [112] and ASK-BAN [113] use on
and off-body signal propagation for bit extraction. Zeng et al. use multiple antennas
for bit extraction, followed by reconciliation and amplification [137].
The extraction-reconciliation-amplification approach has several shortcomings.
First, it is quite slow, often taking 30 seconds or more to make connections. Wanda
is fast, taking less than half a second on average to send a 128-bit message. Another
problem is that Wi-Fi, in many practical environments where device connections
might be made, lacks the necessary entropy to extract a secure bit string [59]. Wanda
does not rely on random environmental fluctuations to generate common bits on
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two devices; it imparts the bits onto a target device based on the antenna chosen by
the Wand.
Wanda does share common elements with two papers. In Good Neighbor [18]
the authors use a technique similar to Wanda to determine if a sending device with
a single antenna is in close proximity to a receiving device with two antennas. Good
Neighbor, however, runs significantly slower on average than Wanda and requires
the use of public key cryptography to transfer data between devices whereas
Wanda does not. Wanda could be useful for devices with limited computational
and storage capabilities. Additionally, Good Neighbor requires two devices to move
in close proximity with each other. Wanda uses a mobile Wand that allows devices
to be physically distant from each other. This would be useful if the devices are not
easily moved, such as a refrigerator connecting with a Wi-Fi AP.
Another recent approach called SeAK [60] uses two antennas to develop a
secret key, but each device independently develops a key based on the RSSI of
exchanged frames. In Wanda, the Wand knows the secret information and imparts
it onto the other device without the need for the Wand to develop the same key as
the target device.
2.9 User Study
After IRB approval, we conducted a 36-person user study to evaluate the ease of
use and effectiveness of our Wanda prototype.
2.9.1 Participants
There were 16 males and 20 females in our subject population, ranging in age from
24 to 76. Subjects were randomly recruited from people passing by in public places
such as a library. While we did not screen for it, all subjects had Wi-Fi in their
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homes.
Before beginning the experiment, subjects who agreed to participate were
asked for demographic information, which consisted of their age, gender, and
experience using wireless technology. Subjects rated their experience with wireless
devices on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 indicated limited or no experience with wireless
technology and 5 indicated expert or “power user.” We later grouped the subjects
into categories based on their self-reported experience. Those subjects who rated
themselves a 1 or 2 we categorized as Novices, those who rated themselves as a
3 were classified as Intermediates, and 4 or 5 were Experts. Our study population
consisted of 12 members from each category for a total of 36 subjects.
2.9.2 Task
After collecting the demographic information, researchers told the subjects that
the purpose of the study was to evaluate a new technique for configuring wireless
devices. One of the major goals of Wanda is to impart configuration information
onto any type of wireless target device in a consistent manner. This means that
we cannot assume the target device has any specific kind of input method such as
a USB port. To simulate a device with minimum inputs, we simply used a 3 cm
x 10 cm x 3 cm cardboard box with a single Alfa Networks AWUS036H Wi-Fi
antenna [4] hidden inside. The Alfa Networks antenna was connected to a MacBook
Pro running the target device portion of the Wanda software.
The box size was chosen because it was nearly identical to several commercial
blood-pressure monitors such as the Fora D30 [35] and because it was large enough
so that the data transfer would fail if the user did not move the Wand close enough
to the correct location on the target device. The box was adorned with a Wanda
logo (see Figure 2.15) affixed near the Alfa Networks antenna to indicate where
the user should move the Wand. We envision that future production devices may
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Figure 2.15: Target device is a simulated blood-pressure monitor. Note the Wanda logo on
the side of the device. Photo by Timothy J. Pierson.
come pre-marked with the antenna location, but even if they are not marked, the
Wand can guide the user to the correct location using the technique described in
Section 2.3.
Subjects were asked to imagine that the target device was a Wi-Fi-enabled
blood-pressure monitor that their doctor had asked them to take home and use
everyday. In the imagined scenario, the simulated blood-pressure monitor would
transmit blood-pressure readings to the subject’s doctor through a Wi-Fi connection.
The subject’s task was then to configure the simulated blood-pressure monitor to
connect to a Wi-Fi AP.
2.9.3 Procedure
After explaining the task, the researcher then showed the subject the prototype
Wand and told that them that the Wand could wirelessly impart the network name
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Wanda	  Connec*on	  Instruc*ons	  
Step	  1:	  Locate	  the	  Wanda	  logo	  on	  the	  device	  to	  be	  connected	  
New	  device	  
Wanda	  logo	  
Step	  2:	  Touch	  the	  wand	  to	  the	  logo	  and	  hold	  steady	  for	  5	  seconds	  
New	  device	  
Touch	  wand	  to	  logo,	  and	  
hold	  5	  seconds	  
For	  help:	  
Call	  (555)	  123-­‐4567	  
or	  	  
Watch	  video	  at:	  
www.wanda-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.com	  
Figure 2.16: Instructions provided to subjects. Note that the instructions included a phone
number to call for help and a link to a video, but no subjects elected to use those options.
and password of a Wi-Fi network onto the simulated blood-pressure monitor. If the
subject asked how the Wand got the network name and password, the researcher
explained that in one arrangement the Wand was envisioned to be part of the AP,
connecting to the AP over a wired USB connection so the Wand could get the SSID
and password securely over the wire, without fear of a hacker intercepting the
credentials.
Once the researcher explained that the purpose of the Wand, subjects were
shown the instructions in Figure 2.16. The researcher asked the subject to read the
instructions and when they felt like they understood how to use the Wand, to let
the researcher know. After showing the instructions to the subject, the researcher
refused to answer any questions about how to use the Wand.
The instructions have two steps: (1) Locate the Wanda logo on the device to be
configured (e.g., the simulated blood-pressure monitor in this case), and (2) Touch
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the Wand to the logo and hold steady for five seconds. The first step was included
so the subject would know where to place the Wand so that the Wand could run
the detect and impart primitive operations. The second step of the instructions was
provided so that the subject understood they should actually move the Wand in
close proximity to the target device.
The subjects were not asked to initiate the Wanda protocol on the target
device. To provide security against an adversary who might try to impart his own
information onto a target by modulating his transmit power to simulate the Wand’s
two antennas, Wanda calls for the protocol to begin only after the user takes an
action on the target device such as pressing a button. Because the target device
could have any number of different interfaces to begin the protocol (e.g., on one
type of device the user presses a button, on another type the user selects from a list
of options displayed on a screen, on another type the user shakes the device), we
elected to forgo this step for consistency.
After the subject indicated they were ready to begin, the researcher told the
subject that he would like the subject to try using the Wand five times to configure
the simulated blood-pressure monitor. The researcher then placed both the Wand
and the simulated blood-pressure monitor on a desk in front of the subject and
started the Wanda software running on the Wand and the simulated blood-pressure
monitor. The Wand would then play a sound file instructing the subject to, “Move
the Wand close to the target device.” If the subject moved the Wand close enough
for the Wand to detect proximity with the simulated blood-pressure monitor, the
Wand played a sound file that said, “Transferring data.” If they did not move within
close proximity within four seconds, the Wand played a sound file that said, “Touch
the Wand to the Wanda logo and hold steady.” This repeated every four seconds
until the Wand was close or 100 seconds elapsed, in which case the Wand timed
out and declared the configuration a failure. If proximity was detected and the
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data transfer completed (this took approximately 0.5 seconds), the Wand played a
sound file that said either, “Successfully configured device”, if the impart succeeded
and the target device received all bits correctly, or “Configuration failed, please try
again”, if the impart failed and the target device did not receive all bits correctly.
A trial succeed if the target was able to decode a SSID of “Linksys” and an
eight-character password (128 bits in total). If the simulated blood-pressure monitor
did not receive the SSID and password correctly, or if 100 seconds elapsed, the trial
was considered a failure. After each trial, the researcher returned the Wand and
target device to the desk.
2.9.4 Results
We evaluated Wanda on reliability, speed, and ease of use for each of the subject
categories – Novice, Intermediate, or Expert.
Reliability
To be considered reliable, Wanda must correctly impart data onto the target device
with high probably. Each of the 36 study participants used the Wand five times
for a total of 180 trials. Of those 180 trials, 174 succeeded for a 96.6% success rate.
Figure 2.17 shows the result for each of the five trials for each participant where the
participants are sorted by their self-reported familiarity with wireless technology.
None of the 12 Experts failed in any of their 60 attempts to configure the target
device. Three of the Novices and three of the Intermediates each failed on one of
their attempts, although no subject failed more than one time, and five of the six
failures were on the first attempt. If we do not consider the subject’s first attempt to
use the Wand, their success rate improved to 99.4%.
Failures occurred when the subject moved the Wand away from the target
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Figure 2.17: Outcome of five trials for each study participant. Success indicates the target
device correctly received the SSID and password imparted by the Wand. Failure indicates the
target device did not correctly receive the data.
device while the impart primitive was running. This movement away made it
impossible for the target device to determine which antenna sent the frames at the
end of message string m. This is by design to prevent an attacker located more than
approximately 30 cm away from learning the data imparted by the Wand. Without
prompting from the researcher, each subject correctly used the Wand on subsequent
attempts after the initial failure.
Using Wanda, even inexperienced Novices and Intermediates were ultimately
able to configure a device with the same level of accuracy as the Experts. To
confirm there was no difference between the subjects based on their self-reported
familiarity with wireless technology, we performed an ANOVA analysis of the trials.
A successful trial was recorded as a 1 and an unsuccessful trial was recorded as a
0. The p-value was 0.215, suggesting no statistical difference between the groups.
After eliminating the first trial the p-value climbs to 0.371, further reinforcing the
66
Novices Intermediates Experts
Se
co
nd
s
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Elapsed Time
Figure 2.18: Elapsed time. Time in seconds between starting the Wanda protocol and suc-
cess or failure. There were 60 trials in each group. The box represents the 75th and 25th
percentiles, the red line is the median, and the whiskers represent the range of times.
notion that all groups are equally skilled using Wanda.
Given the high probably of successfully configuring the target device, we
conclude that Wanda is reliable, even for inexperienced users.
Speed
To evaluate the speed of Wanda we measured the elapsed time from when the
subject was asked to begin a trial until the time when the target device reported
success or failure. The results are shown in Figure 2.18.
We see that the participants were able to complete the task in under 7 seconds
on average and all trials took less than 14 seconds. From Figure 2.18 it appears that
Novices were on average slightly faster than Intermediates and Experts and had
less variability in timing than the other groups. Normally we would expect Novices
to take longer and have more variability configuring a device to connect to a Wi-Fi
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AP than Intermediates or Experts. Our goal for Wanda was to make configuring
devices as fast for Novices as it is for Experts. To evaluate whether there was any
statistical difference between the groups, we performed an ANOVA analysis using
the timing data. The p-value between groups was 0.087, suggesting no statistically
significant difference between the groups.
For comparison, three expert users followed the directions given in Table 2.3
to configure the Fitbit Aria smart scale and it took them on average over 24 minutes
to complete the configuration the first time. The first trial, however, required the
users to create accounts and download software. A second trial, using the accounts
and downloaded software from the first trial, still took the three experts nearly 6
minutes on average to complete.
We conclude that Wanda is fast in comparison with traditional setup applica-
tion such as the Fitbit Aria and is fast regardless of the subject’s familiarity with
configuring wireless devices.
Ease of use
We conducted a structured interview after the usage trials to get a deeper under-
standing of each subject’s experience using wireless devices prior to and after the
user study. While we did not explicitly screen for it, all subjects had Wi-Fi in their
homes and had used it previously. Most of them, 32 out of 36, had previously
connected devices to their Wi-Fi AP, but four had not. Interestingly, 20 of the 32
subjects who attempted to connect a device found it too difficult to do by themselves
and had to call someone for help. Table 2.4 shows who was called.
From Table 2.4 we see that family members are most commonly called upon
for help, but corporate IT departments are also sharing a good deal of the burden
for setting up personal devices for our study subjects. Other IT support such as
the subject’s cable TV provider also fielded a number of help requests. Device
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Number
of calls Entity called
6 Spouse/relative
5 IT support (work)
4 IT support (other)
3 Device manufacturer
2 Friend
Table 2.4: Calls for help. 20 of 32 subjects who attempted to configure a wireless device
without using Wanda needed to call for help. This table shows the number of calls to help
entities.
manufacturers (e.g., Cisco) and non-family friends were called less frequently.
While none of our study participants reported using a professional installer, clearly
the group was reliant on others for help.
One of the major problems many of the subjects reported was remembering
their Wi-Fi AP’s network name and password: 18 said they knew their network’s
name and password, 13 said they did not know the password because it was
complex (and written down somewhere), and 5 (about 14%) did not know the
password at all and did not know how to find it. With Wanda the user does not
need to know the network credentials – the Wand learns them over a wire and then
imparts them onto devices. Because the user does not need to memorize (or write
down) the network credentials, stronger, more complex passwords can be used
with the same ease as simple, easy to crack passwords. Wanda could be extended
to allow each device have its own unique password to access the network such
as in 802.1x networks typically found in corporate environments and managed by
technology professionals, or in proposed research initiatives such as MultiNet [16].
We asked the subjects to rate how confident they are that they could configure
a wireless device before and after using Wanda. Before using Wanda, the subjects
rated themselves an average 3.4 on a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 indicated they had no
confidence they could configure a device and 5 indicated they were very confident
they could configure a device. After using Wanda, all subjects except one reported
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they were a 5 on the same scale. The subject who did not report a 5 said he was 4.5
due to one of the trials failing. ANOVA analysis yielded a p-value of 1.4× 10−10,
suggesting it is extremely unlikely the subject’s confidence levels did not improve.
The subjects generally enjoyed using Wanda. We asked them for general
comments on Wanda’s approach versus methods they had previously used to
configure devices and their comments are listed in Appendix A.2. While most of
the comments are extremely positive, subject number 12 was concerned that this
approach would be less safe than entering her password herself, noting that she
had previous experienced identity theft. None of the other participants expressed
security concerns.
Finally, the subjects all understood how to use the Wand simply by reading
the instructions in Figure 2.16. The instructions contained a phone number to call
for help (which rang at the researcher’s desk) and link to a video. None of the
subjects elected to call the help line or watch the video.
Based on these results, we conclude Wanda is easy to use.
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3
Physical Layer Concepts
So far in this thesis we have focused on RSSI as the primary characteristic of a
radio signal. RSSI, however, is a relatively coarse description of a signal, providing
limited information. Much of the cutting-edge research on radio communications
these days uses more detailed information about the physical layer (sometimes
referred to as PHY layer). The terms used in the physical-layer literature, however,
can be confusing for researchers accustomed to working at layers above the physical
layer. In this section we briefly review some of the basic physical-layer concepts that
we build upon in following chapters. Readers familiar with PHY-layer concepts can
safely skip this chapter.
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We begin with a discussion of how complex numbers provide a convenient
way to mathematically describe and manipulate radio signals. Next we review
how real hardware uses complex numbers to create sophisticated modulation
schemes such as Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM). Because our focus in
is primarily oriented around Wi-Fi, we discuss how Wi-Fi uses these modulation
schemes together with Orthogonal Frequency Division Modulation (OFDM) to
create fast and reliable wireless data transfer. Finally, we revisit how a signal changes
as it propagates through space while traveling from transmitter to receiver and how
those changes can be estimated by a receiver using Channel State Information (CSI).
3.1 Complex number review
Complex numbers are a convenient way for a single quantity to represent vectors
in a two-dimensional space. Complex numbers are the sum of two components: a
real component and an imaginary component. The real component is simply an
ordinary number, and the imaginary component is also an ordinary number but
is multiplied by
√−1. Complex numbers are represented in rectangular form as
a + bj, where a is the real component, b is the imaginary component, and j is
√−1.
Mathematicians often use i to represent
√−1, while engineers typically use j. In
this thesis we use j.
Complex numbers can be viewed in the complex plane where the horizontal axis
maps the real component (often denoted as Re, or I for the “in-phase” component
described in Section 3.3.1) and the vertical axis maps the imaginary component (of-
ten denoted as Im, or Q for the “quadrature” component described in Section 3.3.1)
of a complex number as shown in Figure 3.1.
A complex number can be separated into its real and imaginary components
using two operators: <(x) returns the real component, and =(x) returns the imagi-
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Figure 3.1: Numbers plotted in the complex plane. Several complex numbers in the form a+ bj
are plotted in complex plane.
nary component of complex number x without the j. For example, if x = 5+ 3.2j,
then <(x) = 5 and =(x) = 3.2.
In addition to the rectangular notation described above, complex numbers can
also be described in polar notation. In polar notation, points in the complex plane
are described in terms of phase angle θ and a magnitude M instead of coordinates a
and b. Magnitude M represents the distance of a point from the origin, while phase
θ is an arc from the positive real axis in a counterclockwise direction as shown in
Figure 3.2.
Because rectangular notation and polar notation both describe the same point,
we can convert between them. Equation (3.1) converts from rectangular to polar
notation and Equation (3.2) converts from polar to rectangular notation.
From rectangular to polar:
M =
√
(<(x)2 +=(x)2
θ = arctan[=(x)/<(x)].
(3.1)
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Figure 3.2: Polar form. Converting rectangular point 5 + 3.2j to polar notation with magnitude
M =
√
52 + 3.22 and phase θ = arctan(3.2/5).
From polar to rectangular:
<(x) = Mcos(θ)
=(x) = Msin(θ).
(3.2)
Applying Equation (3.1) to the point x = 5 + 3.2j yields polar coordinates
M =
√
52 + 3.22 and θ = arctan(3.2/5). The key idea is that the same point can be
represented in either rectangular or polar form in the complex plane. In rectangular
form information is carried in variables a and b, but the entire complex number is
the expression a + bj. Similarly, in polar notation the information is contained in M
and θ, but the entire complex number is the expression M(cos(θ) + jsin(θ)).
The fact that the same point can be represented in two ways yields the follow-
ing equality:
a + bj = M(cos(θ) + jsin(θ)). (3.3)
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Additionally, we know from Euler that [115]:
ejx = cos(x) + jsin(x). (3.4)
Substituting the Euler’s formula in Equation (3.4) into Equation (3.3), we see
that:
a + bj = Mejθ. (3.5)
Describing a point in the form Mejθ is especially useful for describing a radio
signal. As discussed below, we often use two features to describe a signal: M to
denote the magnitude (amplitude) of a signal, and θ to describe its phase. Complex
numbers provide a compact representation of both aspects the signal in a single
value and a convenient way to mathematically manipulate a signal.
3.2 Representing a sinusoid as a complex number
Communication systems often use a high-frequency carrier signal (sometimes called
the bandpass signal) to “carry” a lower frequency information signal (sometimes
called the baseband signal). In this case the carrier frequency is modulated (changed)
according to the lower frequency information signal. Except for extremely ba-
sic modulation schemes such as on/off keying, the carrier signal itself provides
no information – the information is encoded by modulating the carrier signal in
some manner. If the modulation is done in a predetermined fashion, a receiver
can demodulate (recover) the information signal encoded onto the carrier by a
transmitter.
As suggested above, a radio signal can be described in terms of two values:
magnitude and phase. The following formula is the standard way to represent a
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sinusoid radio signal and uses magnitude and phase to describe the signal over
time in polar notation [127]:
V(t) = Mcos(2pi fct + φ) (3.6)
where V(t) is the voltage of a signal at time t, M is the magnitude or amplitude of
the signal, fc is the frequency of the carrier signal,1 and φ is the phase offset of the
signal.
Given magnitude and phase information from Equation (3.6), the state of the
signal in the complex plane at an instantaneous point in time can be plotted as
discussed above. Furthermore, coordinates of the signal in rectangular form can
be computed using Equation (3.2). Figure 3.3 shows the conversion to rectangular
coordinates for a point with magnitude M and phase θ. Basic trigonometry confirms
the rectangular coordinates of the point are (I, Q), where I = Mcos(φ) and Q =
Msin(φ).
While somewhat counterintuitive, describing the signal in terms of point (I, Q)
provides an easy way to modulate a signal. Next we discuss how actual hardware
uses these coordinates to modulate a carrier frequency’s phase and amplitude,
imparting the information signal onto the carrier.
3.3 Modulating a sinusoid signal with actual hardware
An unmodulated sinusoid carries no information; for a signal to convey information,
it will need to be modulated in one or more ways. Recall from Equation (3.6) that
a sinusoid can be described as Mcos(2pi fct + φ). This equation suggests three
possibilities to impart information onto the carrier signal – vary amplitude M by
12pi fc is sometimes called the natural frequency often denoted as ω, and represents the rate of
change of the signal in radians per second.
76
Sinusoid at point in time
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(I,Q)
I = Mcos(?)
Q = Msin(?)
Figure 3.3: Plotting phase and magnitude with I and Q. Given phase and magnitude informa-
tion, the state of a signal can be plotted in the complex plane in rectangular form as a point
(I, Q).
changing the transmit power, vary frequency fc by changing the cycles per second
of the signal, or vary phase by changing the phase offset φ of the signal. Sometimes
more than one of these factors are modulated simultaneously.
Mathematically, these factors can be modeled by converting the values that
were previously constants in Equation (3.6) into time-varying vectors:
• M(t) for amplitude
• f (t) for frequency
• φ(t) for phase.
In this section we examine how the magnitude and phase of a carrier frequency
can easily be modulated by changing I and Q.
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3.3.1 I and Q
While there are three possibilities for modulating a signal, it is difficult with physical
hardware to precisely modulate the phase of signal in accordance with an input
signal. We can, however, accomplish the same thing and avoid directly manipu-
lating the carrier’s phase by modulating the I and Q values discussed above. To
understand why, we turn to the following trigonometric identity [36]:
cos(α+ β) = cos(α)cos(β)− sin(α)sin(β). (3.7)
Applying this trigonometric identity to Equation (3.6), where a signal is de-
scribed by Mcos(2pi fct + φ), multiplying Equation (3.7) by M, and substituting
2pi fct for α and φ for β yields:
Mcos(2pi fct + φ) = Mcos(2pi fct)cos(φ)−Msin(2pi fct)sin(φ). (3.8)
We saw from Equation (3.2) and Figure 3.3 that I = Mcos(φ) and Q =
Msin(φ). Substituting I and Q into Equation (3.8) yields:
Mcos(2pi fct + φ) = Icos(2pi fct)−Qsin(2pi fct). (3.9)
Equation (3.9) shows that by changing I and Q, we can steer the coordinates
of the modulated signal (e.g., the left side of Equation (3.9)) in the complex plane to
any desired location. Then by using Equation (3.1) we can convert back to polar
notation, yielding the new magnitude and phase of the modulated signal.
Furthermore, building on Equation (3.9), we see that it is possible to modulate
a single carrier frequency with both the I and Q components. A sine wave and a
cosine wave of the same frequency have a 90-degree (pi/2 radians) phase offset
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between them (e.g., cos(2pi fct− pi/2) = sin(2pi fct)). Signals with a 90-degree offset
are said to be in quadrature with each other. By convention, the cosine wave in
Equation (3.9) is said to be the in-phase or I component of the signal, while the sine
wave is said to be the quadrature or Q component. We can leverage the quadrature
nature of the sine and cosine wave in Equation 3.9 by substituting a cosine wave for
the sine wave as follows:
Mcos(2pi fct + φ) = Icos(2pi fct)−Qcos(2pi fct− pi/2). (3.10)
With Equation 3.10 we see that a single input frequency with no phase shift
can be modulated by the I component (the in-phase component) and a 90-degree
phase shifted version of the same input frequency can be modulated by the Q
component (the quadrature component). Because of its quadrature nature, this
modulation technique is called Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM).
Figure 3.4 shows a simple hardware diagram of a transmitter that implements
Equation (3.10), illustrating how a single carrier frequency can be modulated by
both I and Q. In this diagram the circles with an ‘X’ represent mixers – devices that
perform frequency multiplication and either upconvert from the baseband signal to
the carrier frequency or downconvert from the carrier frequency to the baseband
signal [81]. In Figure 3.4 we see the I/Q modulator mixing the I signal with the
unaltered RF carrier wave, and mixing the Q signal with a quadrature (90-degree
offset) version of the same RF carrier. The Q signal is subtracted from the I signal
as in Equation (3.10) to produce the final RF modulated waveform.
At the receiver the process is reversed. The incoming RF signal is mixed with
the output of a local oscillator with a zero phase shift to recover the I component
of the signal, and the RF is separately mixed with a 90-degree offset of the local
oscillator output to recover the Q portion. We examine the receiver closely in
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Figure 3.4: Simplified hardware diagram of an I/Q modulator [81].
Chapter 4.
In summary, Quadrature Amplitude Modulation modulates an in-phase ver-
sion of a RF carrier with the I information signal and a 90-degree phase shifted
version of the same RF carrier with the Q information signal. This allows QAM
to shift the output signal to any (I, Q) point, and thus any desired magnitude and
phase.
3.4 BPSK, QPSK, and QAM modulation
To illustrate how I and Q can be used to implement real-world modulation schemes,
consider the case where I and Q can take the value of 0 or 1, that is: I, Q ∈ {0, 1}.
In this case, if I = 1 and Q = 0, then by Equation (3.10) the output is simply the
cosine wave (phase equal to 0). If I = 0 and Q = 1, then the output is a sine wave
(phase shifted 90 degrees). If both I and Q are 1, then the output is the combination
of both phase shifts (0 and 90 degrees), resulting in a new signal with a phase shift
of 45 degrees.
3.4.1 BPSK
Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK) exploits this concept. In BPSK, Q is kept constant
at 0, and I is modulated as either +1 or -1. This creates a phase shift when I
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Figure 3.5: Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK). BPSK keeps Q constant and modulates I,
producing a change in phase when the value of I changes [124].
modulates as shown in Figure 3.5. The resulting signal has either a phase of 0
degrees or a phase of 180 degrees, depending on whether I was +1 or -1. Figure 3.6
shows the results graphically in a plot called a constellation diagram. Table 3.1 shows
the resulting phase from I ∈ {−1,+1} and Q = 0. The receiver can use the signal’s
phase to decode a bit as a 1 if the phase shift is 0 and to decode a bit as 0 if the phase
shift is 180 degrees.
I Q Phase
+1 0 0
-1 0 180
Table 3.1: BPSK phases in degrees. In BPSK I ∈ {+1,−1} and Q = 0, resulting in two
possible phases.
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BPSK constellation diagram
M=1
?=0
I,Q
(1,0)
M=1
?=180
I,Q
(-1,0)
I
Q
1-1
1
-1
Figure 3.6: BPSK constellation diagram showing the two possible phases where I ∈
{−1,+1} and Q = 0.
3.4.2 QPSK
Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (QPSK, sometimes referred to as 4-QAM) builds on
BPSK by allowing both I and Q to take values of either +1 or -1. Table 3.2 shows the
phase values the signal can take on and Figure 3.7 shows the resulting constellation
diagram. Given that values of I and Q are either +1 or -1, there are four distinct
values each transmission can assume. Each distinct value is called a symbol and
each symbol can represent two bits in QPSK. Because each symbol can represent
two bits, QPSK can transmit data twice as fast as BPSK.
I Q Phase
+1 +1 45
-1 +1 135
-1 -1 225
+1 -1 315
Table 3.2: [QPSK phases in degrees. In QPSK I, Q ∈ {+1,−1}, resulting in four possible
phases.
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QPSK constellation diagram
?
M
I
Q
(1,1)
1
(-1,-1)
-1
(-1,1) 1
(1,-1)-1
Figure 3.7: QPSK constellation diagram showing the four possible phases where I, Q ∈
{−1,+1}.
3.4.3 QAM
More complex QAM modulations simply have more states that I and Q can take
on. For example, in 16-QAM, I and Q can each take on one of four discrete values
{-3, -1, +1, +3}, resulting in 16 possible combinations of amplitude and phase. These
16 positions effectively allow 16-QAM to transmit 4 bits per symbol as shown in the
constellation diagram in Figure 3.8. This allows 16-QAM to transmit data at twice
the rate of QPSK and four times the rate of BPSK.
Other modulations schemes allow for more values for I and Q – 64-QAM
has 64 symbols and transmits 6 bits per symbol, and 256-QAM has 256 symbols,
transmitting 8 bits per symbol. Also, because I and Q can assume the same values
(e.g., either +1 or -1 in QPSK, or one of four values in 16-QAM, and so on), the
resulting constellation diagrams are square.
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16-QAM constellation diagram
I
Q
1 3-3 -1
1
3
-1
-3
Figure 3.8: 16-QAM constellation diagram showing the 16 possible phases and amplitudes
where I, Q ∈ {−3,−1,+1,+3}. Because I and Q can each take on one of four different
values, there are 16 possible combinations and each symbol in 16-QAM represents four bits.
3.4.4 Demodulation
When a receiver demodulates a symbol, it effectively plots the position of the
symbol’s I and Q components on a constellation diagram and selects the closest
reference point on the constellation diagram as the most probable value the sender
transmitted. Noise on the channel, however, can cause alter the demodulated I
and Q values and cause the receiver to misinterpret the sender’s symbol. As the
modulation scheme increases in complexity, the number of values I and Q can
take on increases, increasing the chance for error. In practice, complex modulation
schemes are chosen when the channel is relatively noise-free to increase throughput,
and simpler schemes are chosen in noisy conditions to increase reliability.
We examine demodulation closely in Chapter 4 where we build our own Wi-Fi
receiver using a Software Defined Radio (SDR).
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3.5 Wi-Fi OFDM
So far we have discussed modulating signals in general. In this section we focus
on how Wi-Fi in particular uses the modulation techniques described above, to-
gether with Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM), to provide fast and
reliable information transfer. At the physical layer, Wi-Fi versions 802.11a/g/n/ac
use OFDM to send portions of a data over several orthogonal (non-interfering)
frequencies simultaneously.2 Wi-Fi’s implementation of OFDM creates 14 channels
in the 2.4 GHz band and 24 channels in the 5 GHz band.3 Each channel is 20
MHz wide4 and is divided into 64 subcarriers that are separated by 312.5 KHz,
although only 48 of the 64 subcarriers are used to carry data in 802.11a/g (the other
subcarriers are pilot and guard subcarriers) and 52 carry data in 802.11n/ac. Each
subcarrier can be thought of as its own narrowband data channel and is modulated
independently of the other subcarriers. This means that Wi-Fi can send 48 or 52
symbols in parallel with each symbol modulated with either BPSK, QPSK, 16-QAM,
64-QAM, or 256-QAM, and with each symbol on its own subcarrier. Collectively
this collection of data symbols is called an OFDM symbol and lasts 4 microseconds
according to the Wi-Fi specification [57]. The choice of modulation scheme depends
on the hardware capabilities of the transmitter and receiver, and the noisiness of the
channel. As noted above, the more complex modulation schemes allow more bits
per symbol, which equates to faster data throughput, but can lead to more errors
when the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) is low.
In addition to providing faster throughput by parallel transmission of data on
2The older 802.11b uses Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) instead of OFDM. In this thesis
we focus on OFDM techniques.
3802.11a only uses the 5 GHz band, 802.11g uses the 2.4 GHz band, 802.11n/ac can use either
the 2.4 GHz or the 5 GHz band. Some countries restrict usage of some channels due to concerns of
interference with other systems such as weather radar.
4802.11n/ac can use wider channels, but in this thesis we focus on standard 20 MHz wide
channels.
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separate subcarriers, the multiple OFDM frequencies help combat the fast-fading
effects of multipath described in Section 2.2. Under multipath conditions, a signal
reflects from obstacles in the environment and multiple copies of the signal arrive at
the receiver with different delays, amplitudes, and phases. Sometimes the multiple
copies of the signal combine destructively. Small changes in the position of the
transmitter or receiver, or other moving objects in the environment, can significantly
alter the received strength of a signal, sometimes severely fading a signal that had
been strong only a short while before. If a signal is highly faded, it is likely the data
transmitted will be received with errors.
OFDM attempts to avoid errors due to fading while still maintaining high
reliability by sending redundant copies of the data on different frequencies simulta-
neously. Because it is less likely that all frequencies will be highly faded at the same
time compared with sending data over only one frequency, OFDM’s frequency
multiplexing tries to ensure reliable data transfer. By using multiple frequencies
and sending data in parallel, OFDM tries to maintain high speed.
Wi-Fi attempts to combat fading by sending duplicate bits on different subcar-
riers. The process is shown in Figure 3.9. In the first part of the process data bits are
sent through a convolution encoder to introduce redundancy. For example, a 1/2
convolution code provides two output bits for every input bit. The resulting bits
can then optionally be “punctured” to remove selected bits, reducing the level of
redundancy, but increasing throughput. The resulting bits are then interleaved to
ensure redundant bits are sent on different subcarriers.
The resulting bits are then fed into a Modulator as shown in Figure 3.10 [38].
The Modulator groups bits into symbols according to the desired modulation,
BPSK, QPSK, or QAM, as described in Section 3.4. Each symbol is comprised of
a distinct phase and amplitude and depending on the modulation scheme cho-
sen, may represent multiple bits. The output of the Modulator is a stream of
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(5) QPSK Modulated
f
(6) Mapped onto Subcarriers as OFDM Symbol
(0) Data Bits (2) 3/4-Coded (3) Interleaved (4) Grouped into
QPSK Symbols
(1) 1/2-Coded
Punctured bits
Figure 1: A graphical view of the OFDM encoding process for the 18 Mbps rate (QPSK, 3/4) of 802.11a.
The data bits (0) are encoded by a rate-1/2 convolutional code (1) and then optionally punctured by dropping
certain bits for higher coding rates (here, 3/4) that send fewer redundant bits (2). The remaining bits are in-
terleaved (3) to spread the redundancy across subcarriers and protect against frequency-selective fades. These
bits are grouped into symbols (4) based on the modulation (QPSK encodes 2 bits per symbol), modulated (5),
and finally mapped onto the di↵erent subcarriers to form an OFDM symbol (6).
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Figure 2: Using some of the transmit/receive antennas in an example 2x2 system to exploit diversity and
multiplexing gain. xi and yi represent transmitted and received signals. The channel gain hij is a complex
number indicating a signal’s attenuated amplitude and phase shift over the channel between the ith transmit
antenna and the jth receive antenna. The received signals yi will additionally include thermal RF noise.
modulation sending more bits per symbol and being used
when there is a higher SNR. There are minor di↵erences be-
tween 802.11a/g and 802.11n. In 802.11a/g there are 48 data
subcarriers, 4 pilot tones for control, and 6 unused guard
subcarriers at each edge of the channel. In 802.11n, there
are only 4 guard subcarriers at each edge of the channel, and
two adjacent 20 MHz channels can be merged into a single
40 MHz channel.
The beauty of OFDM is that it divides the channel in a
way that is both computationally and spectrally e cient.
High aggregate data rates can be achieved, while the en-
coding and decoding on di↵erent subcarriers can use shared
hardware components. More relevant to our point here, how-
ever, is that OFDM transforms a single large channel into
many relatively independently faded channels. This is be-
cause multi-path fading is frequency selective, so the di↵er-
ent subcarriers will experience di↵erent fades. Some adja-
cent subcarriers may be faded in a similar way, but the fading
for more distant subcarriers is often uncorrelated. Dividing
the channel also increases the symbol time per channel, since
many slow symbols will be sent in parallel instead of many
fast symbols in sequence. This adds time diversity because
the channel is more likely to average out fades over a longer
period of time.
802.11 makes use of the frequency diversity provided by
OFDM by coding across the data carried on the subcarriers.
This uses a fraction of them for redundant information that
can later be used to correct errors that occur when fading
reduces the SNR on some of the subcarriers. First, a con-
volutional code of rate 1/2 adds redundant information. It
is then punctured [3] by removing bits as needed to support
coding rates of 2/3 and 3/4, plus 5/6 for 802.11n. At a rate
of 3/4, for example, a quarter of the data on the subcarriers
is redundant. An alternative LDPC (Low-Density Parity-
Check) code with slightly better performance can also be
used for 802.11n. Figure 1 presents a pictorial overview of
the OFDM encoding process.
The net e↵ect of OFDM plus coding is to provide consis-
tently good 802.11 performance despite significant variabil-
ity in the wireless signal due to multi-path fading.
3. SPATIAL DIVERSITY
In this section we look at spatial diversity techniques that
can be applied at the receiver and at the transmitter. Adding
multiple antennas to an 802.11n receiver or transmitter pro-
vides a new set of independently faded paths, even if the
antennas are separated by only a few centimeters. This
adds spatial diversity to the system, which can be exploited
to improve resilience to fades. There is also a power gain
from multiple receive antennas because, everything else be-
ing equal, two receive antennas will receive twice the signal.
These factors combine to improve performance at a given
distance, and hence increase range.
3.1 Receive Diversity Techniques
Consider the arrangement in Figure 2(a). One transmit
antenna at a node is sending to two receive antennas at a
Figure 3.9: OFDM encoding process. Data bits (0) are duplicated to provide redundancy
and protection against fading, but reducing throughput, and then optionally punctured (1) by
dropping certain bits for reduced redundancy but higher throughput (coding rate here is 3/4).
The remaining bits (2) are interleaved (3) to spread the redundancy across subcarriers and
protect against frequency-selective fades. Reproduced from Halperin et al. [51].
complex-valued symbols X[0] . . . X[N − 1] representing these distinct phase and
amplitude values. Stream X[0] . . . X[N − 1] is then converted to parallel by the
Serial-To-Parallel Converter with each symbol matched to one of the N subcar-
rier frequencies. This means subcarrier i will be modulated with the phase and
amplitude specified by X[i], where i = 0 . . . N − 1. Collectively the output of the
Serial-to-Parallel Converter is the frequency-domain representation of an OFDM
symbol. The frequency-domain representation is converted to the time domain
with an Inverse Discrete Fourier ransform (IDFT), most commonly implemented
with an Inverse Fast Fourier Transform (IFFT). The time-domain output of the IFFT,
x[n], is given by [38]:
x[n] =
1√
N
N−1
∑
i=0
X[i]ej2pini/N 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1. (3.11)
Next a Cyclic Prefix (CP) consisting of the last 16 samples in x is prep nded to
x. The CP is not used by the receiver, but is included to help prevent inter-symbol
interference (ISI). The time-domain signal x[n] is then converted to back to se ial
by the Parallel-to-Serial Converter and is converted from digital to analog by the
Digital to Analog (D/A) co verter, re ulting in x(t). Finally, x(t) is upconverted
with the carrier wave of frequency f0 and transmitted as s(t).
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Figure 3.10: OFDM transmit process. Data bits from Figure 3.9 are fed into a Modulator
which groups bits into complex symbols X[0] . . . X[N-1], one symbol per subcarrier. These
symbols are converted from serial to parallel and the resulting frequency-domain signal is
converted into the time domain by an IFFT operation. Next a Cyclic Prefix is added, and
the parallel time-domain signal is converted back to serial. The serial time-domain signal is
converted to analog and finally upconverted with a carrier wave of frequency f0 resulting in
transmitted signal s(t). Reproduced from Goldsmith [38].
The Wi-Fi receiver then reverses these steps to recover the 48 or 52 transmitted
symbols. We discuss this process in detail in Chapter 4.
3.6 SISO, SIMO, MISO, and MIMO
So far we have implicitly assumed that there is one transmit antenna and one
receive antenna. This configuration is often called Single Input Single Output (SISO).
Modern systems, however, frequently use multiple antennas to transmit and receive
signals. Wanda, for instance, uses two antennas on the Wand to receive signals
from the single-antenna target device to determine proximity in the detect portion
of the Wanda protocols. In this case the arrangement is called Single Input Multiple
Output (SIMO) because the signal transmitted by the single-antenna target is picked
up by multiple (in this case two) antennas on the Wand. During the impart phase of
the Wanda protocols, Wanda switches its method of operation and the Wand uses
its two antennas to transmit signals to the single-antenna target device. This type of
configuration where multiple transmit antennas send a signal to a single receiver
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Figure 3.11: SISO, SIMO, MISO and MIMO. Various antenna configurations with channel
state represented by hrt for the path between transmit antenna t and receive antenna r.
is called Multiple Input Single Output (MISO). Finally, some systems have multiple
antennas on both the transmitter and receiver. These systems are called Multiple
Input Multiple Output (MIMO). SIMO, MISO, and MIMO configurations are shown
in Figure 3.11.
3.7 Channel State Information
Now that we have reviewed how to represent, transmit, and receive signals, we
turn our attention to what happens to the signal while in transit between the
transmitter and receiver. As noted above, a signal can be changed at the receiver
by multipath effects and moving obstacles. Each antenna on a receiver acquires
a copy of the transmitted signal modified by the channel between the transmitter
and itself. The state of the channel (e.g., the nature of the changes the channel
makes to the transmitted signal) may change quickly, but can be estimated on the
receiver (and in some cases that information can be fed back to the transmitter to
allow the transmitter to alter the signal before transmission to purposefully cause
the multipath signals to add up constructively at the receiver). These estimates of
the channel’s state are called Channel State Information (CSI). The drivers on some
commercial NICs can be modified by software tools to provide their estimate of the
89
channel to user applications [52].
In Wi-Fi, the channel state for all symbols in a frame can be estimated during
the frame’s preamble. The preamble includes a number of “training” bits that
precede the data in the frame and are sent at a pre-determined amplitude and phase.
The receiver can recognize the preamble bits and compare the magnitude and
phase of the bits it receives with the pre-determined magnitude and phase of the
training bits. This allows the receiver to estimate the changes to the signal, in both
amplitude and phase, caused by the channel. CSI tools can provide their estimate of
the channel state for each data subcarrier in an OFDM channel. Because the channel
is estimated during a frame’s preamble, there is only one CSI measurement for each
Wi-Fi frame, even though a Wi-Fi frame may contain many symbols.
Radio transmissions are often modeled according to the following time-
invariant formula [127]:
y = Hx+w (3.12)
where y is the symbol received at a receiver, represented by a complex number
comprised of the magnitude and phase of the received signal, H is a matrix of
complex numbers representing CSI, the changes to the signal caused by the state of
the channel, x is the transmitted symbol, represented as a complex number of phase
and magnitude, and w is white Gaussian noise. If there are nr receive antennas and
nt transmit antennas, then H is a nr × nt matrix of complex numbers: H ∈ Cnr×nt .
It is important to note that the magnitude and phases in complex numbers
contained in matrix H represent the changes to signal as it travels through the air.
They do not represent the magnitude and phases imparted on the carrier frequency
during modulation to form symbols. The symbol modulations are represented in
vector x. Vector y represents symbol x transformed by the channel and noise.
The line-of-sight channel between transmit antenna t and receive antenna r as
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shown in Figure 3.11 is denoted as a complex number hrt [127]:
hrt = arte−j2pi f τrt (3.13)
where art is the attenuation of the signal on the path between transmit antenna t
and receive antenna r, f is the signal frequency, and τrt is the time of flight between
transmit antenna t and receive antenna r.
Each of the different paths from transmitter to receiver will impart a different
attenuation, delay, and phase shift on the signal and can be modeled in H as
follows [127]:
hrt =
P
∑
p=1
ape−j2pi f τp (3.14)
where P is the total number of paths from transmitter to receiver, including the line-
of-sight and all multipath routes, ap represents the attenuation of the signal on path
p, f is the signal’s frequency, and τp is the propagation delay (i.e., time-of-flight) for
the signal on path p.
We can also formulate h in terms of the distances and wavelength of the signal.
We know from physics that distance d is equal to rate times time, and that a radio
signal travels at the speed of light c, so distance is equal to c× τ. We also know
that the frequency f of a signal is equal to c/λ, where λ is the wavelength of the
frequency. We can substitute into Equation (3.14) to formulate the channel in terms
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of distance and signal wavelength:
Given:
dp = c× τp
f =
c
λ
Then:
τp =
dp
c
2pi f τp = 2pi(
c
λ
)(
dp
c
)
= 2pidp/λ
hrt =
P
∑
p=1
ape−j2pidp/λ.
(3.15)
A CSI tool provided by Halperin [52] that works on the Intel 5300 Wi-Fi
card [58] provides estimates of H as a nr × nt × 30 matrix of complex numbers
where each entry in H is given by Equation (3.15) in the form a + bj. Here nr is the
number of receive antennas, nt is the number of transmit antennas, and 30 is the
number of subcarriers estimated. Equation (3.1) converts from rectangular form to
polar form to produce magnitude M =
√
a2 + b2 and phase θ = arctan(b/a) for
each transmit and receive antenna pairs on the 30 different subcarriers.
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4
SNAP: SiNgle Antenna Proximity
4.1 Introduction
We saw in Chapter 2 that Wanda is a practical way for a two-antenna Wand to
securely impart data onto a nearby target device. The two-antenna Wand is able
to determine proximity with a nearby target device by examining the RSSI of a
signal transmitted by the target. If the RSSI received on the Wand’s antenna A1 is
sufficiently stronger than the signal received on antenna A2, then the Wand declares
proximity. The single-antenna target device, however, cannot use the two-antenna
method and has no way of verifying its proximity to the Wand. Without a means of
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separating nearby devices from distant devices, the single-antenna target device
could potentially be tricked into accepting data from a distant adversary that is
modulating its transmit power as discussed in Section 2.7.
To protect against a distant adversary attempting to impart data onto the
target device, in Chapter 2 we suggest that a human must intentionally initiate the
Wanda protocol by taking action such as pressing a button on the target device.
The Wand then listens for rogue Wanda frames. If rogue frames are detected, the
Wand sends a Stop message to the target device to it inform of the presence of the
adversary. Ideally, however, the target device would have its own way to recognize
frames sent by a distant device. That way if the Wanda protocol were initiated on
the target (perhaps accidentally) and the Wand were not present to monitor for
rogue frames, the target would be able to reject the distant adversary’s frames on
its own, without the Wand’s help.
In this chapter we present a technique called SNAP: SiNgle Antenna Proxim-
ity. SNAP is a novel method for a single-antenna target device to quickly determine
when it is in close proximity to a transmitting antenna. SNAP leverages the repeat-
ing nature Wi-Fi’s preamble and the characteristics of a transmitting antenna’s near
field (i.e., the region physically close to the antenna) to detect proximity with a trans-
mitter. When the target device is physically close to a transmitter, near-field effects
will cause the repeated portions of the preamble to differ in phase and amplitude,
whereas when the target device is far from the transmitter, the repeated portions
of the preamble will be received with a consistent phase and amplitude. We use
these observations to determine when the single-antenna target device is in close
proximity to a transmitter.
4.1.1 Contributions
We make the following contributions in this chapter:
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• a novel method for a single-antenna device to quickly determine when it is in
close proximity with a transmitting device;
• a reference Wi-Fi implementation that performs the same frame decoding
steps any Wi-Fi device must perform; and
• an experimental evaluation of the technique using several popular types of
antennas.
4.2 Wi-Fi Preamble
In this section we briefly describe the Wi-Fi preamble, focusing on the repeating
portions of the Long Training Field (LTF). We show that when the target is not in the
transmitter’s near field, even though the channel changes the transmitted signal, the
repeated portions are changed consistently and are received with matching phase
and amplitude. In Section 4.3 we show that when the target is in the transmitter’s
near field, this consistency does not hold, allowing SNAP to determine proximity
with the transmitter.
4.2.1 PHY layer preamble format
Every OFDM Wi-Fi frame begins with a physical (PHY) layer preamble to aid in
synchronizing the transmitter and receiver. In this thesis we focus on 20 MHz wide
channels described in 802.11a/g/n/ac, but the technique could easily be extended
for wider channels available in 802.11n/ac. The format of the PHY layer preamble
is shown in Figure 4.1 and consists of a Short Training Field (STF) followed by
a Long Training Field. The STF consists of 10 identical short training symbols
(denoted t1 through t10 in Figure 4.1) where each STF symbol is sampled 16 times,
for a total of 160 samples. The STF is used by the receiver for frame detection,
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A short OFDM training symbol consists of 12 subcarriers, which are modulated by the elements of the
sequence S, given by
S–26, 26 = (13/6) u{0, 0, 1+j, 0, 0, 0, –1–j, 0, 0, 0, 1+j, 0, 0, 0, –1–j, 0, 0, 0, –1–j, 0, 0, 0, 1+j, 0, 0, 0, 0,
 0, 0, 0, –1–j, 0, 0, 0, –1–j, 0, 0, 0, 1+j, 0, 0, 0, 1+j, 0, 0, 0, 1+j, 0, 0, 0, 1+j, 0,0} (17-6)
The multiplication by a factor of (13/6) is in order to normalize the average power of the resulting OFDM
symbol, which utilizes 12 out of 52 subcarriers.
The signal shall be generated according to the following equation: 
(17-7)
The fact that only spectral lines of S–26:26 with indices that are a multiple of 4 have nonzero amplitude
results in a periodicity of TFFT/4 = 0.8 Ps. The interval TSHORT is equal to ten 0.8 Ps periods (i.e., 8 Ps).
Generation of the short training sequence is illustrated in Table I-2.
A long OFDM training symbol consists of 53 subcarriers (including the value 0 at dc), which are modulated
by the elements of the sequence L, given by
L–26, 26 = {1, 1, –1, –1, 1, 1, –1, 1, –1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, –1, –1, 1, 1, –1, 1, –1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 
 1, –1, –1, 1, 1, –1, 1, –1, 1, –1, –1, –1, –1, –1, 1, 1, –1, –1, 1, –1, 1, –1, 1, 1, 1, 1} (17-8)
A long OFDM training symbol shall be generated according to the following equation:
(17-9)
where 
TG 12 = 1.6 Ps
Two periods of the long sequence are transmitted for improved channel estimation accuracy, yielding
TLONG = 1.6 + 2 u3.2 = 8 Ps.
Figure 17-4—OFDM training structure
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Figure 4.1: Wi-Fi OFDM PHY preamble format. Each Wi-Fi frame begins with a PHY layer
preamble consisting of a 160-sample Short Training Field (denoted t1 . . . t10), a Long Training
Field comprised of a 32-sample guard interval (denoted GI2) and two identical 64-sample
symbols (denoted T1 and T2), and a Signal Field comprised of a 16-sample guard interval
(denoted GI), and 64 samples containing data about the Wi-Fi frame. Data symbols in the
Wi-Fi frame follow the preamble. Reproduced from IEEE standard [57].
automatic gain control, coarse frequency offset estimation, and rough symbol
timing synchronization. We discuss the STF in more detail in Section 4.4 below.
A Long Training Field (discussed next) follows the Short Training Field. After
the preamble, a Signal field encoded with Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK) pro-
vides information about the rest of the Wi-Fi frame including the number of bytes
and the encoding scheme used on the data portion of the frame. Data carried by
the Wi-Fi frame follows the Signal field and each OFDM data symbol consists of a
16-sample guard interval (denoted GI in Figure 4.1) and 64 samples carrying the
actual symbol data (see Section 3.5 for a more detailed discussion of OFDM).
4.2.2 Long Training Field
The LTF consists of a 32-sample guard interval (denoted GI2 because it is twice as
long as other guard intervals in the frame) followed by two identical 64-sample
OFDM symbols which are denoted T1 and T2 in Figure 4.1. The guard interval
together with T1 and T2 make a total of 160 samples in the LTF. Because T1 and
T2 are identical, the phase and amplitude of sample i in symbol T1 matches the
phas and amplitud of sample i + 64 in T2, where i = 0 . . . 63. This rel tionship
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Figure 4.2: Time domain amplitude of the Long Training Field. In the time domain, samples
i and i + 64 match in phase and amplitude. Here we highlight how sample 16 in T1 matches
sample 80 (64+16) in T2.
between samples is shown in Figure 4.2. Each sample is represented by a complex
number of the form i + jq, where i is the real component and q is the imaginary
component of the complex number and j =
√−1 (see Section 3.1). For clarity we
plot the amplitude of the signal (i.e.,
√
i2 + q2) in time.
We can convert the time-domain samples into an equivalent frequency-domain
representing by taking a Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT), which is nearly always
implemented in real hardware with a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT). As discussed in
Section 3.5, Wi-Fi receivers perform a 64-point FFT over the received time-domain
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I.1.3.2 Generation of the long sequences
The frequency domain representation of the long training sequence part of the preamble is given in
Table I-5.
The time domain representation is derived by performing IFFT on the contents of Table I-5, cyclically
extending the result to get the cyclic prefix, and then multiplying with the window function given in I.1.3.1.
The resulting 161 points vector is shown in Table I-6. The samples are appended to the short sequence
section by overlapping and adding element 160 of Table I-4 to element 0 of Table I-6. 
Table I-5—Frequency domain representation of the long sequences
## Re Im ## Re Im ## Re Im ## Re Im
–32 0.000 0.000 –16 1.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 16 1.000 0.000
–31 0.000 0.000 –15 1.000 0.000 1 1.000 0.000 17 –1.000 0.000
–30 0.000 0.000 –14 1.000 0.000 2 –1.000 0.000 18 –1.000 0.000
–29 0.000 0.000 –13 1.000 0.000 3 –1.000 0.000 19 1.000 0.000
–28 0.000 0.000 –12 1.000 0.000 4 1.000 0.000 20 –1.000 0.000
–27 0.000 0.000 –11 –1.000 0.000 5 1.000 0.000 21 1.000 0.000
–26 1.000 0.000 –10 –1.000 0.000 6 –1.000 0.000 22 –1.000 0.000
–25 1.000 0.000 –9 1.000 0.000 7 1.000 0.000 23 1.000 0.000
–24 –1.000 0.000 –8 1.000 0.000 8 –1.000 0.000 24 1.000 0.000
–23 –1.000 0.000 –7 –1.000 0.000 9 1.000 0.000 25 1.000 0.000
–22 1.000 0.000 –6 1.000 0.000 10 –1.000 0.000 26 1.000 0.000
–21 1.000 0.000 –5 –1.000 0.000 11 –1.000 0.000 27 0.000 0.000
–20 –1.000 0.000 –4 1.000 0.000 12 –1.000 0.000 28 0.000 0.000
–19 1.000 0.000 –3 1.000 0.000 13 –1.000 0.000 29 0.000 0.000
–18 –1.000 0.000 –2 1.000 0.000 14 –1.000 0.000 30 0.000 0.000
–17 1.000 0.000 –1 1.000 0.000 15 1.000 0.000 31 0.000 0.000
Table I-6—Time domain representation of the long sequence
## Re Im ## Re Im ## Re Im ## Re Im
0 –0.078 0.000 1 0.012 –0.098 2 0.092 –0.106 3 –0.092 –0.115
4 –0.003 –0.054 5 0.075 0.074 6 –0.127 0.021 7 –0.122 0.017
8 –0.035 0.151 9 –0.056 0.022 10 –0.060 –0.081 11 0.070 –0.014
12 0.082 –0.092 13 –0.131 –0.065 14 –0.057 –0.039 15 0.037 –0.098
16 0.062 0.062 17 0.119 0.004 18 –0.022 –0.161 19 0.059 0.015
Figure 4.3: Frequency domain representation of T1 and T2 in the Long Training Field. Re is
the real component and Im is the imaginary component of the complex number representing
the phase a d am litude of each complex number. Reproduced from IEEE standard [57].
samples to transform the time-domain samples into the frequency domain. The FFT
operation yields 64 complex numbers representing the phase and amplitude of 64
subcarriers, indexed from -32 to +31. Figure 4.3 shows T1 and T2 represented in the
frequency domain. Provided samples in the time domain in T1 match corresponding
samples in T2 at the receiver, the phases and amplitudes of each subcarrier after
an FFT of the samples in T1 will also match the phases and amplitudes of each
subcarrier after an FFT of the samples in T2. If the samples in the time domain do
not match, however, the phases and amplitudes of the subcarriers will also not
match.
We note in Section 2.2.2, however, that the channel between the transmitter
and receiver will modify the transmitted signal because the signal takes multiple
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paths while in flight, reflecting off or passing through objects in the environment.
These multi-path signals add up constructively or destructively at the receiver
and the result is that the samples will not be received with the same phase and
amplitude with which they were transmitted. This signal change suggests the
possibility that samples in T1 may not have the same phase and amplitude as the
corresponding sample in T2 when the signal is received. We see next, however, that
those samples will match (except for random noise) when the receiver is not in the
transmitter’s near-field region.
4.2.3 Channel State Information
The channel between the transmitter and receiver can be mathematically expressed
as [127]
y[i] = Hx[i] +w[i] (4.1)
where y[i] is the ith received sample, H is the channel matrix representing the
changes to the signal caused by the channel, x[i] is ith the transmitted sample and
w[i] is noise received with sample i. In a static environment (e.g., no moving
objects), H is time invariant and causes the same shift in phase and amplitude for all
samples in x because all transmitted samples take the same multipaths from sender
to receiver. Neglecting noise, the result is that sample y[i] still matches sample
y[i + 64] in phase and amplitude, even though they no longer match x[i] due to the
effects of H.
This phase and amplitude change in the received sample compared with the
transmitted sample is normal for wireless communication and is one of the reasons
why Wi-Fi uses a preamble. The phase and amplitude of the preamble samples are
pre-defined by the Wi-Fi specification and are known to both the transmitter and
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receiver. The receiver uses these known phase and amplitude values in the STF to
detect the start of the frame and apply a coarse frequency correction. Next it uses
the LTF to synchronize symbol timing and apply fine frequency correction. Finally,
because each subcarrier may be impacted differently by the channel, the receiver
performs an FFT of the received time-domain signal to independently measure the
phase and amplitude of each frequency-domain subcarrier in the LTF. The receiver
computes the difference from the known transmitted phases and amplitudes for
each subcarrier (see Figure 4.3) and the received phases and amplitudes to estimate
the channel’s impact on each subcarrier. As discussed in Section 3.7, this estimate is
called Channel State Information or CSI. The receiver then applies the opposite CSI
phase and amplitude to the remaining portion of the Wi-Fi frame to correct for the
channel’s changes.
4.2.4 Coherence time
Above we consider an environment with no moving objects and we see in Equa-
tion (4.1) that H is time invariant so corresponding samples in T1 and T2 will be
received with identical phase and amplitude (except for noise). In the real world,
however, the transmitter, receiver, or other objects may be moving and that move-
ment may impact the signal. A channel is said to be coherent if it is stable over a
particular time interval. We can calculate the needed coherence time, Tc, for the
corresponding portions of the preamble. If the channel is coherent over Tc then the
corresponding samples will be received with the same phase and amplitude.
Wi-Fi samples at 20 MHz, meaning it takes 20 million samples per second.
The time for one sample, Ts, is then 1/(20,000,000 samples/second) which equates
to 50 ns. T1 and T2 are a total of 128 samples long, and because we are interested
in how T1 matches T2, we require a coherence time of 6.4 µs (50 ns/sample × 128
samples = 6.4 µs). In this case, if the channel is stable over 6.4 µs, then T1 will match
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T2 (aside from noise). Moving objects, however, may cause a mismatch.
4.2.5 Moving objects
Moving objects can potentially cause changes in the signal in two ways: (1) by
changing the signal’s path length or (2) by causing a frequency shift via the Doppler
effect. Next we examine both of these possibilities with regard to the required
coherence time Tc = 6.4 µs.
Changing path length
The length of the path between the transmitter and receiver affects the phase and
amplitude of the signal according to the following formula [127]
H =
P
∑
p=1
ape−j2pidp/λ (4.2)
where ap is the attenuation of the signal along the path p, dp is the length of path p,
and λ is the wavelength. The path length p for a path may change as the transmitter,
receiver, or multipath-inducing objects move. To cause a significant change in the
signal between corresponding samples, however, the movement would need to
cause a change in path length of more than one-quarter wavelength (and one-half
wavelength to cause maximum change) [127]. In Wi-Fi’s 2.4 GHz band, the wave-
length λ is approximately 12 cm, so an object would need to move approximately
λ/4 = 3 cm in 6.4 µs to significantly impact the phase and amplitude between
corresponding LTF samples. This translates to a speed of over 17,000 km/hour (and
roughly twice this speed for Wi-Fi’s 5 GHz band). Given the extraordinary speed
an object would need to be moving to cause a substantial change in path length
in the short coherence time needed for the preamble, we eliminate changing path
lengths as a possible explanation for corresponding LTF samples to have different
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phases and amplitudes.
Doppler effect
A moving transmitter, receiver, or other object may cause a shift in the received
signal’s frequency. Called the Doppler effect, if the shift is large enough, it may
cause a change in corresponding portions of the LFT. Channel coherence time can
be related to the frequency shift caused by moving objects as [127]
Tc =
λ
4 f v/c
(4.3)
where f is the signal frequency, v is the maximum speed of any moving object, and
c is the speed of light.
In our case, the Tc = 6.4 µs, so we can solve for the minimum velocity that
would cause a significant phase shift as:
v ≥ λ
4 f Tc/c
. (4.4)
With a wavelength λ ≈ 12 cm and a coherence time Tc = 6.4 µs, Equation (4.4)
suggests moving objects need to be traveling even more than 17,000 km/hour to
substantially change the phase and amplitude of the signal. Again we find that
the environment is unlikely to cause a significant different between corresponding
portions of the LTF.
4.2.6 Summary
The implication of this section is that the channel between the target device and
a transmitter will not cause a significant difference in the phase and amplitude
of repeating portions of the LTF. This section, however, implicitly assumes that
the signal produced by the transmitter is planar in nature. We find in the next
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section that near-field effects can cause differences in the phase and amplitude of
corresponding LTF samples. We use those differences to detect when the target
is near the transmitter. If those changes are not present, based on this section, we
assume the target is far from the transmitter.
4.3 Near Field
We’ve seen that due to the short time duration between the corresponding portions
of the LTF, the environment is not likely to cause a difference in phase and amplitude.
In this section we see that the near-field region around the antenna can cause changes
between corresponding samples. The regions around a transmitting antenna are
generally classified into three different regions as shown in Figure 4.4. The region
boundaries are not sharp, but rather transition gradually from one region to another.
Using the orientation depicted in Figure 4.5, where the antenna is aligned
vertically with the z axis, the magnetic fields H relative to each axis1 are determined
by the following formulas [9]:
Hr = Hθ = 0 (4.5a)
Hφ = j
kI0lt sin θ
4pir
[
1+
1
jkr
]
e−jkr (4.5b)
and the electric fields E are determined by
1Here H refers to the magnetic field, whereas previously the same symbol referred to CSI.
Unfortunately, this overloading is common in the literature.
103
I 2 { 1,+1}
Q 2 {0}
Phase
I Q (degrees)
+1 0 0
-1 0 180
I 2 { 1,+1}
Q 2 { 1,+1}
Phase
I Q (degrees)
+1 +1 45
-1 +1 135
-1 -1 225
+1 -1 315
Reactive near-field region
R1 = 0.62
p
D3/ 
Radiating near-field (Fresnel) region
R2 = 2D
2/ 
Far-field (Fraunhofer) region
(2)
2
I 2 { 1,+1}
Q 2 {0}
Phase
I Q (degrees)
+1 0 0
-1 0 180
I 2 { 1,+1}
Q 2 { 1,+1}
Phase
I Q (degrees)
+1 +1 45
-1 +1 135
-1 -1 225
+1 -1 315
Reactive near-field region
R1 = 0.62
p
D3/ 
Radiating near-field (Fresnel) region
R2 = 2D
2/ 
Far-field (Fraunhofer) region
(2)
2
I 2 { 1,+1}
Q 2 {0}
Phase
I Q (degrees)
+1 0 0
-1 0 180
I 2 { 1,+1}
Q 2 { 1,+1}
Phase
I Q (degrees)
+1 +1 45
-1 +1 135
-1 -1 225
+1 -1 315
Reactive near-field region
R1 = 0.62
p
D3/ 
Radiating near-field (Fresnel) region
R2 = 2D
2/ 
Far-field (Fraunhofer) region
(2)
2
I 2 { 1,+1}
Q 2 {0
Phase
I Q (degrees)
+1 0 0
-1 0 180
I 2 { 1,+1}
Q 2 { 1,+1}
Phase
I Q (degr es)
+1 +1 45
-1 +1 135
-1 -1 225
+1 -1 315
Reactive near-field region
R1 = 0.62
p
D3/ 
Radiating near-field (Fresnel) region
R2 = 2D
2/ 
Far-field (Fraunhofer) region
(2)
2
I 2 { 1,+1}
Q 2 {0}
Phase
I Q (degrees)
+1 0 0
-1 0 180
I 2 { 1,+1}
Q 2 { 1,+1}
Phase
I Q (degrees)
+1 +1 45
-1 +1 135
-1 -1 225
+1 -1 315
Reactive near-field region
R1 = 0.62
p
D3/ 
Radiating near-field (Fresnel) region
R2 = 2D
2/ 
Far-field (Fraunhofer) region
(2)
2
Reactive near-field region
R1 = 0.62
p
D3/ 
Radiating near-field (Fresnel) region
R2 = 2D
2/ 
Far-field (Fraunhofer) region
R1
R2
D
lt
(2)
3
Figure 4.4: Regions surrounding a transmitting antenna. A transmitting antenna with length lt
has three surrounding regions: the reactive near-field is closest to the antenna and extends to
a distance R1, the radiating near-field begins where the reactive near-field ends and extends
to R2, and the far-field begins where the radiating near-field ends and extends to infinity. D is
defined as the length of the transmitting antenna lt plus the length of the receiving antenna, lr.
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152 LINEAR WIRE ANTENNAS
Since the source only carries an electric current Ie, Im and the potential function F
are zero. To find A we write
A(x, y, z) = µ
4π
∫
C
Ie(x ′, y ′, z′)
e−jkR
R
dl′ (4-2)
where (x, y, z ) represent the observation point coordinates, (x ′, y ′, z′) represent the
coordinates of the source, R is the distance from any point on the source to the
observation point, and path C is along the length of the source. For the problem of
Figure 4.1
Ie(x ′, y ′, z′) = aˆzI0 (4-3a)
x ′ = y ′ = z′ = 0 (infinitesimal dipole) (4-3b)
end-plate
Figure 4.1 Geometrical arrangement of an infinitesimal dipole and its associated electric-field
components on a spherical surface.
Figure 4.5: Antenna orientation. To provide a common reference, the transmitting antenna
is typically assumed to be aligned with the vertical (z) axis as shown. Reproduced from Bala-
nis [9].
Er = η
I0lt cos θ
2pir2
[
1+
1
jkr
]
e−jkr (4.6a)
Eθ = jη
kI0lt sin θ
4pir
[
1+
1
jkr
− 1
(kr)2
]
e−jkr (4.6b)
Eφ = 0 (4.6c)
where j =
√−1, k = 2pi/λ is the wavenumber, I0 is current applied to the transmit-
ter, lt is the length of the transmitting antenna, η = 120pi is the intrinsic impedance
of free space, θ is the vertical angle between the transmitter and receiver, φ is the hor-
izontal angle between the transmitter and receiver, and r is the distance extending
radially from the transmitter.
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4.3.1 Reactive near-field region
The reactive near-field region is the region closest to the transmitting antenna,
where kr < 1 (or equivalently, where r < λ/2pi). In this region the reactive (e.g,
non-radiating) field dominates and there is a high content of non-propagating
stored energy. We see this energy accounted for in the second term in the brackets
in Equations (4.5b) and (4.6a). In Equation (4.6b), the third term in brackets ( 1
(kr)2 )
dominates as kr  1, and the second term ( 1jkr ) is greater than the first term (1).
The result is that the wavefront is not spherical because the electric and magnetic
fields are not yet aligned, and in addition to the radiated energy described by the
first term in brackets in Equations (4.5) and (4.6), there is a great deal of stored,
non-propagating energy due to the second term and third terms dominating at
close range.
Because energy is stored close to the transmitting antenna, the presence of
another resonant antenna in the reactive near-field region can cause mutual coupling
and the transmitting antenna can detect an increased power draw due to the
presence of the nearby antenna [19]. This is an area of future work, where the
single antenna device may be able to detect the presence of a nearby antenna by
monitoring for an increased power draw due to mutual coupling.
With real antennas, the reactive near-field region is commonly estimated to
extend from the surface of the antenna to roughly R1, defined as [9]
R1 = 0.62
√
D3/λ (4.7)
where D = lt + lr is the combined length of the transmitting antenna, lt, and the
length of the receiving antenna, lr, and λ is the signal wavelength. With Wi-Fi
2.4 GHz band, and quarter-wavelength dipole antennas, this region extends to
roughly 2.7 cm from the transmitter. In Wi-Fi’s 5 GHz band this region extends to
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roughly 1.1 cm.
4.3.2 Radiating near-field (Fresnel) region
Sometimes referred to as the Fresnel or intermediate field, the radiating near-field
region is the area between the reactive near-field and far-field regions. In this
region kr > 1 and the electric and magnetic fields are predominantly in phase, but
the wavefront is still not yet spherical as it is in the far-field region. Examining
Equations (4.5b) and (4.6a) we see that, unlike in the reactive near field, the first
term in the brackets (1) begins to dominate the second term ( 1jkr ) because kr is greater
than one. Likewise, in Equation (4.6b), the first term in the brackets (1) begins to
dominate the second ( 1jkr ) and third terms (
1
(kr)2 ). Because of the increasing value of
kr compared with the reactive near-field region, the energy in the radiating near
field is largely real, that is, radiated energy.
We can estimate the average power of the signal, W, using the following
equation [9]:
W =
1
2
(E×H∗) (4.8)
where * denotes complex conjugate and E and H are determined using Equa-
tions (4.5) and (4.6). W can be decomposed into its radial, Wr, and vertical, Wθ
components as follows [9]:
Wr =
η
8
∣∣∣∣ I0ltλ
∣∣∣∣2 sin2 θr2
[
1− j 1
(kr)3
]
(4.9a)
Wθ = jη
k|I0lt|2 cos θ sin θ
16pi2r3
[
1+
1
(kr)2
]
. (4.9b)
Mapping the power of each of these components, we see in Figure 4.6 for
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Figure 4.6: Power of the radial and vertical components of a signal. Using Wi-Fi’s 2.4 GHz
band and Equation (4.9), the vertical component Wθ begins to dominate the radial component
Wr at about 5 cm.
Wi-Fi’s 2.4 GHz band with quarter-wavelength antennas, at distances larger than
roughly 5 cm the Wθ component begins to dominate the Wr component as it does in
the far field. At distances closer than about 5 cm the radial component is stronger
than the vertical component. This relative strength suggests the power pulses
inward and outward near the transmitter, whereas at greater distances, the radial
component dies out and vertical component takes over. This vertical component
domination is indicative of signals in the far-field region, whereas radial component
domination is indicative of signals in the radiating near-field region.
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With real antennas, the radiating near-field region is commonly estimated to
extend from R1 to R2, where R2 is defined [9]
R2 = 2D2/λ (4.10)
where D is the combined length of the transmitting antenna, lt, and the length
of the receiving antenna, lr, and λ is the signal wavelength. With Wi-Fi 2.4 GHz
band, and quarter-wavelength dipole antennas, Equation (4.10) suggests this region
extends to roughly 6.2 cm from the transmitter. This roughly matches the results
shown in Figure 4.6 using Equations (4.9) where the radial component of the energy
begins to dominate as it does it the far field. We note, however, that this boundary
is not a sharp distinction between the radiating near-field and the far-field. We
see in Figure 4.6 that the radial and vertical components are nearly equivalent for
some distance past this point, but that by 12 cm distance Wθ is roughly three times
stronger than Wr.
4.3.3 Far-field (Fraunhofer) region
The far field, sometimes referred to as the Fraunhofer region, is the area far from
the transmitting antenna where kr  1. Because kr is large in the far field, several
of the terms in Equations (4.5) and (4.6) become extremely small and the E and H
fields can be approximated by the much simpler formulas [9]:
Eθ ' jη kI0lte
−jkr
4pir
sin θ (4.11a)
Er ' Eφ = Hr = Hθ = 0 (4.11b)
Hφ ' j kI0lte
−jkr
4pir
sin θ. (4.11c)
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In Equation (4.11) we see that the electric and magnetic fields are aligned
orthogonal to each other (e.g., θ is orthogonal to φ), transverse to the direction of
propagation, and are in time synchronization. This arrangement creates a spherical
wavefront with average power given by Equation (4.8).
4.3.4 Near-field impact on corresponding samples
At ranges closer than roughly R2, because the overall E and H fields are not in
phase with respect to time, and because those fields are do not have equal mag-
nitude, they form a vector that rotates in time in a plane parallel to the direction
of propagation, rather than the stable orthogonal relationship seen in the far-field
region [9]. Wi-Fi samples taken as the E and H fields rotate can result in different
phase and amplitude readings between corresponding samples in the LTF. We
see in Section 4.5, as suggested by Figure 4.6, there is a difference in phase and
amplitude in the corresponding LTF samples out to about 12 cm.
4.3.5 Pilot subcarriers
Because the E and H fields near the antenna are rotating in time and can cause
differences in the corresponding portions of the preamble, the samples in the data
portion of the frame will also be received with a rotation-induced phase and ampli-
tude offset. One might wonder how Wi-Fi is able to receive frames at all at close
range. The answer lies in Wi-Fi use of pilot subcarriers. In addition to estimating
the channel from the LTF, also known as a block-type channel estimate where there
is one block of data sent at known phases and amplitudes on all subcarriers, Wi-Fi
also uses comb-type channel estimation where several pilot subcarriers, separated
by S subcarriers, are included in each Wi-Fi symbol [111]. Figure 4.7 illustrates the
difference between block and comb-type channel estimation. Wi-Fi uses subcarriers
-21, -7, 7, and 21 as pilot subcarriers. The receiver then gets an initial channel
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estimate from block-type LTF subcarriers, then updates its channel estimate for
each Wi-Fi symbol by comparing the received phases and amplitudes on the comb-
type pilot subcarriers with the known phases and amplitudes transmitted on those
subcarriers. The receiver then corrects each Wi-Fi symbol using the refined channel
estimate from the pilot subcarriers. In this way Wi-Fi is able to correct each symbol
as the fields rotate in time.
Pilot subcarriers allow Wi-Fi to effectively deal with moving objects. We see
in Section 4.2 that an object would need to be moving at an extremely high speed to
affect the preamble. A Wi-Fi frame, however, may be composed on many OFDM
symbols, each lasting 4 µ seconds. A moving object might be able to move λ/4 cm
during the frame transmission time, and thus might affect the phase and amplitude
at the receiver. For example, a Wi-Fi frame consisting of 1,500 OFDM symbols will
take 6 milliseconds to transmit (plus the preamble). This transmit time suggests
that an obstacle moving at 19 km/hr would move more than λ/4 cm and thus
could make a significant change to the received signal over the transmission time.
Additionally, Equation (4.3) suggests that an object moving roughly 230 km/hr
would cause a significant frequency change. Wi-Fi’s comb-type channel estimation
allows it to dynamically correct each symbol during the relatively long frame
transmission time and overcome these issues caused by moving objects. This same
feature allows Wi-Fi to receive a frame in the presence of rotating E and H fields.
4.4 Implementation
We wanted to test the insight from Section 4.3 that the phase and amplitude of
corresponding Long Training Field samples would change when the receiver is
close to a transmitting antenna (e.g., when the receiver is in the transmitter’s near-
field region) and would not change when the receiver is far from the transmitter.
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4 Freescale Semiconductor
Block-Type Pilot Channel Estimation
Under the assumption that the interferences are completely eliminated [1–3], you can derive:
 Equation 3
This equation demonstrates that an OFDM system is equivalent to a transmission of data over a set of parallel 
channels.
As a result, the fading channel of the OFDM system can be viewed as a 2D lattice in a time-frequency plane, which 
is sampled at pilot positions and the channel characteristics between pilots are estimated by interpolation. The art in 
designing channel estimators is to solve this problem with a good trade-off between complexity and performance.
The two basic 1D channel estimations in OFDM systems are illustrated in Figure 2. The first one, block-type pilot 
channel estimation, is developed under the assumption of slow fading channel, and it is performed by inserting 
pilot tones into all subcarriers of OFDM symbols within a specific period. The second one, comb-type pilot 
channel estimation, is introduced to satisfy the need for equalizing when the channel changes even from one 
OFDM block to the subsequent one. It is thus performed by inserting pilot tones into certain subcarriers of each 
OFDM symbol, where the interpolation is needed  to estimate the conditions of data subcarriers.  The strategies of 
these two basic types are analyzed in the next sections.
3 Block-Type Pilot Channel Estimation
In block-type pilot-based channel estimation, as shown in Figure 2, OFDM channel estimation symbols are 
transmitted periodically, and all subcarriers are used as pilots. The task here is to estimate the channel conditions 
(specified by  or ) given the pilot signals (specified by matrix  or vector ) and received signals (specified 
by ), with or without using certain knowledge of the channel statistics. The receiver uses the estimated channel 
conditions to decode the received data inside the block until the next pilot symbol arrives. The estimation can be 
based on least square (LS), minimum mean-square error (MMSE), and modified MMSE.
3.1   LS Estimator
The LS estimator minimizes the parameter , where  means the conjugate transpose 
operation. It is shown that the LS estimator of  is given by [2].
 Equation 4
Figure 2.   Two Basic Types of Pilot Arrangement for OFDM Channel Estimations
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Figure 4.7: Block and comb-type channel estimation. Wi-Fi uses block-type channel estima-
tion from the LTF and uses comb-type channel estimation from pilot subcarriers in each Wi-Fi
symbol. Reproduced from Shen and Martinez [111].
Because we could not get granular phase and amplitude data for corresponding
portions of the Wi-Fi LTF from Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Wi-Fi adapters
(even with the CSI tool frequen ly used by res archers [52]), we built our own Wi-Fi
receiver using an Ettus Research USRP N210 Software Defined Radio (SDR) [30]
with a UBX40 daughterboard and GNU Radio [125]. The USRP SDR hardware
allowed us to receive signals from 10 MHz to 6 GHz, enough bandwidth to cover
both the 2.4 and 5 GHz Wi-Fi bands, and GNU Radio is an open-source computer
program that processes signals sent by the SDR hardware.
4.4.1 Custom Wi-Fi receiver steps
At a high level, all Wi-Fi receivers must accomplish two steps: (1) detect the pres-
ence of an incoming Wi-Fi frame and (2) decode the frame according to the Wi-Fi
specification [57]. In the detection step, receivers look for the presence of the Short
Training Field (STF) briefly discussed in Section 4.2. Since the Wi-Fi specification
details both the frequency and time domain samples of the STF, both the transmitter
and receiver know ahead of time the precise phases and amplitudes of that field.
The receiver can then look for the STF pattern in the incoming signal. When it finds
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Figure 4.8: Custom Wi-Fi receiver software. Our receiver was implemented with GNU Radio
and involved several custom signal-processing blocks: frame_detector looks for the presence
of the Short Training Field that indicates the start of a Wi-Fi frame, frame_align synchronizes
symbol timing and estimates CSI, and frame_equalize performs equalization and decodes the
Signal field.
the pattern, it performs automatic gain control and coarse frequency correction,
then passes the samples to the decoding phase. The decoding phase uses the LTF to
determine the precise symbol alignment then estimates and corrects for the effects
of the channel on the signal. After correcting for the channel effects, the receiver
next reads the Wi-Fi Signal field to learn the number of bytes remaining in the
frame and modulation coding scheme used on the remaining bytes. Our GNU
Radio implementation is shown in Figure 4.8. We provide more details on the frame
detection and decoding steps next.
4.4.2 Detecting incoming Wi-Fi frames
Because the receiver and transmitter both know the signal phase and amplitude of
the STF, a natural approach would be to use a matched filter to look for the presence
of the STF amid the other signals the receiver picks up. A matched filter is an
optimal linear filter that maximizes the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) when looking
for a known signal in a noisy signal [127]. To find the known signal (e.g., the STF),
a matched filter convolves the noisy signal with a conjugated time-reversed version
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of the known signal. We attempted to write matched filter to find the STF amid
the incoming signals, but found that even with a gigabit connection between GNU
Radio and the SDR, the matched filter was too slow to keep up in real time (later
we learned others also tried and failed with this approach [14]). We also attempted
to implement the well-known Schmidl & Cox method [106], but also found it to be
too slow for SDR hardware and GNU Radio software. This method is better suited
to implementation in a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) than with an SDR.
Because the matched filter was too slow, we follow the approach outlined
by Liu [72] and implemented by Bloessl [14]. The STF specification calls for 10
repeating 16-sample sequences, so we look for an autocorrelation between samples
separated in time by 16 samples. If we see a large correlation over a window
of samples, it is likely the samples are the Short Training Field of a Wi-Fi frame.
Following Liu and Bloessl, we calculate an autocorrelation value as follows:
a[n] =
Nwin−1
∑
k=0
s[n + k]s[n + k + 16]∗ (4.12)
where s[n] is sample n produced by the SDR hardware, s[n]∗ denotes the complex
conjugate of sample s[n], and Nwin is a window of 48 samples (set experimentally
by Blossel).
To help reduce false positives, once the autocorrelation coefficients a[n] have
been calculated we then normalize the autocorrelation coefficients with the total
power received in those samples as follows:
p[n] =
Nwin−1
∑
k=0
s[n + k]s[n + k]∗ (4.13a)
c[n] =
|a[n]|
p[n]
(4.13b)
where |a[n]| indicates the magnitude of a[n]. These steps are implemented using
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standard GNU Radio blocks as shown in the first row of Figure 4.8. Samples are
then passed to our frame_detector block to determine when a frame starts and to
apply coarse frequency correction.
frame_detector
The frame_detector block attempts to find the start of a Wi-Fi frame by looking for two
consecutive values of c from Equation (4.13b) that are above a pre-defined threshold
τ (experimentally set to 0.56). Also, because we are interested in signals from nearby
devices, we add a check to ensure the signal power (squared magnitude) of the
most recent samples crosses a threshold m (set experimentally to 0.25). If both the
normalized autocorrelation values and the magnitude cross their thresholds, we
make a coarse frequency correction and for speed pass 400 samples on to following
processing blocks. The 400 samples account for the STF (160 samples), the LTF (160
samples), and the Signal field (80 samples).
The reason we pass along enough samples to account for the entire STF
instead of simply passing along samples for the LTF and Signal field is because the
autocorrelation portion may not precisely align on the STF boundary and thus we
cannot simply skip 160 samples ahead to where we expect to see the guard interval
(GI2 in Figure 4.1) and T1 and T2 in the LTF to begin. To be safe, we pass along the
samples of the STF in addition to the LTF and Signal field to the frame_align block
that determines the exact starting sample for the LTF.
If the autocorrelation portion declares a frame start a few samples after the
actual start, the next block will simply receive a few more samples than it needs.
Due to the power normalization step in Equation (4.13), the autocorrelation portion
should not indicate the start of a frame early, but even if does, or it causes a false
positive, the error will be quickly detected in the equalizer because the Signal field
will not decode properly.
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frame_align
The frame_align block is a custom block that attempts to find the exact sample where
a Wi-Fi LTF starts. Because Wi-Fi starting points are relatively infrequent, and this
block will not start until it receives 400 samples from the frame_detector block, we
find that we can implement a matched filter here and still keep up with incoming
samples. To implement this match filter, we pre-calculate a time-reversed complex
conjugate version of the LTF, then wait for a block of 400 samples to arrive. We
then perform a convolution over the incoming samples with the conjugated, time-
reversed LTF. The sample with highest value after convolution is the likely start of
the LTF. This block then marks the sample with the maximal value as the start of
the LTF, skips the guard interval, and passes 208 total samples to the frame_equalize
block. The 208 samples are comprised of 128 samples for the two repeating portions
of the LTF (T1 and T2 from Figure 4.1), plus 80 samples for the Signal field.
4.4.3 Decoding frames
Now that the signal is aligned to the starting sample, we decode the Signal field to
ensure the samples comprise a valid Wi-Fi frame. Because we are only interested in
the difference between matching samples in the Wi-Fi preamble, in our implemen-
tation we only decode the Signal field to ensure our algorithm has found a valid
Wi-Fi frame and, for speed, we do not decode the remainder of the Wi-Fi frame.
A real Wi-Fi receiver, however would need to decode the additional portions of
the Wi-Fi frame, but the logic could be implemented in hardware and would likely
outperform our SDR implementation by a large margin.
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frame_equalize
This block receives 208 samples from the frame_align block where the first sample
should be aligned with the first sample of T1 in the LTF. This block then estimates
the channel by performing an FFT over the first 64 samples, and a second FFT
over the second 64 samples. This step converts the time-domain samples into the
frequency domain. Because Wi-Fi uses an FFT of size 64, the FFT outputs 64 different
frequencies, each representing a Wi-Fi subcarrier. This block compares the phase
and amplitude of those subcarriers with the phase and amplitude mandated by
the Wi-Fi specification to develop its estimate of the channel. We estimate Channel
State Information for each of the 64 subcarriers using both portions of the LTF by
following Liu [72] as:
H[k] =
1
2
(
Y1[k] +Y2[k]
X[k]
)
k = 0 . . . 63 (4.14)
where H[k] is the CSI estimate for subcarrier k , Y1[k] is the received phase and
amplitude of subcarrier k from an FFT of T1, Y2[k] is the phase and amplitude of
subcarrier k from an FFT of T2, and X[k] is the transmitted phase and amplitude
prescribed by the Wi-Fi specification for subcarrier k.
This block then checks that the Signal field is valid. First it applies a CSI
correction from Equation (4.14) to remove channel effects, then extracts the data
bits from the 48 data-carrying subcarriers, performs a parity check on the Signal
field, and computes the number of bytes and encoding used on the remainder of
the frame. If the parity check passes and the encoding equates to a valid Wi-Fi MCS,
we output the phase and amplitude of each of the k subcarriers from T1 and T2 as
given by Y1[k] and Y2[k]. We use that output to examine the difference in phase and
amplitude between corresponding subcarriers in the LTF.
Based on the discussions in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we expect the subcarriers to
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match in phase and amplitude when the receiver is in the transmitter’s far-field
region, and to differ when the receiver is in the transmitter’s near-field region. In
the next section we test four different off-the-shelf Wi-Fi configurations using our
SDR receiver and find we can determine reliably determine proximity with a single
antenna receiver out to roughly 9 cm.
4.5 Evaluation
We used our custom Wi-Fi receiver software with the USRP SDR hardware discussed
in Section 4.4 with a quarter-wavelength dipole antenna to receive Wi-Fi signals
transmitted by several different Wi-Fi antennas. Because dipole and micropatch
antennas are the most common antennas found in consumer electronics [9], we fo-
cused our testing on those types of transmitting antennas. All tests were conducted
in a busy computer science lab where there were many moving obstacles.
4.5.1 Hardware setup
In Section 4.4 we discussed the custom Wi-Fi receiver software we created to capture
the differences in corresponding portions of the LTF preamble. Here we briefly
describe the hardware we used.
Receiver
We used a USRP N210 shown in Figure 4.9 with a quarter-wavelength dipole
antenna as a Wi-Fi receiver. We connected the quarter-wavelength dipole to a
circular base to hold the antenna upright, and we used a 3 m RF cable to connect
the dipole antenna base to the USRP. We also connected the USRP to a laptop with
a 2 m ethernet cable. The laptop ran GNU Radio and our custom Wi-Fi software
described previously to process the samples coming from the hardware. We used
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Figure 4.9: Wi-Fi receiver hardware. We used a USRP 210N Software Defined Radio with a
quarter-wavelength dipole antenna as a Wi-Fi receiver. The USRP was connected to the an-
tenna via a 3 m RF cable and to a laptop via a 2 m ethernet cable (laptop not shown). Photo
by Timothy J. Pierson.
this configuration as a receiver for all tests.
Dipole transmit antennas
We used a half and quarter-wavelength dipole antennas connected to an internal
Intel Ultimate N WiFi Link 5300 card [58] installed in a Linux laptop to test different
transmitting dipole antennas. We attached each dipole antenna to a circular base to
hold the antenna upright during testing and connected the base to the laptop with
a 3 m long RF cable as shown in Figure 4.10. Each type of transmitting antenna was
tested separately.
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Figure 4.10: Transmitters. We used a quarter-wavelength and a half-wavelength dipole an-
tenna as well as a micropatch antenna connected via a 3 m cable to an internal Intel Ultimate
N WiFi Link 5300 adapter installed in a Linux laptop. We also used a Panda Ultra Wireless N
USB adapter connected via a 1 m USB extender cable. Photo by Timothy J. Pierson.
Micropatch transmit antennas
We tested a Panda Ultra Wireless N USB Adapter [86] attached to a Linux laptop via
a 1 m USB extender cable and micropatch antenna connected to the Intel 5300 card
via a 3 m RF cable. Due to their small size, these antennas are popular in mobile
consumer electronics such as cell phones.
4.5.2 Preamble error
We transmitted 1,000 Wi-Fi frames from each of the four different types of antennas
using BPSK 1/2 encoding on Wi-Fi channel 1 at distances ranging from 2 cm to
3 m. The Wi-Fi frames were sent on Layer 2 using a Python program written with
Scapy [13]. Frames were not acknowledged by the SDR.
We calculate the total Euclidean distance between the phase and amplitude of
subcarriers in T1 and T2 as:
Ej =
31
∑
k=−32
√
(<(Y1[k])−<(Y2[k]))2 + (=(Y1[k])−=(Y2[k]))2 (4.15)
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where Ej is the total Euclidean distance between the phase and amplitude of all
subcarriers k for frame j, and where <(Yx[k]) is the real component and =(Yx[k]) is
the imaginary components of the phase and amplitude of each subcarrier k in Yx,
for x ∈ {1, 2}. Recall from Section 4.4 that Y1 is the result of an FFT over T1 and Y2
is the result of an FFT over T2. We call this difference Ej the preamble error of a frame.
If the subcarriers in the two corresponding portions of the LTF are substantially the
same, then the preamble error will be small. If the subcarriers are different in the
two corresponding portions of the LTF, then the preamble error will be large.
Figure 4.11 shows the difference between Y1 and Y2 for subcarrier 1 of one
frame when the transmitter was located at 6 cm from the receiver and for subcarrier
1 of another frame sent from 30 cm. We see that at 30 cm the Y1 matches Y2, but at
6 cm Y1 does not match Y2. Figure 4.12 shows difference between Y1 and Y2 for all
subcarriers of one frame. We see at 30 cm Y1 and Y2 match for all subcarriers, but
at 6 cm many subcarriers do not match. The sum of the distances between Y1 and
Y2 over all subcarriers makes up the preamble error and we see it is small at long
range and large at close range.
We calculate the average preamble error over a number of frames for each
antenna type as:
At =
1
n
n
∑
j=1
Ej (4.16)
where t ∈ {half-wavelength, quarter-wavelength, micropatch, Panda} is the type of
antenna used to send Wi-Fi frames and n = 1, 000 is the number of frames received.
The average preamble error over all 1,000 frames sent at each distance for each
antenna type is shown in Figure 4.13 for distances from 2 cm to 3 m. We show the
distribution of preamble errors for these frames in Appendix B.1. As predicted in
Section 4.3, at short range we see large preamble errors and at distances beyond
roughly 12 cm, we see small preamble errors. This relationship holds across all
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Y1 and Y2
Subcarrier 1
I
Q
Expected location
Y1 at 6 cm
Y2 at 6 cm
Y1 at 30 cm
Y2 at 30 cm
Figure 4.11: Difference between Y1 and Y2 for subcarrier 1. At long range (30 cm) the dif-
ference between Y1 and Y2 for subcarrier 1 is small. At close range (6 cm) the difference
between Y1 and Y2 for subcarrier 1 is large.
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All subcarriers of one frame
I
Q
Expected location
Y1 at 6 cm
Y2 at 6 cm
Y1 at 30 cm
Y2 at 30 cm
I
Q
Figure 4.12: Preamble error for all subcarriers of one frame. Y1 and Y2 match at long (30 cm)
range, but do not match at close (6 cm) range.
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Figure 4.13: Average preamble errors by distance and antenna type using Equation (4.16).
The average preamble error over 1,000 Wi-Fi frames is large at close range and small at long
range for each antenna type.
all antenna types and suggests that a single-antenna target device can monitor
the preamble error and declare proximity when the preamble error rises above a
threshold.
4.5.3 Thresholds
We would like a single-antenna target device to be able to determine proximity with
a transmitting device without help from another source. A simple way to make that
proximity determination using the data in Figure 4.13 would be to set a threshold, τ,
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where if the preamble error for a frame is greater than τ, the single antenna device
declares proximity, otherwise it does not declare proximity.
If τ were set relatively high, say around 0.2 (indicated by the dashed line
in Figure 4.13), then the single-antenna device would like not falsely declare prox-
imity when the transmitter is far away because the preamble errors are never over
the threshold for any transmitting antenna type at distances over 14 cm. If the
target device uses only one frame to determine proximity, however, it could be
the case that the particular frame happens to have have a low preamble error and
the single-antenna device would not recognize proximity even though it should.
Appendix B.1 shows that there is variability in the preamble errors, especially at
close range.
This situation suggests that proximity detection with a single-antenna device
may benefit from measuring the preamble error from multiple frames before declar-
ing proximity. Instead of relying on the preamble error from a single frame, we can
use Equation (4.16) to average the preamble error from multiple frames and then
compare that average value with threshold τ.
To determine the likelihood of detecting proximity using the average preamble
error from multiple frames, we created a Monte Carlo simulation where we ran-
domly sampled n frames from the 1,000 Wi-Fi frames we captured at each distance
between transmitter and receiver, and then calculated an average preamble error
over those n frames for n ∈ {1, 2, 5, 10, 20}. We ran 1,000 trials at each distance
and for each value of n. The idea is that the single-antenna target device declares
proximity if the average of n frames is greater than τ.
In Figure 4.14 we show the likelihood of declaring proximity from 1,000 runs of
the Monte Carlo simulation that randomly selected n ∈ {1, 2, 5, 10, 20}Wi-Fi frames
at each distance and then calculated the average preamble error over those frames.
The simulation declared proximity if the average preamble error was greater than
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τ = 0.2. The results shown are the average over all antenna types. Appendix B.2
shows the results in detail for each antenna type and for several values of τ. We see
there is a high likelihood of declaring proximity when the transmitter, regardless
of antenna type, is within about 9 cm if the receiver uses more than one frame. In
fact, we see that using only two frames performs much better than a single frame,
consistently predicting proximity at short ranges, and never predicting proximity at
ranges over 14 cm (although we see in Appendix B.2 that proximity is detected on
one frame sent by the Panda adapter at 80 cm with τ = 0.15 and n = 2, otherwise
with τ or n at higher values, proximity is never detected at ranges greater than
14 cm). Because the single-antenna device is able to determine proximity with a
small number of Wi-Fi frames, this proximity detection process is fast.
4.5.4 Future exploration
Our experiments suggest that the preamble errors caused by the near field of a
transmitting antenna allow a single-antenna target device to reliably detect prox-
imity at distances under 9 cm. We focused our testing on dipole and micropatch
antennas because they are the most common antennas used in consumer devices.
There are a myriad of other types of antennas including: horn, helical, parabolic
dish, spiral, loop, spiral, Yagi, and bow tie to name a few. In future work we may
examine how the near field affects these other types of antennas. We may also test
with more off-the-shelf systems, other than the Panda adapter. We also used the
default transmission power settings on the Wi-Fi devices and have not yet tested
with non-standard power settings. We expect little difference in results. We believe,
however, that our work here is a starting point and opens an important new area of
research that warrants further investigation.
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Figure 4.14: Likelihood of declaring proximity. This figure shows the likelihood of a single-
antenna device declaring proximity in 1,000 Monte Carlo simulation runs at each distance
where proximity was declared if the average preamble error for n ∈ {1, 2, 5, 10, 20} randomly
selected Wi-Fi frames was greater than τ = 0.2. We see proximity declared with high probabil-
ity at close range and never detected at ranges over 14 cm.
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4.6 Security
Above we see that a single-antenna device is able to reliably detect proximity
with a transmitting device if the single-antenna device is in the near field of the
transmitter. Our experiments suggest that the single-antenna device can reliably
detect proximity out to roughly 9 cm for dipole and micropatch antennas. These
results assume, however, that the transmitter is sending properly formed Wi-Fi
frames where T1 in the Long Training Field matches T2. It could be the case that
a sophisticated adversary transmits a malformed Wi-Fi preamble where T1 does
not match T2 in an attempt to trick the single-antenna device into falsely declaring
proximity. That adversary might pre-compute a mismatched LTF and send those
samples with a Software Defined Radio. In this case, a single-antenna device
could potentially be tricked into declaring proximity when in fact the transmitter is
far away. We propose two ways a single-antenna device might overcome such a
sophisticated adversary.
4.6.1 Help from a trusted device
A single-antenna device might be able to overcome an adversary transmitting
malformed preambles if the single-antenna device has a pre-existing trusted re-
lationship with another device known to be far away (perhaps by measuring the
preamble of signals from the trusted device) such as a Wi-Fi router. If the single-
antenna device detects a preamble error greater than τ, it could ask the trusted
device to confirm the trusted device sees a matching preamble. Provided the trusted
device is located more than about 18 cm from the single-antenna device (e.g., two
times the effective range of the preamble detection technique to rule out a legitimate
transmitter positioned in between the single-antenna device and trusted device),
the trusted device will see a matching preamble if the preamble is properly formed
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and can inform the single-antenna device. If the preamble is malformed, both
devices will see the high preamble error and with the trusted device’s input, the
single-antenna device can conclude an adversary sent the frames with malformed
preambles.
4.6.2 Signal strength
In many use cases there will not be a trusted device with which the single-antenna
device can confer. In those instances, the single-antenna device can examine the
strength of the signal when it detects a high preamble error. While signal strength
is a notoriously bad indicator of distance, because signal strength drops with the
square of distance, a distant adversary will need to transmit a high power signal
for the single-antenna device to receive it with the same strength as a signal from a
legitimate device located a few centimeters away. To prevent the distant adversary
from tricking the single-antenna device into believing malformed preambles are
legitimate signals from a nearby device, the single-antenna device can measure the
signal strength of frames with high preamble errors and reject frames with a signal
strength below a threshold. We see next that even with a high-gain antenna, and an
unlawfully high transmit power, an adversary’s signal strength will be well below
the signal strength of a legitimate device located nearby, making it possible for the
single-antenna device to reject the weaker signals.
Assuming the adversary is in the far-field region, then signal strength will
drop off as predicted by the well-known Friis equation [127]
Pr = Pt + Gt + Gr + 20log
(
λ
4pid
)2
(4.17)
where Pr is the power received in dBm, Pt is the power at the surface of the trans-
mitting antenna in dBm, Gt and Gr are the gains of the transmitting and receiving
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antennas, λ is the frequency of the signal, and d is the distance between the trans-
mitting and receiving antennas.
Using Equation (4.17), we see that a signal from a legitimate device with
Pt = 27 dBm, Gt = 3 dBi, and located 5 cm away would be received on a single-
antenna device with a signal strength of slightly over 19 dBm, assuming Gr = 3 dBi
on the single-antenna device. To estimate the amount of power a distant adversary
could need to transmit to achieve the same signal strength at the single-antenna
device, we can rewrite Equation (4.17) as
Pt = Pr − Gt − Gr − 20log
(
λ
4pid
)2
. (4.18)
To match the signal strength of a nearby device, Equation (4.18) suggests
that an adversary with a standard 3 dBi antenna located 1 m away would need to
transmit a signal at a whopping 53 dBm – well above the capabilities of SDRs. The
Ettus Research UBX-40 daughterboard for the N210 SDR, for example, transmits
at roughly 20 dBm in the Wi-Fi frequency range. The popular HackRF One [47]
tops out at 15 dBm in the Wi-Fi frequency bands. In fact, in the United States the
Federal Communications Commission sets the legal limit for transmitters in the
2.4 GHz band at 30 dBm [31]. Nonetheless, we assume that an adversary does
not stay within the FCC’s limits and may have a more powerful transmitter. We
acknowledge that there is theoretically no limit to how much power the adversary
can transmit, but we assume a realistic adversary has some practical bounds on its
transmitting capability. For discussion purposes, we consider an adversary capable
of transmitting at 36 dBm – four times the limit set by the FCC and more than
32 times the power of the HackRF One. Furthermore, we assume the adversary
may use a high-gain antenna to increase the strength of the signal received by the
single-antenna device.
Commercially available high-gain Wi-Fi antennas are normally relatively large
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Figure 4.15: Altelix high-gain antenna. This antenna provides 15 dBm gain, but is nearly
one-half meter wide. Photo by Altelix LLC.
panel or parabolic dish antennas that provide up to approximately 20 dBi gain.
For example, the Altelix 2.4 GHz parabolic dish antenna provides 15 dBi gain and
is nearly one-half meter long [5]. While it is possible this antenna, or one like it,
could be concealed inside of furniture or possibly behind a low signal-attenuating
wall, in many cases a user would notice the presence of the one-half meter long
antenna if it is within two meters from the single-antenna device. Additionally, the
single-antenna device may be mobile, making it difficult to preposition a high-gain
antenna such that it is focused on the mobile single-antenna device while data is
transferred.
Using Equation (4.18), and assuming Gr = 3 dBi on the single-antenna device,
in Table 4.1 we show the amount of power in dBm that an adversary would need to
transmit to match the signal strength of a legitimate device transmitting from a few
centimeters away. We assume the legitimate device transmits at 27 dBm (e.g., half
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Adversary distance (cm)
Gt 100 150 200 250 300
0 56 60 62 64 66
3 53 57 59 61 63
6 50 54 56 58 60
9 47 51 53 55 57
12 44 48 50 52 54
15 41 45 47 49 51
18 38 42 44 46 48
21 35 39 41 43 45
24 32 36 38 40 42
Table 4.1: Required adversary transmit power. This table shows the amount of power in
dBm that an adversary located a given distance from a single-antenna device using an
antenna with gain Gt would need to transmit to have a signal arrive at the single-antenna
device with the same signal strength as a legitimate device transmitting a 27 dBm signal
from 5 cm away. Highlighted cells indicate configurations where the adversary would be
able to match or exceed the legitimate signal if transmitting at four times the legal limit
set by the FCC or below. We see that in most cases, even with the high transmit power
and high-gain antenna, the adversary would need to achieve a higher signal strength
than a legitimate nearby device transmitting at one-half the maximum set by the FCC.
the FCC limit) from 5 cm away. We assume the adversary is located one to three
meters away and has a high gain antenna with Gt ranging up to 24 dBi. Highlighted
cells indicate configurations where the adversary would be able to match or exceed
the legitimate signal if transmitting at four times the legal limit set by the FCC
(36 dBm) or below. We see that in most cases, even with the high transmit power
and high-gain antenna, the adversary cannot achieve a higher signal strength than
a legitimate nearby device transmitting at one-half the maximum level set by the
FCC.
4.6.3 Raising the bar for an adversary
In most practical cases the single-antenna device can use signal strength to deter-
mine if a frame with a high preamble error was sent by a distant adversary, even if
that adversary transmits at unlawfully high power and uses a high-gain antenna.
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We consider our methods as a way of “raising the bar” that an adversary must over-
come. It could be the case that the adversary has an extraordinarily high transmit
power and extremely high-gain antenna. In those cases our method could fail, but
our method raises the bar well above the capabilities of off-the-shelf hardware.
4.7 Related work
Exploiting the repeating nature of Wi-Fi OFDM preambles has not been widely ex-
plored in the literature. Work thus far has primarily focused on covertly embedding
a small amount of data into the Wi-Fi frame and on device fingerprinting based on
PHY layer attributes. Both of these approaches are substantially different from our
methods and we examine each of them in this section. Additionally, because Near
Field Communications (NFC) also uses the near field of a transmitting antenna, we
briefly review that approach as well.
4.7.1 Embedding covert information in Wi-Fi frames
Classen et al. examined covert channels possible within standard Wi-Fi frames [21]
to covertly embed information. In particular they analyzed methods to utilize the
Short Training Field with Phase Shift Keying (STF PSK), Carrier Frequency Offset
with Frequency Shift Keying (CFO FSK), using additional subcarriers while still
conforming to Wi-Fi standards, and replacing portions of the Cyclic Prefix with
covert data. In each of these cases the idea is to embed information in the Wi-Fi
frame in a way that a standard receiver would not notice. While these techniques
involve the PHY layer and often use the preamble, they do not exploit the repeating
nature of the preamble for proximity detection.
In related work Rahbari and Krunz proposed a technique they call P-modulation
to modulate the STF in a standards-compliant manner to include up to eight user-
133
chosen bits in a 20 MHz wide Wi-Fi frame [95]. These bits can be used to inform
other devices of the transmitter’s status, possibly eliminating the need for addi-
tional control frames. This technique, however, is different from our technique in
that we use the repeating nature of the Long Training Field to establish proximity,
not to use it to include a small number of indicator bits.
4.7.2 Device fingerprinting
There have been numerous studies on fingerprinting wireless devices. Many of
these approaches focus on PHY layer imperfections resulting from manufacturing
such as clock skews [7] and can determine subtle radiometric differences between
devices. These radiometric differences can often lead to identification of device
type, and can sometimes also lead to specific device identification [85, 135].
While identifying specific devices based on their radio characteristics can be
useful in some use cases, these techniques do not provide an indication of proximity.
It could be the case that a single-antenna device is able to distinguish between
transmitters based on the (presumably non-spoofed) radiometric signatures of
wireless signals it receives, but the single-antenna device does not know if the
transmitter is a legitimate nearby device or a distant adversary – it simply knows
transmissions came from the same device. Our techniques focus on exchanging
data when devices are in close proximity.
Fingerprinting and our single-antenna proximity detection technique could,
however, work together. One solution would be to use our proximity detection tech-
nique to know when a user brings a new device near a single-antenna device. The
idea is that proximity determines the trustworthiness of the new device (whether
the new device is compromised in some manner is out of scope for this work). In
addition to detecting proximity, the single-antenna device could record radiometric
details about the signal it receives from the new device. If the user later separates
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the devices, the single-antenna device could examine the radiometric details of the
signal to identify data sent by the new device.
The goal of re-identifying a known device could also be accomplished, how-
ever, if the single-antenna device shares a key with the new device when they are
in close proximity, perhaps using the techniques described in Chapter 2. In future
communications the new device could use the key to encrypt or sign messages
intended for the single-antenna device, even if the two devices are now far apart.
The single-antenna device could do the same for messages intended for the new
device. We explore this concept further in Chapter 5.
4.7.3 Near Field Communications
Near Field Communications (NFC) is a short-range communication technique that
uses two loop antennas to transfer data between devices located roughly 10 cm apart.
These systems transmit in an ISM (Industrial, Scientific, Medical) frequency band
at 13.56 MHz [23] and rely on magnetic induction to transfer data [100]. Induction
occurs when a receiver is in the transmitter’s near-field region as described in
Section 4.3 and does not occur when the receiver is in the transmitter’s far-field
region. This near-field requirement implies that data can be securely transfer at
short ranges (e.g., within R1 from Equation (4.7)), without fear of interception
by more distant eavesdroppers. Recent work, however, has shown that NFC
communications can be read up to 2.4 m from the transmitter [139], making NFC a
questionable choice for secure communications.
Despite the questionable security aspects of NFC, it is becoming increasingly
popular on cell phones. This increased popularity, however, has not translated
into wide-spread usage. Android Beam, for example, is a feature of the Android
operation system initially deployed with version 4.0, Ice Cream Sandwich, that can
bootstrap a Bluetooth connection by exchanging keys over NFC [44]. Android Beam
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initially generated a great deal of excitement but has seen limited adaption. In fact
ComputerWorld noted that “... despite the admirable marketing effort, Android
Beam never quite worked particularly well ...” [63].
Additionally, because NFC requires specialized radios and antennas, it is not
commonly found on IoT-type devices. Our approach, however, accomplishes some
of the same tasks NFC was designed to accomplish, but does not require specialized
radios or antennas. Instead, our approaches uses the in-band Wi-Fi radio commonly
found on such devices.
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we have shown that a single-antenna device can reliably determine
when it is in close proximity to a transmitting device by leveraging the repeating
nature of Wi-Fi’s preamble and the physical characteristics of signals in the transmit-
ter’s near-field region. Our experiments suggest that mismatches in the preamble
caused by the near field of a transmitting antenna can allow a single-antenna target
device to reliably detect proximity at distances under 9 cm. We focused our testing
on dipole and micropatch antennas because they are the most common antennas
used in consumer devices, but there are a myriad of other types of antennas we
have not yet tested. In future work we may examine the near-field effects on these
other types of antennas. We believe, however, that our work here is a starting point
and opens an important new area of research that warrants further investigation.
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5
JamFi: secure information transfer
between nearby wireless devices
5.1 Introduction
As noted in Chapter 1, analysts predict billions of everyday devices will soon become
“smart” with the addition of wireless communication capabilities. To help alleviate
some of the difficulties in bringing new devices into an environment, in Chapter 2
we introduced Wanda. Wanda works well for imparting information onto the target
devices, but requires the target to run a small amount of Wanda code to decode
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the frames sent by the Wand. In this chapter we discuss another approach called
JamFi, which transfers data to a nearby target device, but does not require the target
to run additional software. In fact, the target device need not even be aware that
the sender is using JamFi. The target simply receives Wi-Fi frames as it normally
does with any other sender. Additionally, JamFi runs up to 18,000 times faster than
Wanda.
JamFi uses jamming to thwart adversaries, while still allowing ad hoc com-
munication between devices in close physical proximity. In this chapter we present
a theoretical and practical evaluation of JamFi that exploits MIMO antennas and
the Inverse Square Law to accomplish those goals. JamFi does not require any
specialized hardware or sensors in the new devices, and does not require complex
algorithms or complicated cryptography libraries. We find JamFi is able to facilitate
secure in-band communication between two devices in close physical proximity
(about 5 cm), even though they have never met nor shared a key.
As with Wanda, with JamFi we assume devices share data and control in-
formation among themselves, with new devices entering and exiting a particular
environment frequently. People and the devices they wear or carry may encounter
dozens, possibly hundreds, of other devices each day. Many of these devices en-
countered will be seen for the first time. Furthermore, some of the information the
devices share may be privacy sensitive or have security implications. On top of
that condition, many of these new devices will have limited or non-existent user
interfaces. Manually configuring a large number of these interface-limited devices
each day for ad hoc data exchange will not scale well. This situation implies that
devices that have never met, nor shared a secret, but that are in physical proximity,
must somehow have a way to securely communicate that requires minimal manual
intervention and yet captures user intent.
As an illustration of this problem in the healthcare domain, imagine that a
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Figure 5.1: Sender and target. A multiple-antenna “sending” device uses antenna A1 to send
a data signal to a “target” device located at distance d1, while antenna A2 located d2 from the
target transmits barrage jamming.
patient has collected health-related data on a medical device and wants to show
that data to a physician. The medical device has a limited user interface, or may
have no display whatsoever, making it difficult or impossible for the patient and
physician to view the information together. There might, however, be a display
in the physician’s exam room. The goal would be to get data securely from the
patient’s device to the physician’s display so that the patient and physician can
review it together as shown in Figure 5.1.
In this scenario the two devices have never met nor shared a key, but need to
share sensitive medical information. If that data were revealed, others may learn
something about the patient that the patient would prefer remain confidential. In
addition to possible data leaks while setting up and using the link to the intended
display, if the health device connects to the wrong display, the confidential data
may be exposed.
There is a broad range of situations like this – where data must be securely
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transferred from one device to another device that is in close physical proximity,
or where it is important to ensure data is not accidentally exposed to more distant
devices. In many such applications, physical proximity is a foundation for trust
and user intent.
5.1.1 JamFi
JamFi uses jamming to cover information exchanged between a multiple-antenna
“sending” device and another nearby “target” device in close physical proximity as
shown in Figure 5.1. We use Wi-Fi to demonstrate JamFi, but the technique could
be adapted for other protocols such as Bluetooth or Zigbee.
One antenna transmits data, another antenna jams
The sending device uses antenna A1 to transmit a data signal to the target device
located at distance d1, while using a second antenna A2 located d2 from the target
to broadcast barrage jamming (random noise).
Multiple antennas are becoming common in mobile devices, and in fact mul-
tiple antennas are required to take advantage of advanced features such as beam
forming in Multiple-Input, Multiple-Output (MIMO) configurations of 802.11n
and 802.11ac [56, 57]. Some devices, however, may simply be too small to support
multiple antennas. In these cases, the small device can act as a JamFi target, but not
a sender. We discuss this bi-directional communication scenario in Section 5.7.
Inverse-Square Law ensures and protects data transfer
Below we show that when a target device is in close physical proximity (about 5 cm)
to a sending device with antennas separated by one-half wavelength, due to the
Inverse-Square Law governing radio signal propagation, the data signal can be
received with up to 50 times more strength than the jamming. This arrangement
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ensures data is correctly received by nearby devices. We also show that more distant
devices receive roughly equal data and jamming strength, making data recovery
difficult.
Meant for ad hoc encounters (send keys otherwise)
JamFi is intended to transfer data under jamming cover when devices move into
close proximity. Some situations such as sending medical data to the physician’s
display described above can be completed while the devices are close and JamFi’s
jamming can cover the one-time data transfer. If devices need to communicate many
times or at long distances, JamFi can transfer a secret key which the two devices can
then use to bootstrap a secure data-transfer session or long-term / long-distance
secure relationship using traditional methods like TLS, with or without an AP, with
or without the Internet.
No need for additional hardware, pre-shared secrets, or complex algorithms
Unlike many other approaches, JamFi does not require any specialized hardware in
the target devices, any pre-shared secrets, any complex algorithms or complicated
cryptography libraries, or any infrastructure such as access points or PKI authorities.
Jamming causes no additional network interference
The Wi-Fi specification requires devices to perform Carrier Sense Multiple Access
with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) to avoid interfering with other devices
operating in an environment [57]. JamFi follows this approach, transmitting both
the data and jamming signals simultaneously during the time a normal Wi-Fi device
would transmit only data. In this way JamFi does not create additional interference
for other devices operating in the local area.
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5.1.2 Assumptions
Throughout this chapter we make the following assumptions about the target device:
1) it has at least one radio antenna to receive wireless data, 2) it cannot be relied
upon to have additional sensors such as cameras, microphones or accelerometers,
and 3) it cannot be altered to add new hardware.
We assume the transmitting device has: 1) a radio compatible with that of the
target device, 2) at least two antennas located approximately one-half wavelength
apart, and 3) one antenna can send data while a second antenna transmits barrage
jamming.
Finally, we assume either the target or the sender (or both) can be moved so
that the devices can be placed in close physical proximity and that adversaries are
located more than about 7 cm away.
5.1.3 Contributions
JamFi is a novel approach for securely transferring data between adjacent devices,
even though the devices have never met, nor have any secrets been pre-shared. We
make the following contributions in this thesis:
1. a consistent, fast, easy, and secure method to transfer any kind of information
between commodity wireless devices, regardless of device type or manufac-
turer, without hardware modifications to the devices;
2. a theoretical analysis of jamming at close range to facilitate data transfer; and
3. an experimental evaluation using several different commercial off-the-shelf
Wi-Fi receivers.
In the next section we review some background information useful to understanding
JamFi’s approach.
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5.2 Radio signal propagation
JamFi’s approach to overcoming jamming for devices in close physical proximity
relies on the fact that radio waves attenuate proportionally with distance the signal
travels. The nature of the signal, however, depends on the distance between trans-
mitter and receiver. When a receiver is extremely close to a transmitter, the receiver
is said to be in the near field of the transmitter. At longer range, the receiver is said
to be in the far field (also called the Fraunhofer region).
As discussed in Chapter 4, the boundary between the radiating near-field
region and far-field region for a finite-length antennas is estimated at distance R2
from the antenna as follows [9]:
R2 =
2D2
λ
(5.1)
where D is the length of the transmitting antenna plus the receiving antenna and
λ is the signal wavelength. Equation (5.1) projects that the far field for a quarter-
wavelength transmitting antenna at Wi-Fi’s 2.4 GHz band begins at roughly 6.2 cm
and is as short as 2.5 cm for Wi-Fi’s 5 GHz band.1
5.2.1 Estimating signal power density at close range
Equation (5.1) gives an estimate for the boundary between the near and far field, but
in reality the boundary is not sharply defined. Instead, the electric E and magnetic
H fields generated by a transmitting antenna begin to align more fully so that
they are orthogonal (perpendicular) to each other, transverse to the radial direction
of propagation, as the signal moves substantially into the far field. Because the
boundary is not sharp and JamFi is designed for communications between devices
1 Some sources suggest the far field for short antennas (where l  λ) are best approximated by
R2 = λ2pi which yields distances of 1.9 cm and 0.8 cm for the 2.4 and 5 GHz bands respectively.
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separated by approximately the estimated distance from Equation (5.1), we cannot
simply use the well-known Friis equation given in Chapter 2 to estimate signal
strength at the receiver because the Friis equation is only valid in the far field.
Balanis, however, gives an approximation of the average power for a thin-wire
(radius r  l) finite-length dipole that is valid everywhere except on the surface of
the antenna: [9]
Wav = η
|I0|2
8pi2d2
cos
(
kl
2 cosθ
)
− cos
(
kl
2
)
sinθ
2 (5.2)
where η = 120pi is the intrinsic impedance of free space, I0 is the current applied
to the transmitter, k = 2pi/λ is the wavenumber, l is the length of the transmitting
antenna, d is the distance from the transmitting antenna, and θ is the vertical angle
between the transmitter and receiver (below we assume θ = pi/4).
The d2 term in the denominator of Equation (5.2) suggests that power density
drops with the square of distance. If the distance d between transmitter and receiver
is reduced by one-half, then the received power is increased by a factor of four. This
relationship between distance and power is often referred to as the Inverse Square
Law.
The relationship is particularly stark when a receiver is in close proximity to
a transmitter. Figure 5.2 shows the expected average power density according to
Equation (5.2), where transmitting antennas A1 and A2 are separated by a fixed
distance of one-half wavelength, and a receiver is located d1 cm away from A1,
such that d2 = d1 + λ/2. Antenna A1 transmits a data signal while antenna A2
transmits barrage jamming. Each antenna transmits at equal amplitude. In this
figure we model a 24 dBm Wi-Fi signal transmitted on channel 1’s center frequency
of 2.412 GHz, which has wavelength λ ≈ 12.4 cm.
We see in Figure 5.2 that when a receiver is very close to a transmitter, it
144
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 12 14 16 18 20 25 30 50 100 150 200 250 300
Distance d1 (cm)
0
50
100
150
200
250
m
W
 / 
cm
2
Average power density by distance
A1
A2
Figure 5.2: Expected power received from two transmitting antennas, each sending a 24 dBm
signal, with antenna A1 located at distance d1 cm from the receiver and antenna A2 located
d2 = d1 + λ/2 from the receiver.
receives a significantly stronger signal than a signal from a transmitter located
only one-half wavelength farther away. In this case, when antenna A1 is located at
d1 = 1 cm, then d2 ≈ 7.25 cm, that is, 7.25 times farther than d1. Because the power
received is relative to the square of distance, even though both transmitting antennas
are physically close to the receiver, the signal from A1 is roughly 50 times stronger
than the signal from antenna A2. The difference in power between a signal sent
from antenna A1 and A2 drops quickly as distance from the transmitter increases.
When A1 is more than about 7 cm away from the target, the received signal strength
from each transmitter is virtually identical. A distant device therefore receives
roughly equal-strength signals from each antenna.
When devices are in close proximity they enjoy a unique channel advantage
over devices located farther away. That channel superiority vanishes quickly as
devices move apart.
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5.3 Signal errors
The performance of wireless digital communication systems carrying data in the
presence of noise (both natural and intentional) has been well studied and has
produced analytical models that predict the number of communication errors
expected to occur given three factors: 1) data signal strength, 2) noise intensity, and
3) modulation scheme. We use those models to calculate the theoretical error rates
given the physical arrangement of transmitter and receiver described in Section 5.2
where a target device is located near data antenna A1 and one-half wavelength
farther from jamming antenna A2. In Section 5.5 we present the results from
experiments using real, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) Wi-Fi devices as receivers.
5.3.1 Data signal strength and noise intensity
The relationship between a signal and noise is captured by the Signal-to-Noise Ratio
(SNR) [38]:
SNR =
Pr
N0B
=
Es
N0BTs
=
Eb
N0BTb
(5.3)
where Pr is the received power of the data signal, N0 is the power spectral density
of the noise, B is the bandwidth, Es is the energy per symbol, Eb is the energy per
bit, Ts is the symbol time, and Tb is the bit time. For pulse-shaping systems such as
Wi-Fi where Ts = N/B, Equation (5.3) simplifies to SNR = Es/(N0N) where N is
the number of samples per symbol [38].
In the presence of barrage noise jamming, where the jammer interferes across
the entire signal bandwidth (as opposed to tone jamming where noise is only
transmitted on specific frequencies), the total power spectral density of the noise
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becomes [64]:
Nt = N0 + Nj (5.4)
where Nt is the total noise power spectral density, N0 is the power spectral density of
any background noise, and Nj is the power spectral density of the barrage jamming.
Accounting for noise provides the Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio (SINR)
where:
SINR =
Pr
(N0 + Nj)B
=
Pr
NtB
. (5.5)
Equation (5.5) can be used to provide the SINR per symbol, γs [38]:
γs =
PrTs
NtBTs
=
Es
NtBTs
=
Es
NtN
. (5.6)
5.3.2 Modulation schemes
As discussed in Chapter 3, 802.11a/g/n/ac uses Orthogonal Frequency Division
Multiplexing (OFDM) to send data symbols over several different subcarriers simul-
taneously, resulting in higher data rates than serial single-channel communications.
Speed can be further enhanced with the type of modulation used on each subcarrier.
In Wi-Fi the simplest modulation type is Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK), where
each symbol represents one bit. More complex than BPSK, Quadrature Phase Shift
Keying (QPSK) symbols represent two bits of information. Finally, Quadrature
Amplitude Modulation (MQAM) is the most complex Wi-Fi modulation type where
each symbol represents log2(M) bits and M is 16, 64, or 256. More complex mod-
ulation schemes increase the data rate because each symbol represents more bits.
Figure 5.3 shows these modulation types in a constellation diagram where a symbol,
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Figure 5.3: Wi-Fi constellation diagrams. Dots represent symbols in the complex plane. Ex-
cept for BPSK, each symbol represents multiple bits. With QPSK each symbol represents two
bits. With 16QAM each symbol represents four bits and with 64QAM each symbol represents
six bits.
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representing one or more bits, is shown as a dot in the complex plane.
To send a symbol, a transmitter selects the complex number on the constella-
tion diagram representing the desired bit pattern, then modulates a cosine wave on
a carrier frequency with the real component of the complex number, and also mod-
ulates a sine wave on the same carrier frequency with the imaginary component
of the complex number. This modulation determines the phase and amplitude of
the signal as discussed in Chapter 3. Assuming an Additive White Gaussian Noise
(AWGN) channel, the receiver receives the signal as [38]:
y[t] = x[t] + n[t] (5.7)
where y[t] is the received signal, x[t] is the transmitted signal, and n[t] is the noise
on the channel at time t.
The receiver then determines the nearest symbol to y[t] on the complex plane.
Because y[t] includes noise, it may not fall exactly on a symbol, so the receiver
chooses the closest symbol and infers that symbol is what the transmitter sent.
Using a more complex modulation increases the susceptibility to noise because
there are more possible symbols and smaller amounts of noise can cause the receiver
to misinterpret a symbol corrupted by noise.
To compensate for noise, Wi-Fi uses convolutional coding to create redundancy
by adding duplicate bits to each transmission. For example, 1/2 coding means that
each bit is duplicated, resulting in 2 bits for every input bit. Coding redundancy
reduces the overall data rate (e.g., 1/2 coding reduces the data rate by half), but can
improve throughput by increasing reliability, especially in noisy environments.
A modulation type combined with a coding scheme is known as a Modulation
Coding Scheme (MCS). 802.11g can use one of eight different schemes: BPSK
1/2, BPSK 3/4, QPSK 1/2, QPSK 3/4, 16QAM 1/2, 16QAM 3/4, 64QAM 2/3,
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and 64QAM 3/4. More recent Wi-Fi versions specified in 802.11n and 802.11ac
can use these modulation schemes as well as more complex modulation schemes.
In Section 5.5, however, we see that more complex schemes cannot survive the
jamming from antenna A2, so we focus on these eight modulation coding schemes.
5.3.3 Energy per bit
The chosen MCS influences the energy per bit because a symbol may represent
many bits, and each bit may be duplicated. Taking the energy per symbol from
Equation (5.6) as a constant, the bit redundancy yields the SINR per bit, γb [38]:
γb ≈ γsRc log2 M
(5.8)
where log2M is the number of bits per symbol and Rc is the coding rate (e.g., 1/2).
There is a trade off in Equation (5.8): as the number of bits per symbol increases, the
energy per data bit deceases, but as the coding scheme produces more redundant
bits, the energy per data bit increases.
5.3.4 Estimating errors
Assuming an AWGN channel between sender and receiver, that all symbols in a
modulation scheme are equally likely to be transmitted, and that Gray coding is
used, so that one symbol error corresponds to one bit error (a conservative estimate,
especially for complex modulation schemes), we can calculate the probability of a
symbol error, Ps. Goldsmith [38] gives an excellent derivation of the error estimate
equations shown in Table 5.1 where the Q function is
Q(x) =
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
x
e−
x2
2 dx. (5.9)
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Modulation M Ps
BPSK 2 Q
(√
2γb
)
QPSK 4 2Q
(√
γb
)−Q2 (√γb)
16QAM 16 4Q
(√
4γb
5
)
64QAM 64 4Q
(√
3γb
7
)
Table 5.1: Probability of symbol error Ps by modulation type [38].
Table 5.1 indicates the probability of a symbol error depends on the signal’s
power relative to noise and the modulation type chosen. Assuming Gray coding,
we can also estimate the probability of a bit error, Pb, as
Pb ≈ Pslog2 M
. (5.10)
Next we use these estimates to predict the ability of JamFi to successfully
transmit data to nearby devices while denying more distant devices.
5.4 JamFi theoretical performance
Section 5.3 provided the mathematical underpinning to estimate JamFi’s theoretical
performance. In this section we use those equations to model JamFi’s expected
performance and in Section 5.5 we provide the results of experiments using COTS
Wi-Fi devices. For all experiments and theoretical estimates we separate antennas
A1 and A2 by one-half wavelength, with d2 = d1 + λ/2, and arbitrarily choose
Wi-Fi channel 1. We model jamming phase and amplitude using a normal Gaussian
distribution with zero mean and unit standard deviation, X ∼ N (µ = 0, σ2 = 1).
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Figure 5.4: Energy per bit vs. noise at close range. At close range the energy per bit to noise
is high, but drops off quickly with increasing distance.
Table 5.1 shows that the key to estimating errors, regardless of modulation
scheme, is the ratio between the energy per bit and the energy in the noise. For
JamFi, that ratio is primarily driven by two factors: 1) the geometry between the
target device and the sending device’s antennas, and 2) the ratio of transmit power
of the two antennas (there is of course other noise in the environment; we model it
at −92 dBm [51] but it typically has little impact on the error estimates).
5.4.1 Geometry
Geometry drives the ratio between signal and noise as shown in Figure 5.4a. We
estimate the received power of the data signal, Pr, using Equation (5.2) at distance
d1. We estimate the noise power similarly, but using the transmit power Pj from
jamming antenna A2 at distance d2. Assuming that antenna A1 transmits data at
the same strength that A2 transmits jamming, then when the target device is located
152
near antenna A1, the energy per bit will be up to 70 times stronger than the jamming
signal. That ratio is maximized when the target device is located where d1 is small
and the antennas are aligned so that d2 = d1 + λ/2 as shown in Figure 5.1.
We assume JamFi devices can be adorned with an indicator such as an arrow
to reveal how to align the devices. If the target is not well aligned relative to the
transmit antennas, the ratio of signal strength to jamming will be reduced, resulting
in increased noise relative to the signal. This works to JamFi’s advantage because
legitimate receivers can be placed near the transmit antennas and easily aligned
to maximize d2, leveraging the Inverse-Square Law, whereas more distant or less
geometrically aligned devices will see a lower γb as shown in Figure 5.4a.
5.4.2 Jamming transmit power
Another factor that can affect the ratio of energy per symbol to noise is the transmit
power of the data and jamming signals. We model the jamming transmit power
as Pj = Pt + δ dBm, where δ ∈ {0, 4}. In the first case the data and noise signal
transmit power are equal; in the second case the jamming power is 4 dBm (2.5 times)
higher than the data signal. In this latter case, shown in Figure 5.4b, JamFi relies
even more heavily on the geometry and Inverse-Square Law to ensure the receiver
is able to recover the data signal in the presence of more noise. If the legitimate
target device is placed near the data antenna, the received data signal can still be
almost 30 times stronger than the jamming signal.
Figure 5.5 plots the theoretical probability of a symbol error, Ps, using the
equations in Table 5.1 and the energy per bit to noise, γb, when JamFi uses each of
the eight modulation schemes and the target is aligned with the transmit antennas.
Symbols transmitted with the simpler modulation types of BPSK and QPSK are
more likely to be received without error than the more complex MQAM modulation
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Figure 5.5: Probability of symbol error by MCS for devices in close proximity. Frames sent
with simpler modulations (e.g., BPSK and QPSK) are more likely to be received without sym-
bol errors than more complex modulations (e.g., 16QAM and 64QAM).
schemes.
Wi-Fi groups bits into frames for transmission. If a frame contains b bits, then
the probability a frame is received without error, Pf , is:
Pf = (1− Ps)b/ log2 M. (5.11)
Figure 5.6 shows Pf , assuming the frame contains a modest-sized payload of
b = 1, 024 bits. We see that frames are likely to be received without error for BPSK
and QPSK when the target is close (less than about 5 cm), and the probability of
receiving a frame without error becomes extremely low at greater distances.
These estimates suggest that BPSK will likely be a good candidate to securely
and reliably transfer data to a device in close physical proximity in the presence of
jamming, while denying a more distant eavesdropper. This distance limitation may
also help mitigate innocent errors where data would be unintentionally transferred
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Figure 5.6: Probability a frame is received without error, given a 1,024 bit frame. BPSK 1/2
frames are likely to be received at close range without bit errors.
to a device located farther away from the multiple-antenna device.
5.4.3 Data transmit power
Another possible approach to securely transferring data between two nearby devices
would be to lower the data transmit power and naively hope that a more distant
eavesdropper would not able to receive the weak signal. Reducing the typical Wi-Fi
transmit power of approximately 24 dBm to 4 dBm would reduce the transmit
power by a factor of 100. Intuitively, that approach appears to be an easy way to
reduce an adversary’s range by a factor of 100. Because the signal attenuates with
the square of distance, however, that is not the case. If we know the minimum
signal strength at which a device can receive a signal, Pr, and assuming the device
is in the far field, we can derive the maximum distance where a transmitted signal
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is recoverable by re-writing the Equation (2.1) from Chapter 2 as:
d =
λ
4pi
√
Pr
PtGtGr
(5.12)
where Pt is the transmit power, Gt and Gr are the gain of the transmitter and receiver
respectively.
For example, if a system is able to recover a signal at Pr = −73 dBm [51],
and no obstacles attenuate a 24 dBm signal, then by Equation (5.12), the received
power will reach the device’s minimum after the signal travels approximately 700 m.
Dropping the transmit power to 4 dBm, however, yields a distance of roughly 70 m,
only 10 times less than when transmitted at high power, not the 100 times reduction
in range that one might have expected.
These calculations suggest that to avoid detection by an adversary located
less than 1 m away, the transmit power will need to be reduced to an extremely
low level. In theory, reducing the transmit power to −50 dBm would result in a
−73 dBm received signal at 20 cm. While these calculations suggest the possibility
that extremely low power could be helpful, there are two important considerations.
First, an adversary can use a high-gain directional antenna to boost his receive
range. A 9 dBi antenna would increase Gr, making the adversary’s effective range
roughly one-half meter. Second, environmental noise is likely to create significant
issues for the legitimate target device at these levels.
Even though reducing transmit power alone does not provide assurance that
a signal will not be recovered by a distant device, lowering transmit power still
makes an eavesdropping adversary’s task more difficult. In the next section we
experiment with commercial-off-the-shelf Wi-Fi devices and 4 dBm data transmit
power.
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5.5 Evaluation
To test the effectiveness of COTS Wi-Fi devices to receive a signal in the presence
of jamming, we tested four devices with electronics similar to those found in
embedded devices: a Panda Ultra Wireless N USB Adapter [86], an Edimax EW-
7811Un [28], an external Alfa Networks AWUS036H [4], and an internal Intel
Ultimate N WiFi Link 5300 [58] connected to a Planar Inverted-F antenna.
On the transmit side, we used two calibrated Ettus Research N210 Univer-
sal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) radios [30], each connected to a quarter-
wavelength dipole antenna to simulate a multiple-antenna device. One USRP
transmitted data using the GNU Radio 802.11a/g/p transceiver code developed
by Bloessl [14], while the second USRP transmitted barrage jamming across the
Wi-Fi 20 MHz channel during frame transmission. This arrangement allowed us
to precisely control the signal strength and coordinate the timing of both the data
and the jamming signals. The antennas were separated by one-half wavelength in
keeping with Figure 5.1. We conducted all experiments on Wi-Fi channel 1, used
4 dBm to transmit power for data, and either 4 or 8 dBm to transmit jamming.
We first tested the ability of the four COTS devices to receive frames containing
a 1,024-bit payload sent from the USRP without the presence of jamming. In this
test we transmitted 1,000 Wi-Fi frames for each of the eight modulation schemes,
with an interval of 100 ms between frames. To minimize outside interference,
we tested these receivers in a remote indoor facility where there were no other
Wi-Fi transmitters within at least 100 meters. We found each commercial device
performed similarly; in this chapter we report the average results across all four
devices. Appendix C provides details on each receiver’s performance.
Figure 5.7 shows the average Frame Reception Ratio (FRR) – the number of
frames received by the Wi-Fi device, divided by the number of frames transmitted,
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Figure 5.7: Frame Reception Ratio for 1,000 packets sent on each MCS. BPSK and QPSK
frames were received with fewer errors than 16QAM and 64QAM frames.
for all four receivers where d1 ranged from 1 to 12 cm. We see that the simpler
modulation schemes were received with significantly higher probability than the
more complex modulation schemes. Unsurprisingly, while theory suggests frame
reception should have been near 100 percent when the devices are in such close
proximity, real-life performance was well below predicted.
Next we tested the ability of the Wi-Fi devices to receive frames in the presence
of jamming. Figure 5.8 shows the average FRR across all four devices when jam-
ming signal strength was equal to the data signal strength (i.e., Pj = Pt), normalized
to the FRR when no jamming was present (we refer to this ratio as NFRR). We
see that BPSK 1/2, BPSK 3/4, and QPSK 1/2 performed relatively well when d1
was less than 5 cm. More complex modulation schemes were received with low
probability at close range, and all modulation schemes performed poorly at longer
ranges. This is by design, as JamFi’s purpose is to transfer data to nearby devices,
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Figure 5.8: NFRR for 1,000 packets sent on each MCS when Pj = 4 dBm. BPSK 1/2 per-
forms better than other modulation schemes when the jamming signal is the same strength as
the data signal.
but not allow reception by more distant devices.
We then tested JamFi’s ability to transfer data to nearby devices when the
jamming signal was 2.5 times stronger than the data signal (i.e., Pj = Pt + 4 dBm).
Figure 5.9 shows the results when d1 ranged from 1 to 12 cm. We see that BPSK has
some ability to transfer data in this environment up to 3 cm, but all other schemes
and distances had virtually no reception. In all cases after 6 cm, no frames were
received using any modulation scheme.
Unsurprisingly, we see that BPSK 1/2 performs much better in the presence
of noise than other modulation schemes. In Figure 5.10 we compare BPSK 1/2
performance with the theoretical performance discussed in Section 5.4 and shown
in Figure 5.6. We see that actual performance follows the theoretical performance,
but lags somewhat. In the real world, data recovery on radio interfaces are never as
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Figure 5.9: NFRR for 1,000 packets sent on each MCS when Pj = 8 dBm. BPSK 1/2 per-
forms better than other modulations schemes when the jamming signal is 4 dBm higher than
the data signal, but does not perform as well as when the jamming and data signals are of
equal strength.
perfect as theory assumes. For example, if an interface misses the frame preamble,
it will not attempt to decode the rest of the frame, whereas theory does not account
for these types of issues. Despite these issues, theory elucidates the real world.
Finally, we examine the performance of BPSK 1/2 when the jamming signal
was 2.5 times stronger than the data signal. Figure 5.11 also shows that the real
world lags theory. We see that no data was successfully exchanged at ranges longer
than 3 cm.
In summary, we see that JamFi was able to use BPSK 1/2 to provide communi-
cation in the presence of jamming when the data and jamming signals are of equal
strength and the devices were closer than about 5 cm. Data could not be recovered
by devices at longer ranges.
160
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Distance d1 cm
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
NF
RR
Actual vs. predicted
BPSK 1/2, Pj = 4 dBm
Predicted
Actual
Figure 5.10: NFRR for 1,000 packets sent with BPSK 1/2 vs predicted when Pj = 4 dBm.
Experimental results lagged somewhat behind the expected theoretical results, but were
generally in line with predictions.
5.6 Security
In Section 5.5 we see that JamFi is able to provide communication while devices
are in close physical proximity; in this section we discuss an adversary attempting
to eavesdrop the data transfer or inject frames. We assume the adversary has
full knowledge of how JamFi works and is able to employ more sophisticated
equipment than COTS devices.
5.6.1 Eavesdropping
An adversary might attempt to eavesdrop on the data transfer between JamFi
devices. Assuming the adversary is located more than about 7 cm away, the data
and jamming signal strength the adversary receives will be roughly equal. An
adversary might then attempt to separate the data and jamming signals with a
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Figure 5.11: NFRR for 1,000 packets sent with BPSK 1/2 vs predicted when Pj = 8 dBm.
Experimental results lagged somewhat behind the expected theoretical results, but were
generally in line with predictions.
directional antenna or with signal processing and MIMO antennas.
Directional antennas
A directional antenna with a narrow main lobe pointed precisely at the data antenna,
but excluding the jamming antenna, would allow the adversary to receive the
data signal only. JamFi’s antennas, however, are only one-half wavelength apart
and because the main lobe expands with distance, the lobe will encompass both
antennas if the adversary is located a reasonable distance away or is inline with
JamFi’s antennas. We evaluate this scenario in Section 2.7 and find that an adversary
with a high-gain antenna located only 1 m away and bore-sighted on one of JamFi’s
antennas would need a one-half beam width of roughly four degrees – well below
most real antennas or antenna arrays. Furthermore, because at least one of the
JamFi’s devices is mobile, the exact orientation and location of devices is difficult to
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predict a priori.
Signal processing and MIMO antennas
Alternatively, an adversary might try sophisticated signal-processing techniques to
separate the data from the jamming signal. Researchers have shown that, provided
the adversary is located at a distance much greater than the separation between
transmit antennas (in this case antenna A1 and A2), and the two transmit antennas
are within one-half wavelength of each other (as they are with JamFi), the channel
matrix has Rank 1 and the signals cannot be separated [127].
As an illustration, in Figure 5.12 we see a transmitter with antennas Tx1 and
Tx2 separated by ∆t and oriented with angle φt relative to a receiver with antennas
Rx1 and Rx2 separated by ∆r and oriented with angle φr relative to the transmitter.
Tx1 and Rx1 are separated by distance d. If the transmitter has nt antennas and the
receiver has nr antennas, then the channel between receive antenna r and transmit
antenna t can be represented by following when the receiver is located a distance
significantly greater than the spread between transmit antennas [127]:
hrt = a
√
nrnt(e−j2pid/λ)(ej2pi(t−1)∆tcosφt)(e−j2pi(r−1)∆rcosφr) (5.13)
where a is an attenuation factor, ∆r and ∆t are the spreads between the receive and
transmit antennas respectively, r = 1 . . . nr, and t = 1 . . . nt.
For the 2 x 2 MIMO arrangement depicted in Figure 5.12, the resulting channel
using Equation (5.13) is
H = a2e−
j2pid
λ
 1 e−j2pi∆rcosφr
e−j2pi∆tcosφt e−j2pi∆rcosφr e−j2pi∆tcosφt
 . (5.14)
We see the second column is the same as the first column, except that the second
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Figure 5.12: Channel Rank. A transmitter with antennas Tx1 and Tx2 separated by ∆t and
oriented with angle φt relative to a receiver with antennas Rx1 and Rx2 separated by ∆r and
oriented with angle φr relative to the transmitter. The channel between these two devices
separated by distance d and with ∆t < λ/2 can be shown to be Rank 1 when d  ∆t.
Adapted from Tse and Viswanath [127].
column is multiplied by a factor of e−j2pi∆rcosφr . This demonstrates the channel
matrix H has Rank 1, holds even if the receiver has more than two antennas, and
indicates signals cannot be separated by the receiver [127].
Given matrix H has Rank 1 when devices are far apart, one might wonder
how spatial multiplexing (e.g., multiple simultaneous data streams) is possible
with MIMO configurations if the transmit antennas are located near each other. Tse
and Viswanath show multiple streams are not possible if the receiver is located
at a distance that is significantly greater than the transmit antenna spread, the
transmit antennas are separated by λ/2 or less, and there are no reflectors in the
environment [127]. Those authors go on to show that multiple streams are possible
in some cases if there is at least one reflector in the environment. As shown in
Figure 5.13, a reflector in the environment can create virtual “relays” (denoted as
points A and B) in the line of sight and reflected path that act as if the signal were
transmitted from those locations [127]. These geographically separate relays may
allow for spatial multiplexing if the transmitter is aware of the channel state and
carefully beam forms its transmissions to bounce a stream off from the reflector.
The result mimics a transmitter with antennas located at A and B. A receiver that
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Figure 5.13: MIMO with reflected path. If there is a reflector in the environment, multiple
spatial streams are possible between MIMO antennas, even if the transmit antennas are
located near each other. Adapted from Tse and Viswanath [127].
has a good estimate of the channel can beam form similarly.
Even with a reflector in the environment, for the channel to have a Rank
greater than one, both of the following conditions must be met [127]:
|cos φt2 − cos φt1 | ≥ 1/Lt
|cos φr2 − cos φr1 | ≥ 1/Lr
(5.15)
where Lt and Lr are the lengths of the transmit and receive arrays normalized to
the wavelength, and φti and φri are the departure and arrival angles for path i as
shown in Figure 5.13. With JamFi, the transmit array length is one-half wavelength,
yielding Lt = 1/2. This length requires |cos φt2 − cos φt1 | ≥ 2 for the channel matrix
to have Rank greater than one. Because a cosine ranges from -1 to +1, the difference
between two cosines is at most two. This fact, combined with the requirements
of Equation (5.15) prompt many papers and books to declare signals from two
antennas separated by 1/2 wavelength or less to be inseparable [40, 126, 127].
Tippenhauer et al., however, exploited the fact that in the equations above
a receiver must be located at a significantly greater distance than the transmit
antenna spread to ensure the channel matrix has Rank 1. They showed that by
using MIMO receive antennas at relatively close range, signals can be separated
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in some cases [126]. Their analysis evaluated an adversary attempting to separate
a 400 MHz data signal sent by one antenna using simple Frequency Shift Keying
(FSK) from a jamming signal sent by a second antenna separated by 15 cm or more.
They showed that it is theoretically possible to extract a signal with less than a
20% bit error rate at ranges around two meters. In practice, however, they found
that (even with precise alignment of the antennas) multipath signals often defeated
separation attempts. Furthermore, separating Wi-Fi’s more complex modulation
schemes at higher frequencies and smaller antenna spreads is more difficult than
separating simple low-frequency FSK signals with large antenna separation. Those
researchers did not demonstrate any capability to separate more complex Wi-Fi
signals from jamming.
5.6.2 Frame injection
An adversary may attempt to inject his own frames while data is transferred be-
tween JamFi devices. In that case the adversary’s signal would have to exceed the
jamming signal strength. Because the jamming signal is located in close proximity
to the receiving device, the Inverse-Square Law helps JamFi defend against such an
attack. Even though JamFi transmits at 4 dBm, an adversary located only 2 m away
using a 9 dBi omni-directional antenna would need to roughly double the maxi-
mum transmit power limits set by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission
to exceed JamFi’s signal strength.
5.7 Bi-directional communications
Above we discuss uni-directional communication – data moves from a multiple-
antenna device to a target device that has one antenna. Here we discuss bi-
directional communication.
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If the target device also has two antennas, bi-directional communication is
possible simply by reversing roles. If one device only has one antenna, however,
we posit that secure bi-directional communications may still be possible. In this
case, the single-antenna device can alert the multiple-antenna device that it has
data to send and the multiple-antenna device initiates jamming on one antenna
while listening on its other antenna. The single-antenna device can then monitor
the noise floor. When the noise floor rises above a preset threshold, strong jamming
is in place and it then transmits its data. In this way, a single-antenna device can
bi-directionally communicate with a multiple-antenna device.
This approach, however, has some limitations. If the adversary is able to raise
the noise floor above a threshold, the adversary may be able to trick the single-
antenna device. The adversary could time his jamming such that after reaching
the threshold on the single-antenna device, the adversary stops jamming just as
the single-antenna device transmits. In this case the data is transmitted without
jamming coverage and could be intercepted. To counter this attack, however, the
single-antenna device could wait a random amount of time after the noise threshold
is reached before sending the data. This way if the adversary stopped jamming, the
single-antenna device would detect it and not transmit.
As noted in Section 5.6, an adversary would need to transmit a great deal of
power to raise the noise floor to a level comparable to a nearby JamFi device. It is
possible, however, that a formidable adversary with a highly directional antenna
and extremely powerful transmitter may be able to raise the noise floor sufficiently.
5.8 Related work
JamFi securely transfers data among devices in close proximity using jamming.
Other research has previously looked at accomplishing that goal using a variety of
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techniques.
5.8.1 Cryptography
Many approaches involve cryptographic means, such as Diffie-Hellman key ex-
change. Despite impressive mathematics, Diffie-Hellman and related approaches
have been shown to be vulnerable to Man-In-The-Middle attacks [2]. Additionally,
because cryptographic methods such as Public Key Infrastructure are expensive
to compute and rely on a trusted certificate authority, they may not be suitable for
embedded devices common in IoT scenarios. JamFi does not require cryptography
to accomplish secure data transfer.
5.8.2 Out-of-band communications
Out-of-band communication systems exchange a secret key between devices over
a secondary communication channel that is impervious to observation and inter-
ference by an adversary. The devices then bootstrap a secure connection over the
primary channel using the information exchanged over the secondary channel.
Proposed secondary channels have included visual [71], audio [79], gesture [138],
or secondary radios such as NFC or RFID. In each of these cases an additional
sensor (light sensor, microphone, accelerometer, or second radio) is required. That
required sensor or radio will not be present on many devices. Additionally, NFC
has been shown to be vulnerable to interception at much longer distances than
originally thought [139]. JamFi uses the in-band Wi-Fi radio and does not require ad-
ditional sensors, radios, or complicated algorithms. As noted in Section 2.1 though,
JamFi could be used to share a secret that can be used to bootstrap a long-term or
long-distance session between devices.
168
Area Description
Time synchronization Create common reference point
Interference management Overcome capture effect
Coexistence Allow different protocols to use same spectrum
Cooperative diversity Allow users to help each other transmit faster
Waking up a destination Jam long enough to wake up sleeping nodes
Power control Jam control channel so devices can determine
required transmit power
Sense sharing Share results of channel use
Channel reservation Jam control channel to reserve data channel
Contention resolution Access to a channel in a multi-user environment
Support of QoS Prioritize some network traffic over others
Solving different problems Hidden/exposed terminal, deafness,
erroneous reservation
Collision detection Eliminate hidden nodes by jamming
Statistics estimation Estimate channel performance
Frame transmissions Transmit data, control, attachment frames
Interrupting an activity Stop transmissions already in progress
Physical security Valid receivers get message/prevent injection
Table 5.2: Areas where friendly jamming has been suggested [3].
5.8.3 Jamming
Jamming has been well studied as means of covering in-band communication.
While there are many uses for jamming, “friendly jamming” attempts to use jam-
ming to accomplish a specific purpose such as secure data transfer. Recently,
Al-Mefleh and Al-Kofahi published a comprehensive survey of friendly jamming.
Their review covered 182 academic papers [3]. Table 5.2 summarizes the 16 areas
they identified where where friendly jamming has been contemplated.
The most relevant area to our work listed in the survey is physical security.
Like JamFi, the physical security papers deal with using jamming to ensure that only
legitimate receivers are able to decode a message, or jamming to prevent injection
of malicious frames. For example, Kuo et al. proposed a solution for imparting
secret keys onto IoT-type devices. They suggest putting devices into a Faraday
cage to exchange information and use a jammer to cover any RF leakage from the
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cage [70]. This approach may work for small devices but is impractical for large
ones. Several papers use cooperating relay nodes to jam and prevent eavesdroppers
from decoding network traffic over large distances [8, 26, 37, 83]. Other researchers
consider remote jamming, where unlike JamFi, the data source and jammer are
located a large distance apart or have a pre-shared key [109, 110, 122, 129, 130, 140].
Another comprehensive friendly jamming survey by Huo et al. segregated
approaches on three criteria: (1) non-self cooperative jamming (where additional de-
vices aid the jamming) versus self-cooperative jamming (where the only legitimate
devices are “Alice” and “Bob”), (2) uniform (omni-directional) versus directional
jamming (jamming is beam formed to keep the receiver free of jamming), and
(3) perfect versus imperfect knowledge of eavesdroppers CSI. JamFi does not rely
on additional “helper” devices, does not rely on beam forming to keep the receiver
away from the jamming, and does not rely on perfect eavesdropper CSI information
(impossible with a passive adversary). None of the papers listed in their survey take
JamFi’s approach. All others rely on either additional helper devices, directional
jamming, or perfect eavesdropper knowledge.
Two papers, however, consider jamming where a data source and jammer
are in close proximity. In both papers a new jamming device is worn by a medical
patient to protect implantable medical devices (IMDs) such as a pacemaker. In the
first paper, a necklace-based jamming device called a Shield listens for communica-
tions specifically directed toward the implanted device and rapidly turns on the
jammer to prevent outsiders from communicating with the implanted device [40].
In effect they are jamming the IMD to prevent it from receiving the outsider’s com-
munication. This approach differs from JamFi in that JamFi allows other devices to
communicate with the target device. JamFi simply protects its own communications
and does not render the target otherwise unreachable. Another difference between
JamFi and the Shield project is that the Shield and the IMD are assumed to have a
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pre-shared key so that the Shield can communicate with the IMD. JamFi does not
have this requirement.
Another paper takes a related approach, but requires an ECG reading to create
a common key between an implanted device and a jammer [134]. We do not intend
for the MIMO device and target device to each have the capability to monitor a
person’s ECG.
5.8.4 Proximity
Like JamFi, other approaches to secure data transfer rely on close proximity be-
tween devices. ProxiMate, for instance uses fluctuations in television or FM radio
broadcast signals to develop a common key between devices located within one-half
wavelength of each other [73]. Separately, our own project called Wanda discussed
in Chapter 2 exploits the difference in signal strength between two nearby antennas
to securely transmit data to a target device [88]. Wanda, however, can only transmit
one bit with each Wi-Fi packet, whereas JamFi can send a much larger data pay-
load – 2,304 bytes in each Wi-Fi packet [57] – making it more than 18,000 times faster
than Wanda. Furthermore, JamFi expands Wanda’s security protection by adding
jamming and by shortening the period of communication. Finally, Wanda requires
the target to run a small amount of code to decode the frames sent by the Wand.
JamFi does not have this additional code requirement. The target devices does not
even need to be aware that the sender is using JamFi’s technique. The target simply
receives Wi-Fi frames as it would from any other sender.
5.9 Conclusion
As the number of deployed IoT devices grows, devices will increasingly encounter
each other on an ad hoc basis and securely transferring data between them will
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become an increasingly difficult problem. Manually entering secret keys on each
device will become extraordinarily cumbersome. To help alleviate that problem, we
developed and evaluated a system called JamFi that leverages MIMO antennas and
the Inverse-Square Law to ensure wireless devices in close physical proximity can
securely communicate while more distant devices cannot recover the information
transmitted. Like Wanda, JamFi and works irrespective of device type or manu-
facturer and without additional hardware, complicated computation, or manual
configuration. Unlike Wanda, however, JamFi does not require the target device
to run special-purpose code to decode messages. The target simply receives JamFi
frames as it would from any other device.
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6
Future work
In this section we briefly describe some ideas for future work. One direction is to
apply our Wanda and JamFi techniques to a wearable device such as a watch or
bracelet. Another idea is to leverage some of our SNAP work to create a biometric
bracelet. We discuss both directions next.
6.1 Wanda or JamFi bracelet
We propose building a wearable version of Wanda and JamFi in bracelet form. We
would start with the simpler Wanda techniques because only one antenna transmits
at a time and it would be easier to confirm which antenna sent a frame versus the
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simultaneously transmitted signals from the data and jamming antennas in JamFi.
The bracelet would be intended to be worn by a single individual and would
be less likely to be shared between individuals than other devices like smart
phones [53]. Furthermore, the bracelet may be able to identify the wearer us-
ing biometric techniques such as those suggested by Cornelius et al. [22] or those
described below in Section 6.2. If the identity of the wearer were known, the bracelet
could then inform other nearby devices of the user’s identity using the techniques
described in Chapter 2 and 5.
A bracelet form factor could be useful to identify who is using a particular
device. In a multi-person home, for example, several people may use a particular
device such as a blood-pressure monitor. In some instances the user can be identified
based on the nature of the interaction – existing weight scales can infer from a
small population who is standing on the scale based on the weight of the person
(e.g., Dad weights much more than Mom who weighs much more than child),
but in many interactions simply using the device does not identify the user. The
blood-pressure monitor may not be able to accurately determine who is using the
device based on blood-pressure readings alone, but a bracelet could identify the
user and communicate with the blood-pressure monitor using our techniques to
annotate readings with the user’s identity. This annotation may help reduce medical
diagnosis errors based on improperly attributed health readings.
To work in bracelet form, two potential problems must be investigated. First,
there must be enough antenna separation (approximately one-half wavelength) on
the wrist to ensure enough difference in signal strength between the two antennas.
Second, we must evaluate the signal-occluding properties of the wrist to ensure
an adversary cannot receive a signal from only one antenna and compromise our
protocols as described in Sections 2.7 and 5.6.
174
Bracelet(side(view(
d(
r(r(
Antenna(1( Antenna(2(
Figure 6.1: Bracelet with antennas stationed d cm apart.
6.1.1 Antenna separation
For our techniques to work in bracelet form, there must be sufficient separation
between antennas so that the target device can differentiate between signals from
each of the antennas, but not so far that a distant adversary can do the same. We
imagine two antennas on top of the wrist as shown in Figure 6.1. Antennas A1
and A2 act the same as in Wanda, or antenna A1 could be the data antenna and
antenna A2 could be the jamming antenna in JamFi. We would like the antenna to
be separated by roughly 6.2 cm if using Wi-Fi’s 2.4 GHz band and roughly 3.1 cm if
using Wi-Fi’s 5 GHz band.
If the bracelet’s antennas are situated as shown in Figure 6.1, the maximum
distance between the antennas would be relative to the size of the wearer’s wrist and
is d+ 2r if the antennas do not extend beyond the wrist. The average circumference
of an adult woman’s wrist is 19.0 cm, and the average circumference of an adult
male’s wrist is 20.3 cm [131], but wrist sizes can vary significantly as shown in
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Circumference Antenna Circumference Antenna
Size Women Spread Men Spread
Small 16.5 6.4 17.8 6.9
Medium 19.0 7.3 20.3 7.9
Large 21.6 8.4 22.9 8.9
X-Large 24.1 9.3 25.4 9.8
Table 6.1: Wrist circumference and estimated antenna spread by gender. Numeric values in
cm [131].
Table 6.1.
Using these circumferences, we can estimate the antenna spread on each wrist
size. Assuming the bracelet has a semi-circular shape on the left and right side, as
shown in Figure 6.1, the total circumference C of the wrist is:
C = 2pir + 2d (6.1)
If we further assume a ratio R that captures the relationship between r and d, then
we can solve for d in Equation (6.1) by substituting Rd for r as:
C = 2piRd + 2d
= d(2piR + 2)
d = C/(2piR + 2).
(6.2)
Using R equal to 0.5 as a rough estimate (by looking at our own wrist) of the ratio
of the r to d, we can estimate the antenna spreads. Without extending beyond
the wrist, the maximum antenna spread estimates for both men and women are
given in Table 6.1. We see that even for small wrist sizes, there is a relatively large
expected spread between the antennas – larger than the 6.2 cm or 3.1 cm needed.
The antenna spreads given in Table 6.1 are the estimated maximum spread with the
antennas mounted on top of the wrist.
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Figure 6.2: An adversary located where one antenna is visible, but the other is occluded, may
be able to decode data intended for a legitimate device.
6.1.2 Wrist occlusion
One potential problem with a bracelet is the possibility that an adversary might
be located in a position where he could capture frames from one of the bracelet’s
antennas, but not both, or see a strong difference in RSSI because the wrist might
occlude one of the antenna’s signals. Figure 6.2 illustrates an adversary located in
such a position. In that case, as discussed in Sections 2.7 and 5.6, the adversary may
be able to decode the data.
A solution to this problem may be to add secondary transmitting antennas
on the opposite side of the bracelet as shown in Figure 6.3. By adding antennas
that transmit the same data as the primary antenna (e.g., Antenna 1 and Antenna 1’
each transmit the same data at the same time, Antenna 2 and Antenna 2’ behave
similarly), we may be able to solve the problem where an adversary can see the
transmissions from one antenna but not the other. In this case, every location
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Antenna&1& Antenna&2&
Target&
Device&
Adversary&
Bracelet&side&view&
Antenna&1’&Antenna&2’&
Figure 6.3: Adding antennas on the opposite side of the bracelet may solve the problem
where an adversary sees only one of the original two antennas.
around the wrist should have an unobstructed view of at least two antennas.
This area of investigation is predicated on the idea that the wrist effectively
blocks RF transmission, but we have not explored this yet. We will also need to
ensure that an adversary who can see three antennas (e.g., antenna 1 and 1’ plus
antenna 2, or antenna 2 and 2’ plus antenna 1) gets the same amplitude signal from
two antennas of the same type as it does from the single antenna of the opposite
type. If there were a signal amplitude difference, the adversary would be able to
identify which antenna sent each frame and could then decode the message.
6.2 Wi-Fi as biometric
Channel State Information has been recently used in a number of interesting ways.
For example, Xin et al. recently explored using CSI to biometrically identify individ-
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Bracelet(side(view(
Figure 6.4: Biometric identification from bracelet RF. Multiple transmitting antennas (top)
send a signal through the wrist where it is received by multiple receiving antennas (bottom).
The physiological make up of the individual’s wrist alters the signal while in flight, resulting in a
possibly unique CSI reading.
uals [133]. The idea is that each individual is made up of different amounts of blood,
fat, bone, and muscle. These physiological factors interact with a radio signal and
may result in different CSI measurements for each individual. Xin’s work was done
in a controlled setting, but we hypothesize that we could use related techniques to
identify a person wearing a bracelet.
We imagine a bracelet, similar to the one described above, but with Wi-Fi
transmitters along one side of the bracelet band and Wi-Fi receivers located on the
opposite side of the band as shown in Figure 6.4. In this configuration the Wi-Fi
antennas function as normal Wi-Fi antennas, sending and receiving data as done
on the Apple iWatch [6]. Those Wi-Fi signals are also received and analyzed as a
biometric, after the signal has traveled through the wrist, by the antennas located on
the opposite side of the band. Because each person’s wrist has a unique physiology,
the CSI of the signal should be different per individual.
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Using MIMO antennas could give multiple paths through the wrist as shown
in Figure 6.4. Here we see three transmitting antennas sending a signal to three
receiving antennas. Because the signal from each transmitting antenna is received
by all three receiving antennas, there are a total of nine paths through the wrist in
this configuration. Some of these paths will pass through or reflect off from blood,
fat, bone, and muscle differently than other paths. We hypothesize that, for reasons
similar to the work by Cornelius [22], the result should be a unique CSI signature
per individual. Unlike Cornelius, however, we do not require constant contact with
the skin, which is a limitation of that work.
Uniquely identifying an individual. Multiple paths through the wrist may allow
a system to uniquely identify the wearer better than the single path that would
result from a single transmitter and a single receiver. This information may not,
however, be accurate enough to identify a person from a large group, but may be
enough to identify a person from a small group such as a family.
Placement consistency. One issue that would need to be overcome is placement
consistency on the wrist. While wrists are relatively small, it is likely that there
will be some inconsistency in the physical location of the antennas each time the
bracelet is donned, and the position will likely change as the bracelet shifts position
during normal wear.
Near-field effects. Because wrists are relatively small, the antennas will be close
together. As noted in Chapter 4, near-field effects may cause problems with CSI
readings. In this case, CSI measurements will need to account for rapid changes
due to the rotating magnetic and electric fields. Pilot symbols, however, may be
able to help by providing a known transmit phase and amplitude.
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Attenuation. Finally, this approach assumes a Wi-Fi signal can pass through the
wrist. There is some medical data around signal penetration of human tissue, but
it is not clear if a Wi-Fi signal will attenuate to a level too low to be detected after
passing through the wrist. We conducted some preliminary tests, and were able
to receive a signal with micropatch antennas mounted on a bracelet similar to
Figure 6.4. It is unclear, however, if the radio signal passed through the wrist or
coupled around the wrist. More experimentation is needed.
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7
Summary
Like many others, we foresee IoT-type connected devices moving into our daily
lives in large numbers. We envision that these devices will gather and share data
about us, and some of that data will have privacy or security implications. Securing
billions of these devices and the sensitive information they will hold will be difficult.
Devices will need to be configured for their local environment, must be managed
to stay properly configured as the environment changes, and because they may
encounter dozens of unfamiliar devices each day, devices will need a way to securely
communicate. We have developed three specific and related solutions to help deal
with the impending arrival of billions of these IoT devices.
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7.1 Approach
At a high level, we adopt the approach advocated by Balfantz and others [10] where
we rely on users to demonstratively identify devices with which to interact. In our
case, we rely on users to expressly bring specific devices in close physical proximity.
Once in proximity, we rely on location-limited channels to transfer data between
proximate devices. We do not require devices to have already been introduced nor
even that they mutually trust a common third party such as a certificate authority.
Our techniques can be used to impart configuration information (such as the SSID
and password of a Wi-Fi access point) onto a device, can be used to ensure the
information came from a nearby device and not a distant imposter, and can facilitate
secure short-range communications.
7.2 Wanda
Our first solution, called Wanda, is designed to help ease the burden of introducing
devices into new environments. It uses a two-antenna hardware device called
the Wand and a novel radio signal strength communication technique to impart
data onto new devices. In addition to academic acceptance at INFOCOM [88] and
a demo at MobiSys [87], Wanda’s approach has been favorably reported in the
popular press, receiving coverage in over 200 newspapers, radio, and television
stations including: the New York Times, Washington Post, NPR, and an invitation
to appear on the TBS television show, America’s Greatest Makers.
Wanda makes the following five contributions:
1. a consistent, fast, easy, and secure method to impart any kind of information
onto commodity wireless devices, regardless of device type or manufacturer,
without hardware modifications to the device;
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2. protocols for imparting information onto new devices (such as a Wi-Fi SSID
and password), introducing two devices so they can establish a secure and
user-intended connection, and imparting cloud identity and credentials into a
new device;
3. a prototype implementation and experimental evaluation;
4. a security analysis of the system; and
5. the results of a 36-person user study.
While Wanda has been favorably received, it has specific short-comings that
we address in our other work. With Wanda, the single-antenna target device has no
way on its own to determine if it is in close physical proximity with the Wand. As
discussed in Chapter 2, the Wand can use its two antennas to independently mea-
sure signal strength to determine proximity with the target device. A single-antenna
target device, however, cannot use the same two-antenna technique. Because radio
waves are invisible, it could be the case that an adversary located more than about
9 cm away from the target device modulates its power in an attempt to mimic
the Wand and trick the single-antenna target into accepting a malicious payload.
Wanda defends against this attack by listening for rogue Message frames that the
Wand did not send and calling a halt to the data transfer if the Wand detects one
of those frames. It would better, however, if the target device had its own way of
determining whether a signal originated nearby, rather than relying on the Wand’s
vigilance.
7.3 SNAP
Our second solution addresses the proximity detection problem for single-antenna
devices. Called SNAP: SiNgle Antenna Proximity, our method uses the repeating
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nature of Wi-Fi physical layer preambles and changes caused by a signal in the
near-field region of a transmitter to reliably determine when devices are closer than
roughly 9 cm. As discussed in Chapter 4, other researchers have used the preamble
to hide a few indicator bits, but our work is the first to use the preamble and the
near field to determine proximity. With SNAP, the single-antenna device no longer
needs to rely on the Wand for proximity detection and can reject malicious frames
on its own.
We focused our testing on dipole and micropatch antennas because they are
the most common antennas used in consumer electronics, but there are a myriad
of other types of antennas we have not yet tested. We believe, however, that our
work outlined in this thesis is a starting point and opens an important new area of
research that warrants further investigation.
SNAP makes the following contributions:
1. a novel method for a single-antenna device to quickly determine when it is in
close proximity with a transmitting device;
2. a reference Wi-Fi implementation that performs the same frame decoding
steps any Wi-Fi device must perform; and
3. an experimental evaluation of the technique using several popular types of
antennas.
7.4 JamFi
Our third solution, JamFi, uses friendly jamming with MIMO antennas and lever-
ages the Inverse-Square Law to ensure data is transferred securely between nearby
devices. Wanda was also aimed at secure data transfer between nearby devices, but
requires the target device to run a small amount of code to interpret the message
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sent by the Wand. JamFi does not require the target device to run additional code,
or even be aware that JamFi’s technique is being used by the sender. With JamFi, the target
simply receives Wi-Fi frames as it normally does with any other sender.
We presented a preliminary version of JamFi at the S3 Workshop at Mobi-
Com 2017, and showed that JamFi’s jamming cover enables a nearby device to
receive a data signal despite the presence of jamming that thwarts more distant
adversaries [90]. In this thesis we present a more fully evaluated version of JamFi
and tested its technique with several unmodified commercial-off-the-shelf Wi-Fi
receivers. We found those receivers were able to recover BPSK 1/2 signals with high
probability when devices were located roughly 5 cm apart. Additionally, because it
can use the entire data-carrying capacity of a Wi-Fi frame, rather than just sending
one bit per frame, we show that JamFi is up to 18,000 times faster than Wanda. This
could create new opportunities to securely send large amounts of data.
JamFi makes the following contributions:
1. a consistent, fast, easy, and secure method to transfer any kind of information
between commodity wireless devices, regardless of device type or manufac-
turer, without hardware modifications to the devices;
2. a theoretical analysis of jamming at close range to facilitate data transfer; and
3. an experimental evaluation using several different commercial off-the-shelf
Wi-Fi receivers.
7.5 Conclusion
The promise of the Internet-of-Things is intriguing, but the challenges are many. We
are skeptical that current approaches such as a smartphone application for each type
of device will scale and we expect those approaches will quickly become impractical
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when there are billions of IoT devices to configure, manage, and secure. We believe,
however, that our three related solutions offer a secure path forward.
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A
Wanda Appendix
A.1 RSSI Ratio in the near field
In Chapter 2 we model the received power on each of the Wand’s two antennas
using the RSSI Ratio derived from the log-normal shadow model. This model
is appropriate when antennas are in the far field, but not when antennas are in
the near field. Here we show that, even though the predicted received power is
different in the near field from the far field, the RSSI Ratio is the same in both fields.
As noted in Chapter 5, Balanis gives an approximation of the average power
for a thin-wire (radius r  l) finite-length dipole that is valid everywhere except on
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the surface of the antenna [9]:
Wav = η
|I0|2
8pi2d2
cos
(
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2 cosθ
)
− cos
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kl
2
)
sinθ
2 (A.1)
where η = 120pi is the intrinsic impedance of free space, I0 is the current applied
to the transmitter, k = 2pi/λ is the wavenumber, l is the length of the transmitting
antenna, d is the distance from the transmitting antenna, and θ is the vertical angle
between the transmitter and receiver (below we assume θ = pi/4).
For notational simplicity let ρ represent Equation (A.1) without the distance d
between antennas
ρ = η
|I0|2
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)
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)
sinθ
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Together with distance d, Equation (A.1) can be reconstructed as:
Wav =
ρ
d2
. (A.3)
We can convert Equation (A.3) into the decibel scale as follows:
Wdecibel = 10 log10(
ρ
d2
). (A.4)
Assuming identical antennas on the Wand, the power, P, captured by each
antenna in dBm will be proportional to Equation (A.4), after accounting for antenna
gain and any loss in the receiver. We now calculate the RSSI Ratio between antenna
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A1 at distance d1 and antenna A2 at distance d2 as:
P1 − P2 = 10 log10(
ρ
d21
)− 10 log10(
ρ
d22
)
= 10 log10(ρ)− 10 log10(d21)− 10 log10(ρ) + 10 log10(d22)
= −20 log10(d1) + 20 log10(d2)
= −20 log10(
d1
d2
).
(A.5)
In free space α = 2. We see that Equation (A.5) is the same as Equation (2.6)
with α = 2, suggesting the RSSI Ratio is the same in the near field and the far field.
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A.2 Wanda user study participant comments
As part of the 36-person Wanda user study, we asked participants for general
comments on using Wanda versus methods they had previously used to configure
devices. Their answers are shown in the following table.
# Comment
1. Very easy to use.
2. Very easy to use. I got it right away.
3. Straight forward.
4. Seems clear, easy to use, very satisfactory experience.
5. Very easy, with the written instructions.
6. Easy as pie.
7. Very simple, explains itself, which is a good thing, I’m not very good
when it comes to computers.
8. I’m excited because it is easy, it feels magic. I love the concept because
my goal is not to connect the device, my goal is to use the device.
9. More intuitive and simpler than the normal way. I like that I don’t have to
type in my password.
10. Why can’t everything be that easy? Can I take it home?
11. This is pretty cool. It’s super easy compared with how I normally use my
password, which is not easy to remember. I am surprised more devices
aren’t this simple to use.
12. I would not trust it. I would worry that my information would be
compromised. This would be less safe than entering the password myself.
I had identity theft once on my computer, so I’m very careful now.
13. Seems a lot easier to me. I can’t see any downside or hang ups to
trip people up that aren’t computer savvy.
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14. Makes it thoughtless to use. Very nice.
15. This is much easier and much simpler. I feel like anybody could do this.
16. 100% of people could do this, even the somewhat mentally impaired could
probably do it.
17. If life was that easy I’d be extremely happy!
18. Super easy and intuitive. I would trust my grandmother with this.
19. I think it is quicker and simpler than traditional methods.
20. Really simple. I don’t have a very steady hand, but it managed to connect.
That’s pretty impressive. It was fast and I don’t have to think of an app.
21. This was much easier. It was seamless and fun.
22. Easier, less complicated.
23. I would prefer to connect through this method. This is much less
complicated and the same every time. My grandfather could do this, he
could not otherwise.
24. It was great. It seems like it would need a universal docking port.
Completely usable as it is though.
25. This is so straightforward; it’s perfect.
26. This goes beyond medical devices, this would be a great way to hook
up all kinds of things. A really good idea.
27. Let me know when this is on the market so I can get one.
28. Very easy to use. I thought it was pretty fun.
29. It’s easy, it’s good.
30. Simple and straightforward. Foolproof.
31. Pretty intuitive. The wand is an intuitive proxy between the router
and some device you’d like to connect with it.
32. Super easy to use. I could do it, my Mom could as well.
33. Wanda is a much simpler and much more likely to be used.
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34. It would be very easy for older people.
35. I love it! Its easy and fun to use. When can I get one?
36. I’m looking forward to this being on the market. It’s so easy and quick.
Table A.1: Study participant comments.
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B
SNAP Appendix
B.1 Distribution of preamble errors by antenna type
The distribution of Ej for 1,000 Wi-Fi frames sent at distances from 2 cm to 3 m is
shown by antenna type in Figure B.1, Figure B.2, Figure B.3, and Figure B.4 for a
half-wavelength, quarter-wavelength, micropatch, and Panda USB adapter.
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Figure B.1: Distribution of sum of phase differences for a half-wavelength antenna. Sum of
differences of phase and amplitude between T1 and T2 in the Long Training Field portion of
the Wi-Fi preamble over 64 subcarriers as calculated by Equation (4.15). Results are from
1,000 Wi-Fi frames transmitted at each distance. The red line indicates the median value,
the box indicates the 75th and 25th percentile, and the whiskers indicate the maximum and
minimum value.
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Figure B.2: Distribution of sum of phase differences for a quarter-wavelength antenna. Sum
of differences of phase and amplitude between T1 and T2 in the Long Training Field portion
of the Wi-Fi preamble over 64 subcarriers as calculated by Equation (4.15). Results are from
1,000 Wi-Fi frames transmitted at each distance. The red line indicates the median value,
the box indicates the 75th and 25th percentile, and the whiskers indicate the maximum and
minimum value.
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Figure B.3: Distribution of sum of phase differences for a micropatch antenna. Sum of dif-
ferences of phase and amplitude between T1 and T2 in the Long Training Field portion of the
Wi-Fi preamble over 64 subcarriers as calculated by Equation (4.15). Results are from 1,000
Wi-Fi frames transmitted at each distance. The red line indicates the median value, the box
indicates the 75th and 25th percentile, and the whiskers indicate the maximum and minimum
value.
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Figure B.4: Distribution of sum of phase differences for a Panda Ultra Wireless N USB
adapter. Sum of differences of phase and amplitude between T1 and T2 in the Long Train-
ing Field portion of the Wi-Fi preamble over 64 subcarriers as calculated by Equation (4.15).
Results are from 1,000 Wi-Fi frames transmitted at each distance. The red line indicates the
median value, the box indicates the 75th and 25th percentile, and the whiskers indicate the
maximum and minimum value.
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B.2 Likelihood of detecting proximity by antenna, dis-
tance, and threshold
The likelihood of declaring proximity based on a Monte Carlo simulation of measure
preamble differences and tranmiting antenna type and thresholds are shown in
Figures B.5 – B.16 for a half-wavelength, quarter-wavelength, micropatch, and
Panda Ultra N Wireless USB adapter.
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Figure B.5: Likelihood of declaring proximity at various distances with a half-wavelength
antenna and τ = 0.15.
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Figure B.6: Likelihood of declaring proximity at various distances with a half-wavelength
antenna and τ = 0.2.
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Figure B.7: Likelihood of declaring proximity at various distances with a half-wavelength
antenna and τ = 0.25.
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Figure B.8: Likelihood of declaring proximity at various distances with a quarter-wavelength
antenna and τ = 0.15.
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Figure B.9: Likelihood of declaring proximity at various distances with a quarter-wavelength
antenna and τ = 0.2.
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Figure B.10: Likelihood of declaring proximity at various distances with a quarter-wavelength
antenna and τ = 0.25.
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Figure B.11: Likelihood of declaring proximity at various distances with a micropatch antenna
and τ = 0.15.
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Figure B.12: Likelihood of declaring proximity at various distances with a micropatch antenna
and τ = 0.2.
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Figure B.13: Likelihood of declaring proximity at various distances with a micropatch antenna
and τ = 0.25.
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Figure B.14: Likelihood of declaring proximity at various distances with a Panda Ultra N
Wireless USB antenna and τ = 0.15.
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Figure B.15: Likelihood of declaring proximity at various distances with a Panda Ultra N
Wireless USB antenna and τ = 0.2.
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Figure B.16: Likelihood of declaring proximity at various distances with a Panda Ultra N
Wireless USB antenna and τ = 0.25.
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C
JamFi Appendix
This appendix provides the Frame Reception Ratio for each of the Panda, Alfa, Intel,
and Edimax adapters tested in Chapter 5 with jamming, with Pj = 4 dBm and with
Pj = 8 dBm.
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Figure C.1: Panda FRR with no jamming.
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Figure C.2: Panda FRR with Pj = 4 dBm.
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Figure C.3: Panda FRR with Pj = 8 dBm.
215
C.2 Alfa
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Figure C.4: Alfa FRR with no jamming.
216
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Distance (cm)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
FR
R
Alfa
Pj = 4 dBm
BPSK 3/4
QPSK 1/2
QPSK 3/4
16QAM 1/2
16QAM 3/4
64QAM 2/3
64QAM 3/4
Figure C.5: Alfa FRR with Pj = 4 dBm.
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Figure C.6: Alfa FRR with Pj = 8 dBm.
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C.3 Intel
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Figure C.7: Intel FRR with no jamming.
219
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Distance (cm)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
FR
R
Intel
Pj = 4 dBm
BPSK 3/4
QPSK 1/2
QPSK 3/4
16QAM 1/2
16QAM 3/4
64QAM 2/3
64QAM 3/4
Figure C.8: Intel FRR with Pj = 4 dBm.
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Figure C.9: Intel FRR with Pj = 8 dBm.
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Figure C.10: Edimax FRR with no jamming.
222
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Distance (cm)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
FR
R
Edimax
Pj = 4 dBm
BPSK 3/4
QPSK 1/2
QPSK 3/4
16QAM 1/2
16QAM 3/4
64QAM 2/3
64QAM 3/4
Figure C.11: Edimax FRR with Pj = 4 dBm.
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Figure C.12: Edimax FRR with Pj = 8 dBm.
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